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What Safeguards are Necessary to Guarantee Political Liberty as Non-Domination?

Thomas Stewart Blenkinsop

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for award
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy
School of Arts
Wordcount: 80844

Abstract

Liberty has traditionally been conceived of as an important and social good, and indeed the prime moral good, by liberal and libertarian thinkers. This thesis argues that the traditional conception of political liberty in the negative sense – freedom from interference – is insufficient as an explanation, and political liberty should instead be conceived of as freedom from domination, as espoused by republican thinkers, especially Philip Pettit. However, it is further argued that non-domination requires additional conceptual and practical support, by the republicans' own logic, than has traditionally been extended. Most critically, a critique is advanced based on the additions of alienation and structural domination as key republican concepts. This critique argues that corporate power, and the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few, drastically undermines republican freedom, and must be combated via regulation and economic reform, which the thesis refers to as “strict material equality”, in contrast to Pettit’s “loose material equality” and “expressive egalitarianism”. The form this regulation and reform might take is considered in detail before the thesis presents a potential solution based on a form of democratic socialism which makes use of social recognition, socialisation, and controlled voluntary exchange in the model Joseph Carens presents in his book “Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market”. The remainder of the thesis is devoted to explicating and defending a republican take on his “egalitarian system”, and defending his socialisation process, explicit utopianism, and the socialist elements which the thesis invokes to explain problems of alienation and corporate power.

Dedication and Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Seiriol Morgan & Dr Chris Bertram, for their enormous assistance, advice and contributions. I would also like to thank Dr Megan Blomfeld, Dr Joanna Burch-Brown, and Professor Havi Carel for their assistance, advice, and constructive criticism. I would like to thank my examiners, Dr Alan Wilson and Dr Cillian McBride, for their many insightful criticisms and the opportunity to improve and extensively adjust my work. I would also like to thank the library staff of the Arts and Social Sciences library, primarily for their enormous patience. I would also like to thank friends and family for their support and general patience.

For Gil Barrow, who always deserved more than he was given.

Author's Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: T S Blenkinsop DATE: 30/09/2019

Contents

10

24

24

34

48

60

60

72

78

103

110

110

119

128

140

152

152

166

169

185

194

194

208

230

238

238

252

263

276

278

Introduction to the Thesis

The goal of this thesis is to question the safeguards necessary for the protection of political liberty (as opposed to liberty of metaphysical will, for example), arguing that those commonly envisaged are insufficient. It will undertake this via two methods.

First, it will be argued that the conceptions of liberty commonly adopted by modern libertarians, liberals, and egalitarians – frequently drawing upon what Berlin calls the “negative” conception of liberty, freedom from obstruction – are inadequate. The most important reasons are both articulated neatly by the neo-republican philosophy of Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner, and others (Dagger 2011, 708-709). Traditional arguments of this conception of liberty generally rely upon direct imposition, obstruction or the plausible presence thereof. Republican theorists, however, assign greater importance to the unequal social positioning that allows for such impositions. In plainer terms, the republican conception of freedom argues that one is unfree when one is in a position to be interfered with, even if no interference actually takes place (Pettit 2012, 66). An individual is therefore un-free whenever they are subservient to another. If subservient, they will not be able to defend themselves properly, nor achieve recourse, from potential interference. Freedom consists in the absence of domination, not merely interference.

The second major argument of the thesis is that many republican theorists underestimate the resources required for protection, although they¹ claim that their theories allow for a more robust justification than that of their rivals. Further, drawing on the work of Schuppert, the thesis argues that absent a strict material equality, to be supported by social recognition responsive to republican-

¹ Primarily Pettit, but Lovett and Maynor also cite the justification of common resources and narrow distributions of wealth on reference to freedom alone. Pettit cites this as a philosophical strength of his theory, as negative libertarians must bring in concepts like equality and (distributive) justice.

aligned social norms, irreparable socio-economic inequalities will create a society where the vast majority are dominated, despite the presence of institutional, democratic safeguards and personal security, insurance and insulation, as Pettit outlines in *Just Freedom*. While Pettit's requirements, if properly implemented, would aid in delaying or mitigating the harms involved, they would be equally affected by these inequalities, and there would be no guarantee of preventing the society from lapsing into one closely resembling modern day capitalism. This would be problematic, as despite the great economic good capitalism offers, it provides numerous opportunities for socio-economic inequality – thus feeding the cycle anew.

Having established this, the thesis will examine potential solutions. The thesis' preferred solution is a form of socialism which still makes use of markets and voluntary exchange, yet maintains strict material equality and a norm-friendly pattern of social recognition, based on the work of Joseph Carens. It bears repeating that this is not the only viable solution; a form of Rawlsian property-owning democracy merits serious consideration, especially supported by a universal basic income. A needs-based socialism which did not require the market to function might be superior, but the thesis could not find a viable way to outline such.

The thesis will devote the rest of the introduction to explaining both the terms used and its rationale for marking some of its philosophical divides, before outlining the content of its chapters. Berlin's dichotomy of positive and negative liberty is explained in chapter one; suffice to say here that the "liberal schools of thinking" (Pettit 2014, 23) mostly adhere to it. Of greater concern may be the patchwork coalition of opponents; a libertarian who demands the restriction of government, and an egalitarian who supports a generous welfare state, might be viewed as having diametrically opposed interests. And in many ways, this is true. Where the two converge, along with the classical liberalism of the 19th century – Mill, Spencer, and so on – and the left wing of modern American

political thought, commonly called liberal² is upon Berlin's great summary: 'What is the area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?'

The answer is exceedingly different within these traditions, let alone between them, but they all attend to this basic question. Skinner and Pettit mutually identify the split between republican and liberal as arising in the 18th century, shortly after Rousseau's writings. Rousseau himself is often considered a patron saint of republicans – that is, those who wish to create a constitutional republic. The modern republicans do not follow Rousseau, however; Pettit and Skinner hearken back to an earlier conception of republican theory, as espoused by Roman authors and Machiavelli, who was enamoured with the Roman tradition himself. For these new republicans, Rousseau's republicanism has serious flaws. For example, his requirement that political government should embody the general will (Pettit 1997, 233) is contrasted against the republican need for contestation, and he is labelled as unacceptably communitarian (Pettit 2012, 12-18). Pettit and Skinner thus lay claim to an "Italian-Atlantic" tradition, quoting figures such as John Milton and Algernon Sidney.

The liberal tradition described here thus contains those who would normally be regarded as bitter (philosophical) enemies – Cohen and Nozick, Nagel and Hayek, etc. For Pettit's part, he identifies liberalism with Bentham and Paley (Pettit 2012, 7-11). This may be thought of as incongruous, with very different political traditions aiming at different outcomes. But as noted by Cunliffe, many of the debates of libertarianism and liberalism from it are anchored in self-ownership and private property. As Cunliffe puts it: "On this (self-ownership), both right-libertarians and left-libertarians agree. There is a shared commitment to private property in internal resources...the second question (private property) concerns rights over external resources." It is this secondary debate, that of private property, that distinguishes liberal from libertarian. (Cunliffe 2000, 1). Defining the liberal-

egalitarian tradition strand is therefore the move away from (nearly) unlimited private property rights, that being right-libertarianism and classical liberalism, towards the left of the debate, that private property should be in many instances controlled and possibly even pooled. Republicanism stands on this side of the debate, as Pettit establishes quite clearly: unchecked material inequality ensures that individuals will have too much power over one another, and he thus opts for “expressive egalitarianism” of one kind or another.

It is worth noting that there have been suggestions that liberalism and republicanism should not be considered particularly divergent; Van Parijs describes republicanism as a “close relative” (Van Parijs 2017, 119) to liberalism. Both Kramer and Carter argue that non-domination is misguided in its attempts to diverge from negative liberty, not least because they view the question of potential interference as merely one of probabilities. The negative libertarian might well concede that potential interference, though it did not deprive one of liberty precisely, was still an area of great concern.

In the author’s view, this is misguided. Kramer and Carter’s critiques of non-domination are reviewed later in considerable detail, but the republican/liberal distinction is built on more than interference. In particular, while republican theorists have historically been in favour of both self-ownership and private property³, of greater concern has been their preoccupation with the free state (Bellamy 2011). The liberal-egalitarian tradition is certainly in favour of a democratic state that allows for great individual freedoms, but this is not the same thing. Skinner in particular emphasises that a colonial state, or one which is bought and sold by creditors⁴, is no longer in a position to guarantee the freedoms of its citizens. From this example, amongst others, one can easily distinguish the republican concern with the state and its apparatus as being far more extensive than

³ Though their approach is far closer to the liberal or left-libertarian approach; republicans dating back to Machiavelli have never been in favour of unlimited private property rights.

⁴ This is an inference on the author’s part, discussed in chapter three of the thesis, but it seems a plausible extension of Skinner’s arguments.

that of liberalism as a whole. Their requirements are much more exacting. This is a point of disagreement because of the republican concern with freedom, power etc as *relationships* – as opposed to a distinct status. On the liberal account, the freedom of a state itself should have no bearing on the freedom of the individuals within it, except insofar as its subjugation might cause their freedoms to be impinged.

Another area in which republicanism differs from liberalism is in its embracing of civic norms and virtues. According to Pettit, republicanism should embrace the prospect of using norms and beliefs as a technique to stabilise government and offer both a good society and a well-functioning political discourse. This is supported to an extent by the historical republican tradition, as Machiavelli writes for a great need of love of *patria* – and the fatherland – and *virtu*, though his use of this term is not the same as Pettit's use of civic virtue. *Virtu* is moral and political fortitude, divorced from the notions of the right and the good per se. For the liberal tradition, the question of inculcating and more importantly suppressing particular beliefs has normally met with a resounding denial, as typified by JS Mill's response: "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, had he the power, would be justified in silencing mankind." (Mill 1974, 76). Mill and Pettit are in agreement on the necessity of vibrant and unhindered political discourse, and republicans speak of the need of an active, contesting citizenry, fulfilling the ideal that a government should be afraid of its people, rather than vice versa. But the two traditions are apt to disagree bitterly on the neutrality of public discourse and government policy.

Where republicanism has carefully scrutinised government, the liberal egalitarian tradition has focused more upon private property and how a just distribution of resources might be constituted. While Pettit and other modern republicans (Lovett, RS Taylor, Gourevitch etc) have made great

strides in this area, Pettit's concerns with maximising freedom and letting the rest follow as a direct result have evoked numerous criticisms from republican and liberal scholars alike, which the thesis discusses in chapters two to four.

Republicanism might therefore be better served with a more egalitarian focus on resources, protections, and in particular, the prospect of systemic domination. Egalitarianism, making up the other strand of the liberal-egalitarian tradition, must be distinguished from liberalism, but also from socialism. All socialists are concerned with equality, of persons and resources (or at least access to resources), but not all egalitarians are socialists. Egalitarian philosophy of the modern day, supported by authors such as Dworkin, Rawls, Sen and Pogge, does not differ overly from liberalism in its political aspirations, but offers far more substantial economic change, depending on how its advocates view equality, or even what ought to be equal (Stanford, Egalitarianism). It is perhaps best to say that the distinction can become quite fuzzy.

As with liberalism, republicans and egalitarians have broad agreement on desirable outcomes with a few points of sharp divergence. Both desire a level of material equality, though Pettit makes no particular demands on how that equality should take shape beyond there being the guarantee of the "eyeball test" and some loose material equality, which places him closer to Rawls than say, Sen. Egalitarians and republicans likewise scorn the idea of "formal" freedom, and demand economic resources to supplement the political in order to assure effective political representation. Both are comfortable with strong democratic government, as opposed to the liberal tradition, which even when government might be effective remains wary of imposition.

The most critical difference between republican and egalitarian thinking rests on the extensiveness of their programmes. Pettit criticises what he considers radical egalitarian proposals, such as Rawls'

- who is by no means the most radical of egalitarians – as being unrealistic and unsustainable, instead suggesting his own array of policy proposals. Other republican authors, such as Taylor, see even less need for government control than Pettit does. This may be because egalitarians more easily accept and identify problems on the systemic level, such as the proposition of systemic domination. Even here, republicans like Gourevitch and Anderson allow for radical changes in capitalist organisation and hierarchy, and are discussed in chapter five. Overlap is not impossible.

A further kind of egalitarianism is also drawn upon in the thesis: social⁵ egalitarianism. Social egalitarianism is defined by David Axelsen as “the view according to which a just society is one in which people relate to each other as equals and are free from, for example, relationships of domination or oppression” (Axelsen & Bidandanure 2019, 336). Naturally, this has great resonance with republican thought, and there are overlapping cases such as Elizabeth Anderson (Anderson 1999, 287-337, Anderson 2015, 47). Further similarities can also be drawn via its focus on the relationship between people, and between people and the social, economic and political structures that surround them. Most concepts, such as freedom being threatened by subservience, are mutually intelligible. (Axelsen & Bidandanure 2019, 344-345, Schuppert 2015, 444-445).

But there are important differences as well, not only between more traditional egalitarian thought and social egalitarianism, but between social egalitarianism, republicanism, and socialism. Social egalitarianism questions if egalitarianism can be reducible to mere distributive fairness (Axelsen & Bidandanure 2019, 338-341); its conception of justice notably differs from Rawls’, who defines it as the “proper balance between competing claims” (Rawls 1971, 9) and Pettit’s, who follows Rawls in holding that social justice will be hold as competing claims by citizens are treated equally in their claims to freedom (Pettit 2014, 79-82). And while social egalitarianism seeks arbitration of inequalities that arise from class, race, etc, and of various kinds, of wealth, esteem, etc, ensuring

that only appropriate socio-economic relationships exist (Schuppert 2015 B, Ch5), social egalitarianism lacks a sustained analysis of democracy, of class interests and antagonisms, etc. In contrast to socialist thought, in particular Marxist thought, it also lacks an assessment of why these particular relationships exist and endure. Anderson, for example, focuses on the problem of “private government”, yet concentrates on a “workplace constitution” (Anderson 2015, 70) over reforming and addressing the system of capitalism as a whole. Much of the social egalitarian approach is palliative, despite Schuppert’s assessment that “the background institutions of society must indeed be designed in such a way so as to treat all members of society as equals.” (Schuppert 2015 B, Ch5).

This difference in focus could be considered problematic for the thesis, which concentrates primarily on corporate power in terms of economic distribution; not in the sense that the economic distribution is unjust, although it is, but because that economic distribution allows for the distortion of freedom and because private control of the means of production is clearly allowing for enormous power and political influence in the hands of a few, distorting democracy altogether. Yet, such distribution (and the accumulated power it permits, following the Marxist account in chapter three, to be outlined shortly) is no less harmful from the perspective of social relationships. And while, as will be conceded, the thesis does not address the problem of inequalities of this kind altogether, the elimination of those arising out of inequalities of wealth, of which there are many, should presumably be a worthwhile endeavour. It should also be noted that an unjust distribution of resources may create inequalities of recognition in its own right.

A small point: the thesis’ particular focus on Schuppert is for two reasons. Firstly, because of his use of an account of alienation and structural domination which – though incomplete, as the thesis will argue – offers an excellent amendment to republican considerations of autonomy. Secondly, because he engages with Pettit, one of the thesis’ main sources, in a thorough and exacting manner.

As the thesis relies upon Pettit's conception of non-domination as a foundation, Schuppert's arguments are useful for moving beyond Pettit, and towards a broader, more egalitarian form of republicanism.

The thesis' focus and foundation using Pettit does not mean that his theorising is perfect or as comprehensive as it could be. Three critiques will be offered against Pettit, drawing first upon a social egalitarian account of alienation and systemic domination, followed by a Marxist account of class and exploitation, which in turn helps establish a last critique of his account of corporate power, necessitating far more safeguards and government oversight – and even ownership – of the economy than he countenances.

Alienation is best established as a threat to autonomy and free agency, what Pettit establishes as discursive control (Pettit 2001, 70). Pettit does not, however, support a particular view on alienation, nor does he establish discursive control as an ideal to be politically obtained. The thesis disputes this by reference to an egalitarian critique, and argues that Pettit underestimates both the value of autonomy and the harm of alienation. It is worth noting that the thesis discusses two types of alienation, Schuppertian and Marxist. These frequently intersect, and one reinforces the other often, but they are distinct and should be treated as such.

Systemic domination, which could also be called structural domination, is more wide-ranging than personal domination; it is harder to identify and dissect, which may be why Pettit gives it very little detail (Pettit 2014, 53-54). Systemic domination not only arises when an individual is dominated by a group, of whom no particular member is dominating but as a whole, the group ensures their place is a subordinate one; it may also occur when one is subordinate to or dominated by an entire systemic function. An example of both would be the South African apartheid – while non-white

individuals were often personally dominated as well, a combination of laws and social norms ensured that a black individual could not freely speak their mind, or succeed against the wishes of the white, privileged minority.

The very basis of group identity may cause systemic domination. This is best demonstrated by the existence of economic classes. Under Marxist theory, society is essentially divided by the ownership of private property⁶, between the proletariat – who have little – and the bourgeoisie – who have far too much. On this account again, any individual member of the proletariat may not be personally dominated, and – unlike the South African example – may have the ability to speak their mind as they see fit, rise and succeed, etc. But the unequal power relation persists on a group basis; the voice of the proletariat is muted, even inconsequential, and their ability to dispute the bourgeois' power is limited. This is discussed in further detail in chapters three and five, but presents – if accurate – a serious concern to republican theory, because it implies that the requirements Pettit sets for a healthy and legitimate democratic state are in practice unachievable when such classes persist.

Marxist theory, and its later defenders and intellectual descendants – Cohen, Gramsci, and so on – thus help to explicate such class antagonisms and compensate for the lack of republican theorising on the topic. More detailed policy such as that of modern egalitarians – and those who refer to themselves as “social egalitarians”, splitting the difference, such as Schuppert – is also helpful in giving greater support to Pettit's theorising. This leads the thesis towards differing solutions. Pettit lists a number of policies and general principles in terms of a just distribution compatible with maximising republican freedoms and effectively giving the resources for freedom and political influence alike. But precisely because Pettit under-theorises systemic domination and

6 Used here in the Marxist terminology, where private property means land, capital, industrial equipment, etc – what is often called the “means of production” (<https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/m/e.htm#means-production>). Even in Marx's own time, workers would own some small necessities, and the working class Briton of today is far better off than their counterpart of the 19th century. This is contrasted with the ownership of goods, commodities, and items of sentimental value, called personal property.

underestimates the potential threats of material inequality⁷, these policies are inadequate, especially when it comes to addressing corporate power. As the thesis will demonstrate, corporate power is not responsive to the tools Pettit suggests – public opinion and legal accountability – in modern capitalism, and there is little to suggest this will change without significant, revolutionary adjustments to the global economic system.

That being the case, there are various revolutionary changes one might propose. The thesis concentrates on two major ideological and organisational proposals, along with more minor organisational principles that might supplement them, such as universal basic income. The first, and the thesis' preferred solution, is a form of socialism. Socialism is here defined as any system where the ultimate ownership of private property rests in the hands of society. This allows for many forms of organisation that could be called socialism, in a wide assortment of theories and extremes. For example, both a Marxist-Leninist command economy and a communal, collectivist group like the kibbutzim (Wikipedia, Kibbutz) could rightfully be called socialist, even though they differ substantially. The thesis' preferred solution is a form of market socialism patterned on the work of Joseph Caren, which maintains the market as a mode of organisation, but equally splits all non-invested profits among the society as a whole, for consumption purposes.

The other viable alternative the thesis considers is some form of capital redistribution in the vein of Rawls' works, maintaining some inequality at the benefit of a potentially more effective and efficient economy, as well as averting socialism's strong dependence on the state, which is explicitly problematic for republican thought (Pettit 2012, 218; Pettit 2014, 77). This would instead disperse capital widely throughout the society, rather than the current concentration of wealth and investment at the top. This would not only have positive effects economically, but also politically,

⁷ It is worth noting that Pettit supports "expressive egalitarianism" and a "loose material equality". It is not that Pettit is unaware of inequality's dangers, nor does he support it; much of his concern seems based on practicality (Pettit 2014, 82-83, McBride 2015, 360.)

as it would provide both stability and a democratic voice (Rawls 1973, 270-274, Rawls 2001, 136-140).

It might be noted that both of these follow suggestions of Rawls in the first place, as he accepts a kind of “liberal socialism” (Rawls 2001, 136-139, 150, 178). But he gives such little detail to it, adopting such reticence, that the thesis must look elsewhere to determine how such a state would look. Not coincidentally, many socialist theorists – notably Cohen and Roemer, though for distinctly different reasons – have taken umbrage with Rawls’ theories. Therefore, the thesis draws a distinction between the two, even though a socialist state based on Rawlsian principles is eminently possible. It should also be noted that neither is proposed as a perfect, perpetual solution. Both do represent substantial improvements on current capitalist practice, but the thesis’ preferred solution would have difficulties in implementation – instability is likely – and would maintain inequalities of a social, rather than political or economic, kind. This does not mean it is not worthwhile.

As for more minor organisational principles, the first would be some form of universal basic income. While the thesis’ preferred solution incorporates this, not all forms of socialism do, nor does property- owning democracy by necessity. There are numerous reasons to endorse such a programme, which the thesis discusses in detail. The second organisational principle the thesis discusses is that of workplace republicanism or workplace democracy – various authors have argued that the proper solution for economic inequality entails a change not in greater economic organisation, but in basic firm organisation and the workplace (Anderson 2017, 61-71, Breen 2017, 430-438). These are best viewed as an addition to reforming the system as a whole; while the latter maintain a focus on the conditions within any given system, they would harmonise well with either of the above approaches.

For clarity, the structure of the chapters is as follows. In the first chapter, negative and positive liberty are further defined and discussed, followed by an explanation for republican freedom, which is then defended against a critique from the liberal-egalitarian perspective. In the second chapter, Pettit's requirements and resources for liberty are discussed in greater detail, before moving on to the ways in which his theory is limited – his inability to properly account properly for systemic domination, following Schuppert and Marxist critique. His decision to focus on a “broadly consequentialist” account of freedom is also discussed. The third chapter outlines how the inequalities created by capitalism undermine the pursuit of freedom and lead to both personal and structural domination, as well as the loss – or hollowing out – of Pettit's democratic resources, in a corrosive fashion. It also objects to libertarian arguments that markets preserve freedom in any way whatsoever; although a market may aid in preserving individuals from domination by a government monopoly, it allows for other – and frequently as severe – forms of domination.

Chapter four thus turns towards potential solutions to the problem of corporate domination, inequality and power. It primarily concentrates on Rawls' proposed solutions, via the principle of maximising the gains of the least advantaged, via a form of property-owning democracy (or POD). While Rawls' solutions are unquestionably superior to the present economic organisation of much of the world today, or even what Rawls calls “welfare state capitalism”, e.g.: a strong social democracy such as Denmark or Norway, Rawls fails adequately to adequately address the problems of systemic domination as well. In part, this is because of a focus on procedure, rather than interfering on behalf of individuals or groups despite it producing a sub-optimal outcome societally⁶. Further criticism of POD leads the thesis to consider socialism, but a command economy socialism as envisaged by Marxist theory lacks practical and political support. Instead, a market-based socialism which still supports Pettit's democratic requirements is argued as being

both practically achievable and better at supporting the strict material equality necessary for freedom to be accomplished. One concern that remains is alienation in the Marxist sense, which can be limited but may persist nonetheless, absent changes which cannot be guaranteed.

The specific form of such socialism is drawn from the work of Joseph Carens, which chapters five and six focus on, first to illustrate his theories and then to answer potential critics. Due to his heavy reliance on motivational arguments, socialisation of proper norms and his unwillingness to explain how his theories could be practically be addressed, all these potential avenues of concern are answered. This being done, there is a brief discussion on civic virtue, both to explain its role as supplementing republican theory and to indicate other areas where Carens' socialisation could be of considerable use to republicanism. The last chapter ends by considering the tensions between the avowed utopian character of Carens' theories, and the realism and practical implementations that Pettit, and to a lesser extent Marx, demand.

Why end on this point? Primarily because the distinction of utopian and realist theory, which can be defined by utopians seeking to establish a grand change in human behaviour and politics, while realists focuses on the immediately possible, consider the fragmented state of human politics to be constant, and do not seek a change to human character (Nicholson 1998, 66-69). Republicanism and indeed political philosophy is, to Pettit, characterised by modest and traditional ambitions (Pettit 1997, 2-3, 11-12). It is thus fitting to establish if the thesis' solution has stepped beyond republican goals through such socialisation.

Chapter One

Section One: Positive and Negative Freedom to Non-Domination

We begin with Berlin. Berlin defines two “senses” of freedom (or liberty, which he uses interchangeably) as follows: ““What is the area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?”” & ““What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?”” He defines these as negative and positive liberty respectively (Berlin 1969, 121-122).

It is important at this point to establish the distinction between concepts and conceptions, as Rawls does in a Theory of Justice. He argues that they are not the same thing; a concept may be contested but we may still agree on its meaning. Justice, for example, being ““the role of its principles in assigning rights and duties and in defining the appropriate division of social advantages””. But a conception of justice “is an interpretation of this role” (Rawls 1973, 7-10). Most would agree that a just society is worthwhile, but there is controversy over how justice is to be enacted and measured. The thesis will accept Rawls’ concept/conception distinction.

Berlin, however, articulates two very different approaches to freedom. They “are not two different interpretations of a single concept, but two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life...each of them makes absolute claims. These claims cannot both be fully satisfied” (Berlin 1969, 166). Negative liberty makes a claim for the limitation of oversight, especially government oversight, to a minimum; it has a deep distaste for any imposition on freedom, and posits that transgressions in this vein are rarely justifiable (Berlin 1969, 122-131). Thus, any imposition is a dangerous one, no matter the kind, although one may be justified by dint of some

other good – justice or equality, for instance. It could also be justified to prevent a far greater loss of liberty (Berlin 1969, 169-172).

Positive liberty, in contrast, claims the necessity of the individual “to be his own master”, to operate on terms without being beholden to others. This gives a much broader view than negative liberty of what can be imposed and justified does (Berlin 1969, 131-144). Yet it is precisely this broader view on which Berlin is deeply sceptical. It is vulnerable to two major problems, in his opinion. First, it is very easy to assume that someone is subjected to restraints or impediments, even of the mind, which must be removed for full freedom to blossom. Yet this could be coercive: it is one thing to say that this coercion or obstruction of liberty, for example, a prohibition on violent action, permits greater liberty, and quite another to say that “I have willed it, whether I know this or not, and am free (or ‘truly free’) even while my poor earthly body and foolish mind bitterly reject it” (Berlin 1969, 132-134), leading to an unpleasantly coercive paternalism.

The second vulnerability is that positive freedom can take a form whereby “some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realized” (Berlin 1969, 169), and this is “demonstrably false”. Berlin later writes of the “freedom to choose ends without claiming eternal validity for them” (Berlin 1969, 172), and it is precisely this which is at stake. Positive freedom can become too constraining when the range of actions we may justifiably undertake is reduced to a handful at most.

Berlin need not be accepted uncritically. Neither vulnerability is a necessary component of positive freedom, merely a likelihood. Conceivably, one could devise a kind of positive freedom to which the objections did not apply. Negative liberty may, by contrast, be viewed as too ungenerous, as

simple lack of interference may still result in a life where this freedom is merely formal, accomplishing nothing.

If Berlin's dichotomy is accepted, then the thesis may argue for a conception of positive freedom to which his criticisms do not apply, or instead argue for a specific conception of negative liberty that is superior to other conceptions thereof. If his dichotomy is rejected outright, we would need to specify a new concept of freedom, and our conception thereof. Only once this is done can the thesis discuss what is necessary for an individual to be free.

The thesis will argue that Berlin's view is incorrect, for two main reasons. Firstly, Berlin's position is overly narrow. Some of the views he takes to be positive (Marx, for instance), have been re-argued in a manner fitting negative liberty (Cohen 2011, 153-165). Indeed, there have been arguments to the effect that *all* conceptions of liberty are inherently negative, or at least that the distinction between positive and negative is meaningless (Nelson 2005, 58-78). It is also plausible for a conception of freedom to demand an unobstructed will as well as unobstructed action. The two concepts may remain distinct, but some elements of both become necessary for a fully-fledged theory of freedom to be intelligible. Such a view is advanced by Philip Pettit, who will be discussed at some length shortly.

Secondly, Berlin's dichotomy fails to capture an important element of freedom. Although claiming to be concerned with political freedom, he gives little indication of what constitutes a free state, or a free populace – the freedom of the collective. Arguably, this is up to each individual conception to determine, but the idea that individuals could be given an exceedingly large area of activity (or be subjected to very few controls or dictates, for positive liberty) and yet as a whole populace be unable to affect meaningful political change remains curiously absent. It may be possible, as Berlin

concedes, to raise the freedom of all by denying certain freedoms, but this says little about how we might determine the freedom of a group *as a whole*. Each of its members may have extensive individual liberties, while the group is constantly obstructed or dictated to by those outside and above it. Whether members of the group are free or not is unclear by reference to the concepts (and conceptions thereof) alone.

Happily, Pettit's theory of freedom offers an answer to both criticisms. In his work, *A Theory of Freedom*, Pettit advances a political ideal of liberty in terms of non-domination, as opposed to non-interference or non-limitation. He begins by asking the question: what is freedom? He concludes swiftly that freedom is "fitness to be held responsible" (Pettit 2001, 6-25). Such an answer seems to resemble that of positive freedom, for Pettit swiftly asks in turn: what is it about free actions that makes it so that we are so responsible? (Pettit 2001, 32-33). When is an agent suitable of being defined as free?

He concludes that it is discursive control⁸ – when someone has the same capabilities and respect as when one is in a discourse. "People enjoy freedom as discursive control so far as they have the ratiocinative capacity to enter discourse and so far as they have the relational capacity that goes with having only discourse-friendly linkages with others." (Pettit 2001, 103). It will need to be clarified exactly what each of these mean.

The 'ratiocinative capacity' is that of reasoning, and in particular, reasoning with others (Pettit 2001, 67), but also in regard to what makes an agent a person. Pettit argues that a person will not be truly free – they will not have fitness to be held responsible – insofar as they lack any real continuity of identity, continually reinventing themselves or being unable to "live up to the legacy of

8 Following a lengthy consideration of rational and volitional control (Pettit 2001, 29-64). The thesis will assume that Pettit is correct in his various arguments as to why these are inadequate.

commitments that they own” (Pettit 2001, 82-87)⁹. Those who are not yet fully developed in this way, children for example, cannot be counted as persons, though they may be perfectly free to act.

‘Discourse-friendly linkages’ is a broad term. The vast majority of relationships in modern society display this, provided the individuals involved can debate the merits of any given topic, with none wielding power¹⁰ over any other. This can be, as Pettit points out elsewhere (Pettit 2014, xiii-xvii, 30, 45-46), a matter of soft or implicit power, as well as explicit power. He gives the example¹¹ of a wife who is denied macaroons by her husband, who otherwise dotes on her and puts up with her eccentricities. However, his patience is merely on sufferance, and at any time, he can effectively shut down all opposition she may raise. Even if he is a kind and conscientious man who would never think to do so, the linkage is a discourse-unfriendly one. For this to be averted, there must be no way for any party to arbitrarily end discussions arbitrarily or coerce the other party into so doing.

Hence, Pettit’s theory of free agency thus far relies heavily upon not only the individual’s own mental fitness and stability, but upon the individuals around them. What of the second critique we put to Berlin, the idea of a free collective? Pettit argues that just as it is possible for an individual to be a free person, a collective can exhibit the exact same qualities and be subjected to the exact same requirements for discourse- friendly linkages (with individuals and/or other collectives) and rational behaviour (Pettit 2001, 119-124).

He expands his conception further in *On the People’s Terms*, making use of what he calls the “eyeball test”;; no-one should be so far above or below anyone else that they cannot look them in the eye, and have a full, discursively functional discussion about the merits of their respective views

9 This is particularly relevant for the thesis’ later discussion of alienation, but Pettit uses no specific conception of alienation in his discussion of discursive control, though he readily allows it could be interfered with. In *On the People’s Terms*, he discusses revealed will vs real will (Pettit 2012, 47-49) but concludes that whether one’s will is “real” is an ethical or psychological challenge, not a political one.

10 The definition of power will be discussed later in the thesis; allow for its brief usage here, as the precise definition is less important at this time.

11 Specifically, he cites the play “*A Doll’s House*” by Henrik Ibsen.

(Pettit 2012 82-87, Pettit 2014, xxvi). One might therefore be tempted to consider Pettit merely offering a nuanced conception of positive freedom, one based heavily on autonomy, or what Pettit calls psychological free will – orthonomy (Pettit 2012, 27), rather than breaking free of Berlin’s distinctions.

Pettit is insistent otherwise, however, when it comes to a “political ideal of freedom”. When we speak of liberty and justice for all, we are not simply speaking of fitness to be held responsible. He specifically objects to any attempts by a government to foster discursive control in relation to intrapersonal factors, being extremely sceptical of attempts to improve people’s psychology, following Berlin’s critique of positive freedom. Thus, there is no political obligation to deal with internal interferences. Rather, the state should only involve itself in interpersonal arrangements, the “discourse-friendly linkages”. However, he argues that these arrangements are both those of specific interpersonal relationships and environmental factors (Pettit 2001, 127-128). Rather than articulating such a political ideal as positive freedom or negative freedom per se, he instead considers competing concepts of liberty as non-limitation, non-interference, and non-domination (Pettit 2001, 128-129). The thesis will discuss Pettit’s critique of his competing approaches and his own position on non-domination in some detail before returning to discursive control¹².

Pettit’s critique in *A Theory of Freedom* starts with non-limitation¹³. Despite appearing similar in character to positive liberty as Berlin defines it, Pettit maintains it is still a kind of negative liberty (Pettit 2001, 130), wherein obstruction is characterised both as intentional and unintentional interference. Yet despite the richness this offers in terms of what can be done to mitigate injustices and threats to our freedom (on its terms), this becomes crippling. Because non-limitation would

¹² It is worth noting here, however, that if intrapersonal difficulties are not also solved by his proposal, then by his own earlier logic, discursive control is potentially at risk.

¹³ In *On the People’s Terms*, Pettit instead uses non-frustration, non-interference, and non-domination. Non-limitation and non-frustration are not identical, however, and the latter, by dint of the argument Berlin levies against it (Pettit 2012, 31-33) is not particularly persuasive. Non-limitation, however, rears its head later in the thesis, and thus is mentioned directly here.

permit, according to Pettit, almost any degree of manipulation or control in order to mitigate such interferences overall, it is intolerable. Pettit justifies this by noting that the idea of discursive control, if considered carefully, does not give equal weight to personal and impersonal obstructions to discursive control, the latter generally being in the category of unintentional interference. Non-limitation is far more demanding as a result, but without achieving proper protections of discursive control. Thus, it risks autonomy entirely, according to Pettit (Pettit 2001, 130-132).

Accept that he is correct for the moment. If so, then non-limitation cannot be permitted. Pettit moves on swiftly to non-interference. This he divides into two parts. One may not be subject to interference by others, and be formally free. However, to be actually free, Pettit argues that one must enjoy an “environment of opportunity in which there is ample scope for the exercise of that capacity”. Limitations of the unintentional, structural or any other kind that do not meet the criteria for interference must be of lesser importance, although Pettit remains ambiguous on how exactly this can be structured (Pettit 2001, 133). This appears to be much closer to negative liberty as Berlin describes it.

Non-interference, however, is coupled with serious difficulties of its own. Pettit regards non-interference as unacceptable; although non-interference regards almost all government interference as inherently objectionable, on the one hand, which may seem questionable, he wields the much more important criticism that such an outlook is blind to *domination*. Thus, non-interference seems to be “impoverished” when it comes to the development of society, but more damningly, it is also incomplete. Pettit defines such domination as uncontrolled¹⁴ interference, and clarifies that it is not only the uncontrolled interference in itself that is objectionable to freedom, but exposure to it – the

¹⁴ He defines it in A Theory of Freedom as arbitrary interference. However,, he changes it to uncontrolled interference in On the People's Terms (Pettit 2012, 58-59), in response to ambiguities in the meaning of arbitrary (Blunt 2015, 2-15). Therefore, the thesis will use uncontrolled interference in preference at all times, including direct quotation.

potential that one may interfered with, without regard to one's well-being – in other words, it does not track to our avowable interests (Pettit 2001, 134-141)

When is interference uncontrolled, and how can we tell whether it tracks to our interests or not? On an individual level, this is quite easy; we can define our interests and argue that any given action was against them (Pettit 2001, 150-151). Of course, such an action may have a practical or moral reason, but it is still a denial of our freedom. Ensuring that a democratic government is attending to our interests, or that a collective's interests are being considered, is more difficult. There is a danger that the state may exert public power – *imperium* – in a way that is unjustly coercive, arbitrary, and dominating (Pettit 2001, 152-155). In order to ensure that a state is free in and of itself, and is composed of free and politically active citizens, Pettit gives an extensive list of requirements and resources, which sum up as a need for citizens to have editorial and authorial opportunities on both government policy and legislation as a measure of influence and control while necessitating a democratic state that is responsive to popular wishes, particularly in “two dimensions, electoral and contestatory” (Pettit 2001, 159-173).

Some examples may be useful in order to clarify Pettit's arguments¹⁵ at this point. Steiner makes a distinction between “pure” negative liberty and other, “impure” kinds on the basis of an action being not impossible, but “ineligible”, based upon moral or motivational considerations (Steiner 1994, 6-21). In a pure conception of negative liberty, ineligibility has no effect; one is unfree only if one's action is made an impossibility, and any interference upon you – regardless of its eligibility or your own action's lack – is an imposition or obstruction. Non-domination would not fit this definition, and Pettit would undoubtedly reject such a pure conception. Thus, while Pettit himself does not use such terminology, his theories might be considered by Steiner as an “impure” negative conception. This is mentioned because such conceptions do not strictly fit Berlin's definition of

15 The examples hold for collectives and individuals alike.

negative liberty either, for they must be concerned with some additional criteria beyond interference. Pettit's critique, however, is still concerned with obstructions, whether justified or unjustified, and therefore it seems absurd to count him amongst those Berlin sets out as positive libertarians. This, again, suggests the positive/negative distinction is flawed.

Returning to Pettit, his own example of controlled interference is that of Ulysses/Odysseus, who ordered his crew to tie him to the mast and block their ears with wax, thus rendering them unable to hear his contrary, objectionable orders to sail towards the sirens and wreck their ship, and allowing him to experience the beauty of their song without dying. According to non-interference, Ulysses must surely be un-free; he is being interfered with, after all. But according to Pettit, this makes little sense. For Ulysses' interests are being considered, as he has explicitly detailed them, and are being attended to despite his unwillingness/irrationality to consider them himself. The interference is entirely a controlled and legitimised one, and his discursive control has been entirely respected throughout the process¹⁶.

Quentin Skinner gives another useful example. He speaks of a slave who is living on his master's estates. The slave may not be in a position to be interfered with often – his master may have been away for years, in fact. But the master could return at any time, and the slave may therefore be punished if the master is displeased in any way, or even if he just happens to feel like it. Thus the slave could live like a king until such a time as he was caught and punished. He therefore has a substantive reason to adjust and amend his behaviour, and remains in the power of another – he is subservient to his master. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that he lacks something fundamental and vital to being free. This same example holds true for a nation-state as well; a colony can never be truly free of its homeland without independence, which Skinner points out directly (Skinner 1998, 50-51).

There will remain challenges from non-interference against such arguments, but they will be covered later, in section three. Pettit also offers another argument against non-interference along Berlin's lines. While it does not substantially support the controlled/uncontrolled interference distinction, it provides additional support for Skinner's example of exposure. He argues that, by strictly considering things in terms of non-interference, it should be possible to achieve freedom through ingratiating yourself with those who are more powerful, who might interfere if they chose. This seems to be an absurdity (Pettit 2012, 64-65).

A restatement of the argument thus far is necessary before proceeding. The thesis began by outlining Berlin's positive/negative liberty dichotomy. Rather than relying upon the dichotomy, the thesis argued that many conceptions of freedom blur together negative and positive concepts, and that Berlin also did not consider the idea of a free society or a free collective. Pettit, who abandoned the dichotomy and sketched out an ideal of freedom as non-domination was then examined, presenting both a theory of individual (and collective) free agency, and individual (and collective) political freedom. Non-domination offers a distinction of uncontrolled interference; it provides a richer foundation for civil society and it adds the additional consideration of subservience. What remains, however, is to examine Pettit and non-domination in greater detail and to consider objections against a move towards a conception of freedom as non-domination.

Section Two: Pettit's Account in Full

Having outlined the overall thrust of non-domination, the thesis focuses now upon the specifics, beginning by outlining what exactly constitutes uncontrolled interference. Per Pettit's own presentation of non-domination, the thesis will initially assume that domination arises solely out of interpersonal causes¹⁷ (Pettit 2001, 154-158, Pettit 2012 50, 60-74). Intrapersonal interference against discursive control, or any kind of structural or systemic interference, will be considered later. For now, the thesis is solely focused upon interpersonal causes, whether they are environmental or via discourse-unfriendly relationships.

Such uncontrolled interference may be obvious. For example, someone may instruct us to vote a certain way in an upcoming election, or have our legs broken. By the earlier logic, even if our legs are never broken (perhaps because he has a great many defiant individuals' legs to break), we are exposed to this risk, and our liberty is seemingly diminished. There may be subtler examples, however. Instead of threats to break our legs, we are offered a large sum of unmarked, untraceable currency if we vote a certain way. Certainly, this represents an interference in our choices, but it is difficult to see whether it is a controlled or uncontrolled one.

Pettit clarifies the ideas of uncontrolled interference in *On the People's Terms* by considering these distinct kinds of interference as "hindrances to free choice" (Pettit 2012, 34-36). He splits these into two: generic hindrances are vitiators, and specific hindrances are invaders. "Where vitiations affect the capacity presupposed to being able to satisfy your will, invaders target the capacity to satisfy your will just as such; they are designed, as we might put it, to thwart your will" (Pettit 2012, 38). A lack of resources is a vitiating hindrance; an invasion involves the imposition of another's will

¹⁷ Notably, Pettit backslides on this point by suggesting there is a form of structural domination in *Just Freedom* (Pettit 2014, 53-54), but he goes into very little detail. Therefore, the thesis will go by his earlier writing and adopt Schuppert's definition of structural domination, but Pettit may be less opposed to the concept than presented as here.

(Pettit 2012 43-44). Only the latter can count as an uncontrolled interference. Interference in and of itself is not invasive, as this could be according to our wishes; Pettit uses the example of an alcoholic who makes sure his friend will return the key to his liquor cabinet only on twenty-four hours' notice (Pettit 2012, 57-58). The interference is not one subjected to an "alien will" (Pettit 2012, 58). But any case of invasion involves domination, and any domination also permits invasion. For if I am subject to any such "alien will", if I am subservient to it along the lines of Skinner's arguments, then any lack of invasion on my choices is solely at the discretion of that will.

Pettit is concerned primarily with the threat of domination. But he recognises that vitiating factors are important for the both enjoyment and robustness of freedom and its robustness. It is presumably possible for individuals to be dominated, but for that domination never to be used invasively. Such invasions may fail to frustrate; it seems reasonable to suggest that preventing me from eating mint, when I loathe the taste of mint, is domination and invasive but not particularly frustrating. It is certainly not as bad as forcing me to eat mint, which would be frustrating indeed (Pettit 2012, 29). Vitiating may deprive one of options, and lead to the same circumstances (for example, there may be nothing to eat except mint). Therefore, such resources should be provided if possible, certainly for basic resources like food and shelter. There is a catch, however; if you are dependent upon another for the sake of such resources, then you are dependent upon their goodwill (Pettit 2012, 70). This will be vital when it comes to discussing Pettit's preferences in the distribution of resources.

For now, another important question is worth considering. The distinction between vitiating and invasion seems clear enough. Yet when exactly are we subjected to an alien will? Returning to the previous example, a threat to break our legs, if the one issuing the threat could carry it out, seems to subject us to his or her will. Does the offer of money do so? What if neither threat nor offer were

probable, or effective – if the offer is made by someone known to be broke, for instance - are we subject to an alien will then?

Pettit argues that threats and offers work in different ways; interference removes a choice altogether, or presents us with a decidedly inferior choice, or a penalty for adopting it. In his nomenclature, x , y and z , becomes either x and y (removal) or x , y , and z -minus (penalty/replacement) (Pettit 2012, 50-53). The nature of the penalty and the degree will affect how much a given option diminishes our freedom (Pettit 2012, 53). An offer, by contrast, does not affect our freedom unless the offer or reward is enforced upon us (Pettit 2012, 54-55). This is rarely the case with most offers, but it could occur; a promotion into an unwanted management position would qualify. There is another dimension to consider in misrepresentation, however.

Pettit argues that misrepresentation, either in terms of manipulation or deception, always results in an interference, although that interference may not always be negative. Outright falsehoods (bluffs or lies) would be negative and unacceptable, but not in all cases of “nudging”, or presenting data in a palatable light (Pettit 2012, 55-56)¹⁸. Assuming Pettit is correct, what instances of removal, replacement, and misrepresentation count as uncontrolled interferences?

In part this can be answered by returning to the principle of avowable interests. It is easy to consider when the former and latter count as such on that principle: if an option is removed, it must be according to our stated interests. If something is misrepresented, it must not involve any intent to harm or defraud our interests¹⁹. Some interests can be assumed, such as health and happiness; removal of non-harmful options or lying with the intent to see someone harmed must be considered

¹⁸ This may seem unconvincing, as it allows for a wide array of possible deceptions. However, the wrongness of these deceptions may be unrelated to whether they are invasive and dominating. There may exist good reasons not to deceive on other moral grounds.

¹⁹ One consideration for this view would be the line to be drawn in advertising or evangelism – an ad which sells something that the possessor does not strictly need is only acceptable if it does not lead to the sacrifice of something he or she does need, vitally. Likewise, religious or political proselytising would have to be honest about its beliefs and policy goals.

uncontrolled interference in any circumstance. Replacement is more complex. It may be that a replacement is viewed as directly tracking to our interests, but whether it serves them depends upon how they are conceived. For example, a doctor may note a patient's withdrawal from a highly addictive drug as being exceptionally unpleasant. He may therefore propose a more gradual retreat from addiction, in opposition to the stated will of the addict, which is to rid himself of said addiction as quickly as possible. This does not, inherently, seem to be against our interests despite being against our will or immediate selfish concerns. It may therefore be acceptable to replace options which would be recognisably detrimental to our long-term interests.

Pettit is however highly opposed to any position, for any person, which leaves them potentially dependent upon goodwill entirely (Pettit 2014, 29). If he is right to be so concerned, then a replacement's legitimacy would have to depend upon a: direct and prior agreement (as in the Ulysses and alcohol cases), or b: the direct and pre-committed authority of the individual to dictate such replacements, as in the case of a doctor. To return to the terminology of "alien will", such actions are either in direct accordance with one's will, respect its intent while temporarily overruling it, or ignore it entirely. The question thus becomes if respect suffices for control.

The thesis will argue that, for Pettit at least, it does not. The reason for this is because is that Pettit is so concerned with the potential for manipulation or coercion in his discussions regarding non-limitation (Pettit 2001, 127). Respecting the addict's intent and then overruling him on the basis of his health is still overruling him, though it may be for an extremely good reason. Exceptions are solely reserved for those cases where the individual's interests are unquestionably served – stopping someone from walking into an open manhole, overdosing, and the like.

Considering the examples given, uncontrolled interference is any action which interferes without the subject's awareness and prior consent (even if that consent is later denied, as with the alcohol and Ulysses examples), or which places us in a state of subjection or subservience to another (Pettit 2012, 59-63). Only cases where consent could be assumed by default would be excepted, and this category is extremely limited. As was earlier established, there can be different degrees of such interference, which may be more or less unobjectionable, or may represent complete denial of our interests, following the vitiation/invasion distinction.

As an alternative view, threats and offers are also prominently discussed by Steiner, who argues, contrary to Pettit, that they are much the same; they provide differing options available to us. Steiner then assesses exactly what these mirrored options do: they change our evaluation and assessment of our potential actions. They do not differ in practice. If an offer does not constitute interference in changing how we consider our choices, how can a threat? Neither of them interferes in the realisation of a given action, unless they come into effect before or during the action. In the same way, living under the implied threat that a man may come and kill me for no reason at all does not diminish my freedom (Miller 1991, 124-134 & Steiner 1994, 22-33) – although it may be rather disturbing.

Although counter-intuitive, there seems little fault in the logic. Indeed, social custom works as both threat and offer through dictating proper and improper conduct, and rewarding them with esteem or disgust respectively. Our freedom to murder is not affected by the law, but our willingness to do so assuredly is. If we really want to try to murder people despite the law, we will. Laws and customs will only be a limit on freedom when they are observed and effectively enforced, and not simply by their presence. They may change our evaluations and choices, but this seems to be an intrapersonal element. If Steiner is correct, then either all instances of removal, replacement and

misrepresentation must count as uncontrolled interferences, or none of them will. Neither outcome is acceptable for Pettit.

Although Steiner's arguments are directed by what Pettit might call non-interference, they hold for Pettit's assessment of non-domination, if it is held that discursive control is not a value we can usefully demand as a political ideal (Pettit 2001, 126-129), and this is the element at risk in the very presence of a threat or offer. It might be objected that many threats will by dint of being effective and immediate constitute a threat to non-domination, or that such a threat may place us in a position of subservience. But it suggests that a meaningless or toothless threat provides no real threat, nor does a very unlikely one.

Pettit acknowledges this problem in part by specifying that protection against invasion must "maximise expected non-domination" (Pettit 2012, 70). It is not enough simply to reward people for not making use of invasion, or to ensure that it is *relatively* unlikely domination will occur. One way to resolve this would simply be to argue that Pettit is mistaken to discount autonomy; that discursive control is something that we absolutely must protect. This could thus coherently explain the problem between threats, fraud, and offers. The first two deliberately undercut our ability to make our own choices and judgements. They may not interfere with our freedom, but they always interfere with our autonomous decision-making. An offer, despite being the same in terms of mental results, has a distinctly different means – it adds options, rather than removing or replacing them²⁰.

Another argument against Pettit's views on uncontrolled interference is raised by Gwilym Blunt²¹.

Blunt argues that Pettit's arguments fail to encapsulate "the use of arbitrary or alien

20 These points are revisited in section three, in response to criticism levied at Pettit by Ian Carter and Matthew Kramer.

21 Blunt's paper has two halves. For reasons of structure, the thesis addresses his arguments about the source of domination (structural or personal, etc) in section two, chapter two. This section focuses on the latter half, about the site of domination, first.

power to establish these relationships and broader social institutions” (Blunt 2015, 12). He makes use of an apartheid-like example wherein a majority is excluded from power on a systematic and impartial basis. He gives a similar and more specific example of a religious minority excluded from a university based on stringent rules. That these rules are being enforced by an individual admissions officer is no demonstration of domination on his part, but the prospective student is dominated all the same. He suggests that Pettit ought to revive a notion of “antipower” and to consider if “a social relationship or institution is dominating if X, an agent, possesses the capacity to arbitrarily interfere arbitrarily, either interactionally or systemically, in the choices available to Y, a dependent agent.” (Blunt 2015, 2).

If correct, this has considerable implications for the Ulysses case when writ large. The most important such implication, for the purpose of the thesis, is that individuals must be protected from any uncontrolled interference, whether this is on a personal or societal basis. Setting the specific nature of systemic and structural domination aside for now²², and Pettit’s own discomfort with it, protecting against invasion and uncontrolled interference must account for the possibility of unforeseen interferences developing through societal ills like irrational prejudices (racism, sexism, etc). To this end, we might rely on something similar to Mill’s principles against the tyranny of the majority; that uncontrolled interference can never be allowed on grounds of paternalism or disapproval, but solely to prevent greater or more harmful uncontrolled interference on the part of another. Pettit makes a similar suggestion of this kind (Pettit 2013, 212-214).

At the same time, this could become too limiting. Part of Pettit’s required social framework for a free society is loose material equality; it is plausible that a difference of status could arise that could threaten this without ever engaging in uncontrolled interference of any kind, nor violating the eyeball test, etc. One example would be a privileged social group which, while possessing no

²² The thesis returns to this point in chapter two.

inherent authority and ability to dominate, frequently manages to receive better education²³. Over time, this could grow to create an imbalance of status and disrupt the loose material equality Pettit desires. Fixing it at that point might be more difficult, or even impossible; surely it would be better, and almost as justifiable, to correct it before it becomes a problem, even if the solution involves some impositions which were a: targeted, and b: not subject to the control of the group, who would presumably be reluctant to accept them.

To answer this, two potential options are immediately apparent. Firstly, we could argue that while this remained an imposition on liberty, liberty is not the sole good to consider. Other principles, such as justice and equality, might compel us to act contrary to liberty. Secondly, we could argue that violating their liberty in a small but significant sense was better than giving up the cause of liberty, which the loss of the loose material equality might cause. The thesis will argue for the latter, following Pettit's own consequentialist logic. To prevent this from imposing an alien will on the minority, however, two safeguards would be needed. The first of these is, as Pettit lays out in *Just Freedom*, the presence of support for minorities which ensured they were treated equitably, not merely equally. This is covered in chapter two. The second is to ensure that any such interference is controlled and undertaken, as noted previously, solely to preserve liberty or to apply similar republican first principles, like the loose material equality.

Pettit makes numerous arguments (Pettit 2001, 156-174, Pettit 2012, 179) to the effect that interference on a government level can be controlled and, through democratic methods, be legitimised and applied fairly, in the same way we might agree to set rules for debates, even via collective rather than individual agreement. Two parts of the rationale for such rules are particularly important. First is what Pettit calls the "corruptibility assumption" (Pettit 1997, 210-212), in that while it would not be plausible to assume all exercise of power, and all positions of power,

23 A useful example is the privileged status of public school pupils at Oxford and Cambridge colleges (Sutton Trust, Access to Advantage).

inherently led to a corruption of the individual and must therefore be condemned²⁴, there is always a possibility that corruption and abuse will occur. Two precautions are again required. The first is a combined set of civic norms, embedding laws dependent upon those norms. To put it more simply, politicians must be capable of being taken to account legally, and the republican state must be prepared to do so. Second is the principle of “tough luck”, that no action of democratic government can be seen as malicious against any portion of the population, even though they may lose out; they can consider it as simply misfortune, rather than a deliberate invasion of their wills.

If these two things can be guaranteed, or at least made highly probable, then the election of politicians to a working democracy provides the opportunity for individuals to *generally* to obtain the results they desire, though not all laws and actions will favour them. Laws thus become ways for the population, as with Ulysses, to agree to the general course of democracy without agreeing on every individual point – provided, of course, that they (as individuals or as groups, such as ethnicities, certain professions, etc) are genuinely not subject to unwarranted malice – following the tough luck principle.

But what Blunt makes clear, and which differs from Pettit’s view, is that our Ulysses – the democratic populace – may find itself arbitrarily disadvantaged by entirely unintended consequences. Pettit sees these laws as a way to commit one’s self to interference on a general scale; this can be compared, on a smaller scale, to a clause in a contract becoming transparently against our interests over time. For interference to truly remain truly uncontrolled, we must have a regular opportunity to challenge such distorted clauses. In *On the People’s Terms*, Pettit offers a potential solution in democratic legitimacy and control; non-domination is not overly demanding in terms of

24 This, by the same token, explicitly rejects anarchism.

government duties per se²⁵, but Pettit is very demanding when it comes to its composition. This is discussed in greater detail in chapter two, but an important point to consider here is what renders such a government legitimate and allows the exercise of its power over its populace to be controlled, rather than uncontrolled. This is relevant not only to the example of unknowing subservience below, but in Pettit's attempts to address unexpected interferences (which, in theory, he does well) and bypass or eliminate systemic/structural interference (which, the thesis will argue in chapter two, he completely fails to do).

Pettit contrasts legitimacy with justice; where the latter equalises the “horizontal relations” of citizens, legitimacy is vertical: it prevents the abuse of the citizenry by the state. In much the same way as the earlier alcohol and Ulysses examples, a state will be controlled when people have foreknowledge of the state's actions and intentions²⁶, when any coercion and uncontrolled interference is justified on the basis of the “tough luck” principle or the need to be equally coercive to all citizens (Pettit 2012, 162-163), and where popular control is equally accessible to all, unconditioned, and effective. This is a demanding list.

Foreknowledge is required for legitimacy on the relatively simple basis of laws as pre-commitment; without a keen awareness of what those laws are, and how the government might legislate, there can be no hope of control on the part of the citizenry as a whole. They might still exert some form of influence, but it will be effectively random and disjointed, unable to allow for a particular result, let alone a systematic set of results (Pettit 2012, 153-157).

Coercion and the “tough luck” principle are required for the legitimacy of a state by dint of avoiding the earlier problems we raised for minorities, but also on the simple notion that any state is

²⁵ In practice, the requirements for preserving non-domination are very extensive, even more so than Pettit allows for. But there is a distinction to be drawn between a government's obligations and what those obligations entail practically.

²⁶ Pettit uses this to contrast between consent and control; the former does not require the same level of awareness and observation.

inevitably going to need to punish individuals who do not wish to be punished, and to institute decisions that a group of people (possibly a very large group) do not like, but which may be vitally necessary or otherwise justified in being enforced, despite their being in opposition to the people's immediate will, again citing pre-commitment.

As for Pettit's requirements for popular control to be enjoyed, anything less than his listed requirements is inevitably flawed in its responsiveness to one or another of its citizens; non-domination is then not accessible to individuals, to a greater or lesser extent. Of course, this is a non-ideal world; no system of government will be perfect. But it is proper to aim to maximise non-domination and the resources necessary to enjoy it.

Pettit's stated view on the means of accomplishing this is via a democratic system, but a highly specific one. It is not enough simply to have an election and consider the task ended. The most important elements are that the electoral system must enable equal access; because the electoral system alone cannot account for this when there may be varied minority interests who, because they are minorities, will never be able to make their voice heard effectively; it must allow for contestation by various popular means. Likewise, if the electoral power of the citizenry is at the behest of any other group, this renders their control highly conditional. To solve this problem, Pettit offers the solution of independent authorities selected by elected representatives, but not answerable to them, such as an independent judiciary, electoral commissions and ombudsmen, etc. Efficiency cannot be compelled, but Pettit argues that government's own failings may – if the citizenry is active, responsive, and can make their feelings known – provide an effective response, by forcing legislation to respond to those failings over time. Thus, in the long run, governments will respond to the norms their citizens promote (Pettit 2012, 269-279, 307-310).

The thesis will, for the sake of the argument, agree with Pettit on all accounts. Any state which the thesis recommends to safeguard non-domination in civil society must be both legitimate and just by Pettit's criteria.

This leaves subservience. Both Skinner and Pettit offer useful insights into its nature; both agree that someone is subservient when their exercise of discursive capabilities is dependent upon the will of another, although Skinner puts it in terms of "the jurisdiction of someone else" (Skinner 1998, 41). The eyeball test serves as an adequate shorthand in day to day life, but other variations deserve some consideration. Skinner concludes that any colony or tributary state is in itself un-free, as noted above, but also that no individual within such states should consider himself free either, as they lack any meaningful way to contest their laws or establish their own lives. This implies that there may be cases in which people may unwittingly be subservient: when someone or something has power over an individual, organisation or state, and does not, yet could, force the individuals or groups into a state of subservience. For if that power was exerted subtly, as it might be with government pressure on a colony, they could find themselves unable to control this interference²⁷. Pettit offers a recurring point of the mutual, and possibly general, awareness of relationships which reinforce superior/inferior social status. Part of the reason that a few can keep a vast many in line is this constant reinforcement and social awareness of their own perceived inferiority. Certainly, if all acted in concert, then it would not be enough to keep them in check. Providing each individual perceives a great risk in standing up for themselves, however, and so long as they know that they are, as an individual, unable to effect meaningful change, the dynamic may prove stable, pervasive, and ripe for domination. A secondary point from Pettit is to note the absurdity that leaving subservience out entails; if one could become freer by avoiding interferences, then toadying up to those in positions of power would render one freer. But this is absurd; freedom remains continually predicated on their whims, and not our own.

27 This point is crucial for the discussion of corporate domination later in the thesis.

Subservience thus may be subtle or blatant, and it relies in a great extent on the relationship of power²⁸ between individuals. One who is subservient is always at the risk of uncontrolled interference by the nature of that relationship; any power-relationship wherein one party possesses the power to thwart another's interest, without internal or external limitations, qualifies. A useful example is that of verbal chastisement by one's employer. It is one thing to receive unpleasant yet constructive criticism, and another to be subjected to a vicious diatribe, intent only on reducing one's self-worth. If the nature of your relationship is such that one cannot stand up for one's self or redress the abuse, then one has become subservient to one's employer. One may be subordinate, without being subservient.

Thus, subservience is always sufficient for domination. It may not be necessary for domination; subservience, as it is a quality of a relationship, makes no comments about actions or contexts. For example, I may not be in any relationship where I am subservient to another's will, but they may nail me inside a locked room by some mistake, to revisit the previous example. I am still interfered with, by another's action, with no semblance of control.

Freedom as non-domination thus is much more demanding than non-interference in practice, not only in what identifying actions become worthy of prohibition, but in the institutional demands of government and society around it. It additionally builds in requirements and concepts that freedom as non-interference does not, such as the need for a loose material equality and equal citizenry in the eyeball test, and the entire concept of subservience. On the other hand, as Pettit notes, such demands justify much greater claims for redistribution and resourcing, as well as individual recognition. These claims are the subject of the next chapter. Before this, the thesis will answer objections from those attached to liberal freedom, as non-interference. Without doing this, the

28 The definition of power, in this case, is a Marxist one; justification can be found in chapter two.

superiority of non-domination as a conception of liberty remains in doubt; this would undermine the entire question of the thesis.

Section Three – Negative Liberty, Autonomy, and Pettit’s Critics

Pettit’s theory of non-domination and discursive control has thus been explained. As a theory, it is an attractive one to conceptualise liberty, for the reasons Pettit has already outlined. Some questions remain. A pressing one is whether non-domination can remain an attractive political ideal, as Pettit desires, without an equal commitment to autonomy as a political goal. The thesis must also consider potential counter-points from those who would prefer non-interference. Kramer and Carter argue that republicanism’s progression is illegitimate, and defend liberty as non-interference, what we might call a “pure” negative liberty following Steiner. At the same time, Kramer argues that Pettit remains wedded to a concept of liberty which is of a negative kind. This could result in difficulties for the thesis, as it will argue here and in the next chapter that autonomy (as discursive control) is worth accepting as a political goal for republican theory. Each of these arguments against non-domination will be considered in turn.

In section one, non-limitation was set aside. Autonomy of the individual is necessary for free agency, but it is irrelevant to non-domination; individuals can be politically free even if they are not free to choose or free to act (Pettit 2012 48-49), according to Pettit. His reasoning is twofold; first, he views a commitment to discursive control on the political level as overly demanding and nonsensical in a group focus (Pettit 2001, 126-127). Second, he acknowledges the potential difficulty in *On the People’s Terms* (Pettit 2012, 48-49) in navigating whether an agent was *really* willing or unwilling to do or be something/someone. He is not concerned with metaphysical or psychological free will, as he puts it, but “social free will”, the political freedom to act and be, however incomplete it may seem. He also argues that political pursuit of discursive control via a policy of freedom as non-limitation might lead to manipulation, tyranny, and disregard of the individual’s wishes in preference to those of some enlightened despot (Pettit 2001, 127-132), citing Berlin on positive freedom. One potential rebuttal would be to argue that this arises out of his

consequentialist ethos. A state that sought to prohibit all actions that would lead to the loss of discursive control, and therefore undertook none of them, would presumably aid considerably in fostering autonomy and Pettit's own political ideal of freedom, but this has its own costs. A full discussion of Pettit's consequentialism will be outlined in chapter two; for now, the thesis will proceed on the assumption that the state is empowered to attempt to maximise individual freedom.

Autonomy and non-domination are still not incompatible on such grounds provided that autonomy is also established as something to be maximised whenever possible: we ought to ensure that each individual is acting in accordance with their own will. But this could again return to Berlin, where one might assume that anyone who is acting in accordance with "false consciousness" or contrary to their interests is lacking in autonomy and must therefore be protected from losing it – by interfering with their autonomy. Clearly, this would not be ideal.

A solution to this is to consider non-limitation from the perspective of minimising the harm to autonomy as opposed to maximising the "real will" of those suffering from various delusions. On this account, while the liberty of individuals in terms of resources and the removal of obstructions should be maximised, threats to autonomy should be minimised. Of course, various intoxicants might interfere with the autonomous will of the individual. But this may be solved by regulation to prohibit their consumption when, say, operating heavy machinery or voting in a general election. They need not be permanently forbidden.

Such a minimising approach would maintain that autonomy remains necessary, but as we cannot be certain of the psychological will of each individual, the best course of action is not to enforce a particular conception or schema that each individual might embrace – not least because this would be tyrannical in the extreme – but to ensure freedom of agency in Pettit's sense.

As regards the liberal-egalitarian counterpoints, both Kramer and Carter concisely outline their views in *Republicanism and Political Theory*, setting out their critique of republican freedom (or unfreedom). While their views are distinct, both take umbrage with Pettit's earlier characterisation of negative liberty, and both are unconvinced by Pettit's view on the prospect of domination, in no small part because they view the exercise of power as being one of *probabilities*; the freedom of the subordinate party is limited by the probability that power will be used against them (Carter 2008, 70-71). Where the views diverge is in their recognition of power.

Carter outlines a negative theory of freedom which acknowledges the relationship of power, where it is contingent, rather than necessary (Carter 2008, 68-69). Again, it becomes a matter of probabilities, and Carter does not think that an un-exercised power represents real obstruction. To his "pure negative liberty", freedom is the absence of prevention (Carter 2008, 67); no obstruction means no prevention. For Pettit, the mere presence of an *opportunity* to obstruct suffices. Carter also characterises freedom as an absence of dependence, but dependence as a "relation between actions" rather than a "relation between wills" (Carter 2008, 80). To elaborate on this, Carter argues in a way similar to Steiner that the *nature* of an action has no bearing on its freedom-limiting or not, against Pettit's view that a: non-arbitrary interference suggests no loss of freedom, and b: a hostile and above all invasive will (Pettit 2012, 59-60) matters and is toxic to freedom even if it does not effectively apply itself. His challenge thus splits in the same way: republicanism must answer why only certain forms of power or hostile will constitute dependence (Carter 2008, 74-80) and it must answer Carter's challenge on probabilities. After all, the conception of pure negative liberty agrees that many such forms of power are "inimical to freedom" - but, it seems, by degrees.

Kramer is even more sceptical. He views the negative conception as far broader than the republican one, yet criticises the republican viewpoint as both impractical and nothing more than a truncated version of negative liberty²⁹. Again, the probability objection surfaces; not only does he believe that republicanism can never entirely eliminate domination, and thus is reduced to the same probability concerns as negative liberty, a simple matter of “alternative foci” - Pettit focuses on avoiding the power to dominate, the liberal-egalitarian on minimising the chances it is used (Kramer 2008, 46). They may even consider the same methods and routes. Kramer’s most important criticism relates to time, however, in that the status of a dominator may not remain constant. The ability to interfere may differ from moment to moment, may be subjected to penalties at one time and not at another, and an individual who lacks the “ascendancy” of a dominator may nonetheless be able, by sheer luck, to dominate even when they lack the effective power Pettit would ascribe – or the will to do so. Or they may, by individual steps which are not dominating, end up in a position to dominate. To Kramer, this places Pettit in an untenable position – it seems highly inaccurate to describe such individuals as dominators, yet they can acquire power over others. It also seems impractical, even impossible, to prevent such instances from occurring.

A noteworthy point is that Carter and Kramer both pay little attention to the prospect of autonomy and discursive control as a necessary condition for and part of freedom. Were this more emphasised by Pettit, they might find his theory more distinctive, though perhaps less persuasive; its inclusion would certainly point to a more positive conception of liberty than Pettit deems fit. Accepting autonomy as a resource provides another useful way to distinguish between threats and offers, as

²⁹ Two of Kramer’s arguments miss the mark entirely, however, and merit little discussion. Kramer criticises Skinner’s conception of republican freedom on the grounds that a: Skinner claims that unfreedom arises when one is aware of it, solely, and this clearly seems clearly absurd (Kramer 2008, 38-39). It is absurd, which is why Skinner corrects himself (Skinner 2008, 98-99), but even then, Pettit’s account does not require awareness for it to be the case. Secondly, Kramer makes the point of a “gentle giant” who holds dominating power but rarely exercises it, perhaps even refusing to do so, and asks what makes the individuals in subservience to such a giant unfree. Kramer is in extreme error, because either the giant cannot interfere at all (possibly via voluntary choice or contractual arrangement, as one might define many laws), or can and chooses not to, in which case the prospect still exists for the giant to abuse his authority if sufficiently vexed, at which point the individuals are still dominated (Skinner 2008, 99).

noted in the previous section. This will be expanded upon shortly to aid in answering Carter's critique.

Pettit responds to their criticism in both the same book of collected works and in a slightly different form in *On the People's Terms*; the notion of "alien will" or "alien control" as an answer for Carter's distinct criticisms, along with the clarification regarding threats and offers which was outlined earlier. In regards to probabilities, Pettit agrees on the necessity of maximising "expected non-domination", but his own response seems insufficient; therefore, the thesis will present a more developed viewpoint and consider potential rebuttals from Kramer and Carter in this vein. As for Kramer's distinct criticism of time, Pettit again offers a reply; the thesis will deal with each of these problems in turn, as the concept of "alien control" informs the answers to the other two.

Pettit defines alien control as any control which has a negative impact on freedom of choice. He clarifies that the free person is not one who simply avoids alien control, but who does so in the right way, e.g.: one who does not avoid it simply by toadying up to the powerful (Pettit 2012, 49-65, 69-73).

Threats and offers therefore constitute different approaches, as outlined earlier, because one adds breadth to the freedom of choice, and the other restricts it. Carter's challenge on dependence can be partially answered in the same way, though not entirely; it is reasonable to suggest that a will which, while it acted contrary to your interests in some ways, expanded your freedom in many others, is ultimately a net benefit. It must still "track to your avowable interests" (Pettit 2001, 155-160) overall. This clarification is necessary, because otherwise republicans might allow for a kind of enlightened despotism, rather contrary to intuition and their political doctrines.

This does not, however, explain why only some forms of dependence or interference are freedom-limiting. Certainly, it means there is a distinction in what constitutes interference, or at least that some forms of interference might be controlled and thus *less* objectionable than other kinds, but it shows little difference qualitatively.

Alien control and dependency of the kind Pettit criticises have little respect for the will of the individual. An individual may place themselves in a dependent situation, of their own volition, as part of a contract or scheme. In the same way, a threat – even an ineffectual threat – by its very nature disregards the autonomy of the individual in a way that an offer – even a malicious offer – does not. Carter’s concern remains focused on the purely negative conception of freedom – what obstructs an individual. On that account, any interference has to be justified. There may be cases, however, where the interference is a reasonable one; e.g. to rescue an unconscious body from a burning building. Perhaps they were willing to lie down and die, and in that sense, this represents a disregard of their free will. But the action was taken, not knowing this, without any such intent.

Carter might reply that even in a case where we wish to prohibit interference, there may be other moral reasons to pull someone from a burning building. It is still interference, but justified due to the circumstances. The distinction is one of an alien will; not knowing the individual’s wishes, the interferer sought to act in accordance with those wishes as they could conceive of them, e.g.: removing them from the flames. It would be absurd to say that this was sufficient in all cases; one cannot simply fantasise about someone’s beliefs and act accordingly. But there clearly seems to be something in the way of justification, to act as another would want us to act, as opposed to against their wishes. Pettit’s concern is to ensure that no interference of this kind is possible, because for it to be possible suggests the power – as a relationship between individuals – to ignore their will.

Pettit's response on probabilities is to note that the decrease in probability of interference does not remove alien control: "A decrease in the probability of interference will only provide a reason for consolation with respect to...the sort of interference actually practised. It will provide some relief from fear...but it will not reduce the level of alien control and the associated unfreedom" (Pettit 2008, 124). This seems plausible as an explanation as to why a slave is perpetually unfree, and distinguishes Pettit substantially from negative libertarians.

Carter still has room for criticism, however. Carter's supposition was that a trivially low chance of actually exercising power – thus, alien control – does not actually affect freedom in any meaningful way. An example might be a large snake with the power of hypnosis, allowing it to hypnotise and eat prey. Suppose that one is forced to confront this snake, day in and day out, but the snake has a mere 0.0000001% chance³⁰ of actually succeeding in its hypnosis. Call this the Kaa argument. Why should we worry, and what threat does the "alien control" actually pose to liberty? We surely cannot be obliged to protect against the trivial possibility of such interference, and the actual harm seems then to be in the interference, not the alien control.

A defence from Pettit might begin by noting that most cases of exercising alien control are much more likely, but that still leads simply to quibbling over probabilities. A 1% chance may seem high, but not if the opportunity for that alien control comes once a century. Drawing the line, as a discussion, is impractical because it will undoubtedly run into the sorites paradox – moving a percentage here and there is useless. As noted in the prior footnote, I invite the reader to supply their own definitions.

³⁰ Pettit's definition does insist on a "negative impact on freedom of choice", so if this number is too low, the author invites the reader to replace it with the lowest percentile chance they believe would actually matter.

Instead, Kaa can be addressed via a variation on Pettit's concept of insulation. In *Just Freedom*, Pettit outlines a case for an intricate criminal justice system to prevent the abuse of the more nuanced republican theory (Pettit 2014, 93-98). The snake will remain a source of alien control if there is nothing to penalise or prohibit its actions. If it should attempt its low chance of hypnosis, the snake must be punished, or there must be an effort to minimise the prospect of attempts to begin with; laws, direct obstruction, or the removal of the snake entirely.

This can be aided via establishing just norms and just laws in support of those norms (Pettit 1997, 241-246), society as a whole can allow individuals to be limited and restricted from exerting alien control, as a promise that alien control will not be exerted on them³¹. Carter is correct that in practice such a low probability means little, but the presence of an unchecked alien control more symbolises the prospect of subservience or danger than it does actual interference. Pettit argues in *On the People's Terms* that a false danger which still serves to restrict one's personal choice – if we do not know the absurdly low probability, for example – is still an impediment to freedom. Thus in cases where the power-relation is known, and toxic to discursive control, but the probability is not known, one will be deprived of freedom to the extent that one is subject to interference and to the extent one *believes* one will be subject to interference. Intimidation must be counted as toxic to liberty; so too must the prospect of government or corporate abuse, however unlikely, because of the obvious discrepancy in the power-relationship between an individual and government³² (Pettit 2012, 50-56, 209). It is for precisely this reason that Pettit is so anxious to establish strong requirements for any republican state to fulfil its obligations, which the thesis considers in chapter two.

31 This may strike one as a little too close to an explicit social contract, but it is more of a kind of reciprocity that Rawls would recognise.

32 Or an individual and a religion, an individual and a trans-national corporation, an individual and another individual with drastically greater wealth, power and influence.

If probabilities are seen in this way, and one accepts the idea of alien control, then Kramer's criticism is mostly misplaced. The "individuation" of the individual options will be changed at any given point in time (Pettit 2008, 121, & Pettit 2012, 66), provided that an individual is in position to make use of that power and exercise those options against you. It may be that the individual will at certain points not be able to do so, or will be harshly punished, and this changes the profile – the meaning, even – of those actions. But the actions themselves remain illegitimate, due to the option of exercising alien control over your decisions. It is reasonable to suggest that Kramer is right that not all individuals will exercise these actions. And if they do not, they should not be punished. But the option to do so should be removed, precisely so there is no "door-keeper", in Pettit's example, who might opportunistically interfere.

Where Kramer has a point is that ensuring this is exceedingly difficult. To prevent all instances of alien control is all but impossible. If republican freedom demands this, it is inherently unachievable, save for the isolated hermit or some godlike being, who may ensure he is never placed in such a position. Far better to focus on the cases where that interference is used. Minimising such occurrences is sufficient, however, and well within our capabilities. In the example of the bully, ensuring such a situation could never arise is impossible. Correcting it and ensuring that the bullied individual has opportunities for recourse would do much to prevent it arising, and these are entirely practical.

Even if this is accepted, Kramer argues that if the bully can still act with impunity, he remains a dominator, even after the apple is obtained (Kramer 2008. 55-56) and that this status of domination can thus be explained by non-interference even though that non-interference has been applied, thus once again intending to suggest that Pettit's version of liberty is not distinctive. But if he will be punished, as with the minimising case, he is not a dominator. To say this, however, misjudges Pettit.

The point of republican freedom is not merely one of lacking uncontrolled interference³³. It also addresses the exercise of power over others, or being subject to that exercise of power. It is a distinct state of relations. It is plausible that an individual could, for a very brief time, end up in a dominating position they otherwise would not hold. Kramer would not describe that person as dominating; it is more accurate to say that they were in an unequal relationship which permitted the use of power to dominate, even if they themselves never exercised it, never realised it, and never conceived of themselves as dominator. Pettit may or may not be correct in this, but he is certainly distinct from the negative libertarian, as the prospect of the actual interference occurring – which may be a minute possibility – is not the fundamental issue of the relationship. It is the relationship itself³⁴.

In conclusion, Pettit's understanding of liberty differs considerably from traditional negative liberty conceptions, and its implementation differs from the liberal-egalitarian model in far more substantive ways than mere "alternative foci". Autonomy seems far more integral to the coherence and strength of Pettit's theory than he himself acknowledges, and so the thesis returns to it again now.

By better emphasising autonomy, Carter's critique might not have found purchase to begin with, and emphasising discursive control and a theory of free agency and personhood as much as a "politicised" freedom (Pettit 2001, 125-128) serves to distinguish republican freedom still further. Many of Pettit's arguments tacitly rely upon the notion of subservience or impinging upon freedom

³³ Or, by Kramer's logic, lacking interference which is not itself interfered with.

³⁴ Shnayderman offers a counter-argument about effectively the same relationship: a malicious villain who can succeed in making people do what he wishes 50% of the time, and a hero with the same power who elects to never use it, but could do so 50% or 100% of the time. Shnayderman argues it is implausible that the villain and hero place others in the same situation with regards to negative liberty, and that the hero with 100% is in fact more dangerous to freedom (Shnayderman 2012, 150-151). He misses the mark entirely, however, for in such a circumstance, the people's freedom is indeed dependent on his goodwill. The eyeball test is violated; hero or villain, your willingness to stand up and disagree is predicated on the likelihood of them not killing you for it. His second argument (Shnayderman 2012, 51-56) is less useful with Pettit's more developed view in *On the People's Terms*.

without direct action. These arguments rely upon some form of autonomy to give them persuasive force.

Drawing upon Skinner, one might also question the denial of autonomy as a political and collective value in Pettit's arguments. Pettit writes in *Just Freedom* that when "a people as a whole are (be) dominated...the individual members of that people are (will be) dominated." (Pettit 2014, 154).

Such a view is not necessarily incoherent without autonomy, but its absence suggests that the fault is purely external, that the state is imposed on from without. This is not the case; to revisit the slave example, consider a polity whose internal affairs were left untouched, but from whom a tribute or tax was regularly demanded. We should rightly consider that an infringement of their freedom, as a nation, but equally importantly, though the external suzerain did nothing *by their own action* to the internal politics or policies of the tributary, the tributary must respond to the wishes and concerns of the suzerain, must live in perpetual fear of increased tribute or displeasure. Such a view has notable implications for political policy, especially if we expand the range of suzerains. If a state is beholden to its creditors, outside its ability to control, does it remain free? What of a state whose populace is overcome with loyalty to an external religion, such that that religion wields immense socio-political power? Perhaps Pettit might respond that these too are instances of domination, as opposed to a loss of (collective) discursive control. The distinction seems increasingly muddled.

To re-examine Kaa, one might also note that autonomy seems particularly injured by the prospect of abuse, no matter the likelihood. Consider the prospect that, having presented a paper at a conference of some kind, some abusive individual will charge onto the stage and begin lecturing you at length on why you are wrong in considerable detail. Pettit notes, and I concur, that we cannot make allowances for timidity (Pettit 2012, 84-85) Suppose however that you have good reasons, or even good but ultimately false reasons, for thinking this might happen, rather than being a paranoid fear

brought on by stress or anxiety. One might take reasonable actions – informing conference staff, leaving the stage briskly, etc. Yet this will undoubtedly have damaging effects on one’s confidence, goals, and purpose.

This seems contrary to Pettit’s intentions, especially as he notes we must guard against possible abuse (Pettit 2014, 105) and a loss of democratic influence and effective control (Pettit 2012, 239-240, 303-310). There may be very good reasons to place autonomy as a political goal as part of liberty, and thereby to protect it. In the next chapter, the thesis will begin not simply to defend Pettit’s arguments, but to move beyond them. A key change will be the protection of autonomy and thus agency as a distinct goal for Pettit’s political apparatus. The next chapter therefore begins with the outline of said apparatus, followed by further support of autonomy being a vital component of republican liberty.

Chapter Two

Section One – Pettit's political requirements

In the prior chapter, the thesis discussed liberty, and concluded that it is best characterised as non-domination: individuals are free to act if and only if they are not subject to uncontrolled interference, based on Pettit's theory of discursive control: we may say someone is freely *acting* if and only if they have the capabilities and protections necessary to contribute to a discourse. Despite some criticisms, it was established that non-domination remains preferable to the alternatives as a conception of liberty. But there are more factors to consider if non-domination is to be of use as a theory. This chapter will focus on many of Pettit's preferences for understanding and implementing non-domination. The first to be covered, via this section, are his implementation of non-domination in consequentialist terms, and his prerequisites for government, especially his specific demands for the democratic government in any society based on republicanism. This is particularly relevant, because the demands Pettit outlines necessitate a great deal of political stability and democratic support – which the thesis will go onto argue are directly threatened by capitalism as a system.

Pettit's view is broadly consequentialist (Pettit 2001, 129, Pettit 2012, 123-127, Pettit 2014, 213), although in a constitutive, not causal sense, as he notes in *On the People's Terms*. This approach has numerous benefits, in terms of what it justifies and permits, and in the ways it refutes traditional objections against utilitarianism. As Pettit notes, a consequentialist approach allows for flexibility in the organisation of society, not only in its overall blueprint, but if a small denial of liberty in one place provides far greater gains in another (Pettit 1997, 97-102). Consequentialism also justifies the practical implementation of Pettit's views, however. If we were to adopt a deontological approach to non-domination, never violating it, it remains unclear how any democratic state could arise from a despotism or oligarchy. For once the despotism had been set in place, the rights of the despotic

would surely have to be violated. This does not necessitate violence: Pettit mentions a general strike and mass unionisation as the imposition of the majority's will upon the minority (Pettit 2014, 105).

As for the denial of traditional objections, to give one example, it is unclear how a utility monster (Nozick 2013, 41) would work in such a schema; one could not justify an infinitely free person (or class of people) by reference to their freedom being so much better than everyone else's.

Utilitarianism is not consequentialism, but even so. One might be subjected to worse and worse privations of freedom (Pettit 2012, 44-47) and of increasingly worse kinds – vitiation, invasion, vitiation and invasion – but non-domination is the absence of any invading kind (Pettit 2012, 59-64). There may be ways to expand the range of non-domination (Pettit 1997, 97-99) but we may say only that someone is dominated or un-dominated. There are no degrees of non-domination, just areas where it does and does not exist/apply.

In the same way, Pettit suggests three basic rules of thumb in *Just Freedom*. To restate the eyeball test, no-one should be so far above or below any other person that they cannot look them in the eye and have a discourse in disagreement (Pettit 2012, 84-87). The tough luck test holds that citizens of a state should be reasonably convinced that any decision against their interests is not the result of malign will, or a state hostile to them, but simply an unfortunate occurrence, to be expected on occasion as a result of the democratic process (Pettit 2014, 142-144). Thirdly, the straight talk test is that individuals, and the governments that represent them, should be neither deceitful, nor overbearing, nor timid and deferential in their approach. They should be able to discuss their business plainly and honestly, with their statements at face value. These more general principles are upheld above more specific axioms because Pettit takes there to be no iron-clad rule about when “enough is enough in providing for justice, democracy, or sovereignty” (Pettit 2014, xxvii).

Pettit imposes further shape on how a government should be but this will be discussed later in the chapter. Note, however, that these goals – while somewhat nebulous – are significantly less abstract than utilitarian notions like happiness or pleasure. Pettit does not mandate whether they should be individual actions or general rules, sidestepping that particular dilemma.

This is not to say that consequentialism of Pettit’s kind is without disadvantages or critique. Set this to one side for the moment; what implications does consequentialism have for republican action? Pettit argues for consequentialism in general in the *Inescapability of Consequentialism* (Pettit 2012b), in which he proposes a specific kind of consequentialism in response to the hostility levelled against it by critics. The right action is that which promotes (ideally, maximises) the good (Pettit 2012b, 51), but by predisposition/nature as well as complex deliberation. It is equally valid to want to be a good friend and help a friend out, as it is to weigh up the pros and cons of my actions – and possibly more so, as such deliberation is complicated³⁵. More importantly, Pettit defends consequentialism’s inescapability by arguing it is necessary to judge competing social arrangements (Pettit 1997, 100).

In *On the People’s Terms* and in *Republicanism*, he defends its specific good for republicanism by several methods. In the former book, he notes that such a theory “associates justice with approximation to a certain goal” - passing the eyeball test, in this case. This gives it a certain flexibility that permits many broad variations on methodology, and because it similarly does not require a “transcendental” ideal of justice (Sen 2009), nor does it lapse into ideal theory (Rawls 1993, 281-285, Kulicki 2010, 1-6), it can accommodate and assess many different forms of distributive justice. Much as with the general principles (eyeball test, etc) above, Pettit refuses to endorse a specific solution for a specific time and place.

35 Lest this be considered hyperbole, Bentham’s felicific calculus is undoubtedly a simplification, and it’s still unwieldy ().

Republicanism offers more specific arguments, with the two strongest being a: that permitting a lapse or failure in non-domination in some ways (Pettit uses the example of a parliament with specific, unfettered powers) which enhances non-domination overall seems rather more compelling than to seek an idealised form of constitution or government which may never yet be realised, and which in the attempt would make matters worse;³⁶ and b: that a deontological approach to realising non-domination would render it difficult to discern which institutions optimise freedom, and deprive the state of empirical testing to see what might work (Pettit 1997, 97-102, Mill 1974, 95-99).

One may thus form the impression that Pettit is overly vague: because of the teleological nature of his arguments, almost anything could be permitted, provided it advances the cause of non-domination. That this resembles the supposed manipulation of non-limitation, which Pettit found unacceptable (Pettit 2001, 130-132) may suggest a certain hypocrisy. This is only the case, however, if Pettit imposes no restrictions upon such maximisation of non-domination. Pettit does, however, impose restrictions via highly specific requirements for a government to be legitimate, also requiring that any such interference be controlled by the individual(s) in question (Pettit 2001 159-174, Pettit 2012, 300-303), this being accomplished via numerous democratic and judicial mechanisms. Pettit's consequentialism therefore has a hard core of deontological principles, which seemingly cannot be violated. As he notes in *Republicanism*, if maximising non-domination required efforts which were entirely repugnant (such as brainwashing), then one would question the point (Pettit 1997, 102).

Republican government's wide-ranging mandate can be contrasted with the narrow requirements Pettit sets for legitimacy. In *A Theory of Freedom*, Pettit outlines the danger of government overreach and exerting inescapable power (Pettit 2001, 152-156), proposing that the only way to avoid non-domination in society is to maintain a democratic state which tracks to commonly

³⁶ This is similar in thrust to the objection to utilitarianism that the best way to guarantee the maximisation of happiness is to not attempt to do so (Williams 46-48, in Scheffler 1988).

avowable interests. It does this by providing authorial and editorial control – the ability for people to consider and propose many avenues of policy, and then to eliminate those which insufficiently track to the common interest (Pettit 2001, 156-161). Finally, for editorial control to work in a representative democracy, there must be additional democratic safeguards – procedural resources, such as formal separation of powers and a bicameral system; consultative resources, such as the British parliament’s requirement to discuss a petition signed by enough members of the public (); and appellate resources, such as the United States’ doctrine of judicial review (Encyclopedia Britannica, “Judicial Review”, Bodenhamer 2018, 37, Pettit 2001, 161-172).

This is expanded upon in his later works, but it is worth discussing the notion of common avowable interests in more detail. Pettit defines a common interest as a certain good, the collective provision of which is dependent upon whether it is supported by “co-operatively admissible considerations”. These are “(considerations) that anyone in discourse with others about what they should jointly or collectively provide can adduce without embarrassment as relevant matters to take into account. They are not selfish or sectional considerations” (Pettit 2001, 156-158). Importantly, this includes redistributive measures, as well as simpler but important considerations like what side of the road should be driven on. The avoidance of collisions, and the support of the infirm, both work as a common interest because even those who are both healthy and do not drive have may yet conceivably have reason to need them. Pettit suggests this may extend to specific support so that some may enjoy a commonly accepted good; if we accept that all individuals have a right to take pride in themselves and their cultural heritage, ethnic minorities may need subsidising to continue their traditions in the face of an indifferent, or even hostile majority. These points will be revisited in the rest of the chapter, but the clarification is needed here to help understand his points in *Just Freedom*.

Democratic legitimacy and the adequate provision of distributive justice are related, but distinct, for Pettit (Pettit 2012 130-131, Pettit 2014, xviii-xxiii). A state may display one, both, or neither; a just but illegitimate state (such as an authoritarian socialist state) could provide exceptional resources and preserve full material equality, but allow minimal political influence. Pettit phrases this as horizontal and vertical control (Pettit 2012, 140, 299-300). To restate briefly, a state is democratically legitimate when citizens can a: attribute any decisions against them to pure “tough luck”, and b: have unconditioned, efficacious, and equally accessible influence (and thus control) on government policy and actions, as they might with any other agent (Pettit 2012, 300-303).

For a state ordered on republican principles to be just, conversely, the first and foremost requirement is that its citizens be treated as equals (Pettit 2014, 4, 118-119). But this does not mean that all citizens must be treated equally; instead they must be treated equitably. This distinction is important for two reasons. First, such a policy is consistent with the account of common interests noted above. Second, Pettit permits a degree of economic inequality that does not violate the eyeball test (Pettit 2012 84-85, Pettit 2014 80-84, 99-101, 104-105), which allows for a system of progressive taxation, while simultaneously enshrining certain property rights³⁷.

For the three basic tests to be met, Pettit suggests that large-scale government action is the sole effective remedy. Philanthropy or private charity is insufficient. The power that this gives a government is extensive, but if a government is democratically elected and legitimate as outlined above, then the potential for dominating power is minimised. The requirements may in fact seem radical by the standards of the liberal, democratic state: Pettit demands what he calls infrastructure, insurance, and insulation.

37 As chapters three and four make clear, this is not a position the thesis adopts.

Infrastructure consists of material and institutional infrastructure, with the former being things like roads and sanitation, and the latter being things like education, access to political and legal information, and market functions. Pettit explicitly rejects both anti-property and anti-taxation arguments, arguing for a robust series of property developments, including in “novel ways”. Insurance encompasses the provision of medical care, shelter³⁸ and nourishment, but also judicial and financial security, police services and carefully regulated banks. Lastly, citizens must be “insulated”, both from the potential legitimate control of others (employers, spouses, unions, etc) and the potential illegitimate control of others (crime, mainly). Just as with democratic legitimacy, many democratic states will not meet these ideals. It is easy to conceive of a legitimate democracy that due to historic debts is unable to supply proper education, healthcare, police, etc. Likewise, an illegitimate democracy that (perhaps out of paternalism) provides all or most of these requirements is both plausible and possible (Pettit 2012, 140).

Most importantly for Pettit, these requirements must be extended equally to all citizens, although as noted under the equity/equality distinction, this principle may result in different treatment in practice (Pettit 2014, 80-81).

Pettit’s requirements are consistent with non-domination; if properly implemented, they would do a great deal to extend freedom by protecting from vitiation, and also domination from both private individuals and the state. Some concerns remain with his views on non-domination per se, however. One such concern is that Pettit’s definition of non-domination is incomplete on two grounds. First, without guaranteeing discursive control, Pettit’s lengthy list of requirements is ultimately meaningless. Second, it lacks an understanding of structural or systemic domination, e.g. where individuals or groups might find themselves dominated not by any specific entity, but by structures

38 This arguably places Pettit in support of socialised housing, but this leaves individuals substantially dependent upon the state’s goodwill, which could allow for domination. Some form of right to buy may be necessary.

and systems like laws, economic practice, etc.. This latter ground is discussed further in section two, immediately following.

Equally important problems are his views on corporate power and material inequality, but the thesis will argue that Pettit's response to both are insufficient. Corporate power is discussed in far greater detail in chapter three, as it is most effective as a criticism once structural and systemic domination have been acknowledged. Material inequality, however, is more self-contained as a critique, and will be discussed briefly before we turn to the more complex problem of discursive control.

Pettit acknowledges the necessity of resources to enjoy freedom (Pettit 2012, 85-92) and the corrosive effects of material inequality (Pettit 2012, 90). He outlines a number of proposals for accomplishing the desired equality, sometimes quite radical by modern standards (Pettit 2014, 104-106). He errs, however, on the side of caution. Quite apart from the matter of corporate power, Pettit fails to consider just how easily inequality can arise out of private property. Consider the stock market. It is possible, although implausible, to achieve considerable wealth from passive investment. £50,000 becomes £5,000,000. At that point, no domination of a personal nature has taken place. Stretching probability still further, the investments may not even have relied upon businesses where domination is used as a tool. In any capitalist system there will be winners and losers; progressive taxation and social security only does so much to mitigate this.

This is not an insurmountable difficulty for Pettit, but it is one on which he seems loath to give ground. In *Just Freedom*, he suggests that some form of private property be retained, although he gives little guidance about its exact form; he seems more concerned with the prospect of union coercion than with that of large-scale swings in private finance. The latter, however, is a far greater threat to the eyeball test and loose material equality; at extremes, it seems utterly indefensible. Pettit of course distinguishes between the power of dominium and imperium; private property offers the

former, not the latter, and those within their power can depart it at any time, and – in a society adhering to non-domination – fight abuse of that power (Pettit 2001, 152-154). This is contingent on society operating as it should, however. In an imperfect society, which Pettit acknowledges will almost certainly be the case, it is distinctly possible for such power to be *de facto* inescapable and unanswerable.

The thesis will therefore argue, contrary to Pettit, that private property³⁹ should be tightly regulated, if it is to be permitted. The exact form of these regulations will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four. For now, it is enough to note that any such regulations should protect the right of individual exit, establish a ceiling on private wealth, and not permit vital industries to pass outside of the control of a democratic state. This will be referred to as strict material equality, in contrast with Pettit's support of loose material equality. Before moving to the discussion of systemic domination as a problem, it is necessary to revisit autonomy in the context of Pettit's political practice.

Discursive control, and non-limitation, were initially rejected by Pettit on the grounds of potential overreach. Requiring it as a "political ideal" would have been overly demanding, and possibly totalitarian (Pettit 2001, 127). In the previous chapter, its importance in guaranteeing free agency was discussed, as was the way it aided in distinguishing republican freedom. Its absence, however, renders one of Pettit's main demands for democratic legitimacy far less coherent. A nation comprised of many non-autonomous individuals might go through the motions of democracy; it may even, by some happy accident, serve non-domination. Although the individuals have the *formal* means to influence government effectively, however, they either do not do so, or they do so blindly, without actual understanding or knowledge of its workings. They are incapable of joining

39 Private property in the Marxist sense is discussed later; as it is used here, this includes personal property for consumption, but it certainly applies to the means of production. Given the power private ownership of factories, tenements and transportation enterprises confers, we may ask if private ownership of any of these things is tolerable.

or comprehending political discourse. Acting to minimise its deprivation is necessary for Pettit's political requirements to be sustained, while averting concerns about overreach.

Four additional reasons recommend the inclusion of autonomy as a "political ideal"; autonomy must be supported and protected, as liberty is, by any republican state. First, autonomy provides an important distinction between republicanism and negative libertarian theories, and not to make use of it renders Pettit's distinction between non-interference and non-domination less coherent (Pettit 1997, Pettit 2001 133, 136, Pettit 2012, 26-28), as outlined in chapter one.

Second, Pettit's arguments for rejecting discursive control are unpersuasive (Pettit 2001, 126-128). His concerns about psychological improvement can be answered by taking an approach of minimising influences upon autonomy, instead of promoting it; autonomy and agency may not be improved by environmental action, but the quality of a discourse clearly could be, and individual autonomy should indeed be all that a government concerns itself with, as opposed to the collective. But this means a narrowing of scope, not an abandonment entirely.

Third, autonomy seems inherent to the value of liberty in itself. This does not mean that it is an element that government can usefully support, which is Pettit's claim. But it still has a strong value towards the resources needed to effectively utilise freedom effectively. Pettit may assume a more robust economy and discourse which would aid in the effective provision of autonomy absent government intervention; that people would be able to educate and protect themselves, thereafter engaging in active civic participation and contestation (Pettit 2012, 226-229). It is feasible that individuals may find themselves in a position where a great many environmental and interpersonal impositions on their will persist and will continue to persist – they may not even be aware of these

impositions – without external assistance⁴⁰. A democratic government seems the only justifiable entity with both the power and legitimacy to offer said assistance.

Fourth, autonomy seems to be a key component of individual relationships. One may be subservient without the loss of psychological autonomy, but consider the case of otherwise equal individuals where one, via psychological manipulation, undermines the other's very self and creates dependency where none was originally present. Techniques like gaslighting, "negging" etc (Dorpat 1994, 91-96) seem to create instances where autonomy and discursive control have been lost, but the majority of actions undertaken as part of that relationship do not constitute uncontrolled interference. Indeed, the abused individual may leave safely at any time, but do not consider themselves able to do so. To not encapsulate this sort of threat within republican freedom and its guarantees seems indefensible. Which is precisely why Pettit objects to a very similar example in *Just Freedom* (Pettit 2014, 42-43); it would take little to change the example to one which threatened autonomy, not liberty.

The protection envisaged can be done without psychological revelation or making grandiose claims about what an individual's mind "should" be. Indeed, all it requires is that an individual should have the sufficient internal capabilities to contribute to a discourse, and to be held responsible for their actions. A good way to envisage autonomy of this kind is to borrow Maslow's term of self-actualisation (Maslow 2013, 19). For Maslow, self-actualisation is the highest potential need to be achieved. It consists in the realisation of one's fullest potential, unhindered by anything else. This is far too demanding an ideal, but the pursuit, and the idea of such self-actualisation, is not. In the same way we might compare freedom to the rights, duties and capabilities inherent in a discourse, autonomy can be compared to the pursuit of self-actualisation as a useful shorthand. When an individual can clearly examine clearly their own desires and skills, can elaborate on what drives

40 Such as alienation might bring. The thesis examines alienation shortly, in section three.

them and what they desire, and can speak in ways that they might change themselves, and how that change might be accomplished, they have all that they need to be considered autonomous individuals. It is this autonomy that republicans must support and, where possible, protect.

Section Two – Moving on from Pettit, and structural domination

In addition to presenting and holding to his democratic requirements, the proposals of the thesis have undergone a substantial departure from Pettit in advocating the tight regulation of private property (strict material equality) and in the promotion of discursive control as a political goal (self-actualisation). A further issue is worth considering in detail, and this is the notion of structural (or systemic⁴¹) domination. The thesis' definition of structural domination is where the structure of a given group – whether that group is a state, a private club, or a corporation – entails the domination of (some of) the individuals comprising it. Systemic domination refers to those cases where it is not a matter of organisational structure or policy, but where social norms or unofficial practice entails the domination of (some of) the individuals in said structure. The distinction is a fuzzy one, and often overlaps – one example would be the highly racist customs and beliefs to which the Jim Crow laws and segregation lent official backing, in the United States (Fremon 2015, 9-33, Shelby 2016, 43-46, 196). One kind of domination informs and supports the other. If structural domination were accepted, further political change would be necessary to ensure non-domination, as well as greater protections on the systemic level.

Pettit notably does not advance an account of domination which allows for structural or systemic domination. While he is acutely aware of the prospects for large material or social inequalities to court domination, and he is aware that a seemingly democratic government can be perverted to become non-representative (Pettit 1997, 167-170 Pettit 2012, 232-238), he seems to consider the individual as being in a state of personal domination and subservience in each individual instance. To use the example of the Jim Crow laws again, Pettit might argue that a black or mixed-race individual who was stripped of important freedoms and protections to allow for non-domination may find himself in circumstances that are extremely conducive to domination, but the

41 The two will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis, as they are highly similar, if not identical strictly speaking.

circumstances (and the system that perpetuates them) are merely a backdrop to the individual power relations⁴². They do not dominate in themselves.

This may seem a spurious distinction. Just as Pettit is concerned with large material inequalities, so he is with large social ones (Pettit 2012, 262). These circumstances qualify as vitiating hindrances (Pettit 2012, 38-40) at least and should be eliminated on that account alone. It may therefore appear that any case of systemic or structural domination is simply an egregious case of vitiation, or a failure of legitimate, democratic government. In the latter case, the domination is still one entity/agent exerting its will upon the other; it is merely a group agent against an individual one⁴³. For the distinction to be useful, a paradigm case is necessary. An obvious case arises from the work of Engels, *The Conditions of the Working Class in England*. At the time of writing, most of the workers in question did not have suffrage. Their status of subservience and the domination from above had little to do with their lack of political representation, however. Nor was there a clear case of aristocratic privilege, as there had been with the yeomanry and peasants. There was certainly a bourgeois privilege, in violation of the eyeball test, but this would rarely occur directly – when the owner of their factory toured it, perhaps. Much like the slave example from Skinner, they were too far removed to exercise that power, although their representatives – foremen and the like – might have been empowered and subjugated by it at once.

Instead, it is the system as a whole which degraded the workers' sense of worth, ruined their health, and forced them into a state of dependency and misery. They were not dependent upon the goodwill of any individual capitalist, but upon the fickleness of the system in which they existed and to which they were enslaved, a system over which they had no control whatsoever. No individual

42 Pettit uses a very specific definition of power, which is expanded on in the next section. The important point for this argument is that his definition of power necessitates an agent (Pettit 1997, 78-79).

43 An alternative take would be that one group agent (supposedly accountable democratic government) is dominating another group agent (any given ethnic group). The actual logic changes very little.

agent held their chains, or profited from their effective enslavement. The system as a whole could not survive without their subjugation (Engels 2005, 127-157, 278-292.)

This is closely related to certain arguments by Gerald Cohen, who argues for a case of “collective unfreedom” (Cohen 2011, 156-163) on the part of the working classes, comparing this to a situation wherein many individuals are locked in a room – one can get a key and escape, but if he leaves, he dooms the rest to remain. While Cohen couches this argument in terms of non-interference, it is no weaker for non-domination; it is in fact stronger, because his original argument makes no mention of subservience. In such a circumstance, absent enormous solidarity on the part of the locked group, anyone who can offer a key (or even the possibility thereof) wields tremendous power, of a kind which demands deference if one’s goal is not to be thwarted.

To say that it is still merely one agent dominating another misses the point. It is not simply a lack of resources which results in a vitiating hindrance; the hindrance, although caused by no obvious person (as is the case with the widespread poverty in the modern world), is an entirely invasive one, because it opens one up to desperation; from desperation, to manipulation and coercion, because of the need to escape.

It is at this point that the thesis turns to Fabian Schuppert⁴⁴. Schuppert writes of republicanism’s need to embrace “social equality”, which he writes as being concerned with social relationships; seeking to eliminate those that are negative, or create a hierarchy of some kind (Schuppert 2015, 443-445)⁴⁵. In this, there is considerable overlap with republicanism, but the two are not identical.

In particular, Schuppert identifies three major issues facing Pettit’s account of non-domination, in

⁴⁴ Other authors have noted similar concerns – see also Alex Gourevitch (Gourevitch 2013, 602-610), Michael Thompson (Thompson 2013, 282-294), etc, for discussions of structural domination.

⁴⁵ Two important caveats for the thesis when dealing with Schuppert: first, he focuses primarily on social, rather than economic, inequalities. This causes certain problems in his definition of alienation, which is dealt with in the next section. Second, Schuppert states that social egalitarianism does not focus on exact principles of material distribution (Schuppert 2015, 444). The thesis is concerned with both relationships and economic distribution, as the two are much less separable than Schuppert appears to think. The next section argues for their interconnectedness, following Fraser.

that it fails to account for social vulnerability, unintentional domination through social-cultural practices, and the complexity of social inequalities (Schuppert 2015, 446-448).

Schuppert's critique comes from the position of "social egalitarianism", whereby a society cannot be equal on the basis of distribution alone, but must allow for socio-economic relationships which are (broadly) fair and equal. Republicanism, per its concern for social dynamics, is perhaps better equipped than traditional egalitarians to support and respond to such a critique. However, the bulk of Pettit's methods focus on a just distribution or upon top-down, governmental apparatus to accommodate such relations, while social egalitarianism focuses on everyday life as much as anything else (Anderson 2017, xix-xxiii). Given that the thesis is primarily occupied with the highly inequalitarian distribution of wealth capitalism creates, and from there its adverse effects, the thesis does not commit itself to a strict social egalitarianism, and remains focused upon the republican perspective. This does not mean that social egalitarian critiques are invalid, only that the thesis is committed to a solution that satisfies republican principles, not social-egalitarian ones. Clearly, Pettit's "expressive egalitarianism", as he defines it, is insufficient by such a critique.

Each of Schuppert's concerns illustrates the problems of structural and systemic domination as the thesis has defined it. Acute social vulnerability consists not only in the expected material inequalities and failures to meet the standards of the eyeball test (which Schuppert discusses briefly), but in individuals or groups being deprived of self-recognition; they are unable properly to exercise what Pettit would term discursive control, what Schuppert calls the "inner conditions of free agency" (Schuppert 2015, 446-447). Schuppert acknowledges Pettit's awareness of the danger to freedom such disruption poses, particularly if one takes the position, as the thesis does, that discursive control must be supported. But such vulnerability may not be the product of specific, personal

domination; it can equally be cultural, economic, or even linguistic “misrecognition” (Schuppert 2015, 447).

Unintentional domination is an insidious development of such vulnerabilities; it is easy to display bias accidentally, even unconsciously. When such biases result in dismissal, in keeping others in their “rightful place”, they become toxic to non-domination. Yet they are systemic, not personal, although they may be used in the context of personal domination. Citing Krause, Schuppert points out that an authoritative woman may be seen as “strident, overly demanding, nasty – even to other women.” (Schuppert 2015, 448). A woman may therefore conform to the “proper” behaviours and find herself slowly forced into silence, entirely unconsciously on her part and the part of those around her⁴⁶. She might, on the other hand, find her non-compliance used as a pretext for holding her back, while men demonstrating the same behaviours are promoted ahead of her. Likewise, it is possible for unintended consequences to result in domination (Schuppert 2015, 449). Without intent, it is difficult to state that it is subservience to, or domination by, any specific individual.

Such problems are unsurprisingly complex, both in presentation and in potential solutions. Pettit – according to Schuppert at least – is ill-equipped to handle such complexity, especially in cases where “socially constructed illegitimate inequalities are perceived as unobjectionable natural inequalities and differences” (Schuppert 2015, 449).

Structural domination thus seems a useful amendment to Pettit’s arguments, one which ties in neatly with the prospects of subservience and loss of discursive control. One major implication of its acceptance is to tie liberty to equality even tighter; while republican freedom, especially as Pettit argues it, necessitates social, political and some degree of economic equality (Pettit 2012 78-92, Pettit 2014, 80), adopting social egalitarianism’s critique of republicanism would make such

46 The bias towards authoritative women in the workplace and elsewhere has been studied; it is not simply anecdotal. (Rudman and Kilianski 2000, 1315-1316).

equality even more demanding. Pettit's proposed solutions, while helpful, would ultimately be insufficient. Lovett makes use of a similar criticism against Pettit, wherein he points out that any just economic distribution reduces personal and systematic non-domination, and hence distributive justice instrumentally serves the cause of republican liberty. Therefore, we are obliged to adopt "the operation of those political and social institutions or practices most likely, given our present knowledge and expectations, to minimize domination in the long run." (Lovett 2009, 823).

Lovett argues for universal basic income as a solution, in part because he views justice as procedural: "Notice here that the justice of a distribution is strictly procedural: it is a question of what the 'ground rules,' so to speak, of society should be, not the actual pattern of holdings arising from those rules per se." (Lovett 2009, 823). Universal basic income would not, however, solve the problems social egalitarianism raises. It would be palliative, and certainly an improvement, but it would not be an effective solution in itself. Any such solution would need to secure stricter socio-economic equality, following the logic of the previous section. It would need to prevent concentrations of power or socio-economic inequality that could threaten an individual's status as a "free and equal person" (Schuppert 2015, 450-451), which is wholly incompatible with corporate power⁴⁷. Lastly, such a solution would need to protect an individual's status as a free person, in that it would need to address the potential loss of discursive control. Schuppert emphasises this prospect as alienation, and it is discussed more fully in the next section.

47 The relevance of this will be established shortly.

Section Three – Non-alienation, Marxist alienation, and the Socialist Critique

Schuppert's critique of non-domination does not end with structural or systemic domination. He also offers an account of alienation, which he holds that Pettit's own definition of non-domination cannot address effectively, and which still seems to be a distinct problem for autonomy, if not liberty. As the thesis established in the first section that autonomy is a critical component of liberty, and we must maintain discursive control as optimally as possible, alienation of any kind is a considerable problem. This section discusses alienation, and in doing so, highlights numerous other concerns in the same vein, following a Marxist critique of Schuppert and the accompanying structural elements necessary to sustain it. It will be argued that the Marxist analyses of class, exploitation and power are not incompatible with a republicanism that allows for structural domination.

Schuppert's definition of alienation is as follows:

“Alienation from oneself means that an agent fails to see herself as a legitimate source of claims and reasons, that is, the agent does not realize her capacity for freedom because of a range of autonomy-undermining experiences of misrecognition, powerlessness, voicelessness and exclusion.”

He is keen to contrast this with non-domination, because an individual may be dominated but not alienated, or vice versa. Alienation attacks autonomous reasoning and self-respect, denying the basic agency – the fitness to be held responsible, to act with a clear goal and real identity – that Pettit rightfully recognises as a pre-condition for freedom (Schuppert 2015, 447).

He also defines the principle of non-alienation:

‘The principle of non-alienation holds that a society should protect all its members against social relationships and structures in which inequalities in power, status differences, institutional mechanisms, social practices or cultural artefacts lead to a person’s loss of self-respect or alienation from herself through the explicit or systematic disrespect of the affected person’s (or group’s) status as socially free and equal.’

(Schuppert 2015, 451)

His reasoning for this partially descends from Pettit’s own eyeball test, and partially from various critiques of Pettit, most notably Garrau and Laborde, “namely, that misrecognition and structural forms of disrespect can impact on the vulnerable self” (Schuppert 2015, 451), and thus leads to a collapse of discursive control and individual autonomy; the agent is unable to actively to exert discursive control, or to return to Pettit’s earlier terminology, they will be unable to live up to their own legacy, as they will be constantly estranged from their own person (Schuppert 2015, 447, Pettit 2001, 86-87). The thesis has already accepted that in order for a republican ideal of freedom to be coherently applied, society must allow for individual autonomy, as well as removing interpersonal and impersonal restraints. Pettit’s lack in this regard has also been established. Therefore, it makes sense to accept Schuppert’s critique here, as with structural domination. A distinction could also be usefully drawn between self-respect and self-esteem (McBride 2013, 63-67, 72-75, 128-130, Shelby 2016, 98). We are not alienated if we are not socially honoured and lack public worthiness and advantage because of it. We are alienated if we no longer see ourselves as having any value at all.

There are, however, certain problems. One of Pettit’s major concerns with non-limitation was the potential for coercion or manipulation if overall limitations for all were reduced (Pettit 2001, 131). Schuppert gives little indication as to how this principle should be expressed in society. Assume a

society with deep racial divisions manages, against probability, to elect a government eager to employ republican principles, and that this government has enough power to enact and enforce any new laws it wishes⁴⁸. Some protections will be obvious – a ban on racial discrimination and segregation, the right to sue in cases of such discrimination in the workplace, the removal of old laws and stronger support for the social identity of the marginalised. This will do a great deal to protect against such alienation. Other elements of racism will be harder to remove. There may be unspoken assumptions of criminality, subtle but critical differences in treatment. Over time, these attitudes may lessen, but persistent racial tensions and conflicts within America – to give but a single major example – suggest otherwise.

If we are to maximise non-domination and non-alienation, this presents us with three problems. First, the two may come into conflict, as the above paragraph's example suggests; in order to correct such sentiments and protect individuals from a constant encroachment of alienating social norms (Pettit and Brennan 2004, 268), the most effective methods involve both controlled interferences in the forms of laws and policy, and uncontrolled interferences such as requiring an individual to support practices they may find morally objectionable. These need not be mere racial prejudices, either. One may consider the example of a Cuban exile whose distrust and distaste for the communist regime leads them to reject almost all government intervention, no matter how well-intentioned.

Second, it is often unclear whether an action results from prejudice or not, and the threshold at which expectation becomes disrespect or condemnation of someone's status as free and equal. For example, at what point does a stereotype of behaviour become a disrespectful one, and when should we be obliged (by the principle of non-alienation) to correct or suppress it?

48 To forestall a potential objection, assume any law not consistent with republican principles would lack the internal support to be passed.

Third, Alvarez highlights a potential issue of “persistent minorities” in *Democracy for Idiots* (Alvarez 2016, 960-965). A group may be alienated in some way without it being obvious, or without any risk of accompanying domination. It is almost impossible to bring this into mainstream political debate; the legislation to address it would no longer be of a general and broadly “reasonable” (in the Rawlsian sense) kind, such as that already outlined, but highly specific. This situation may actually be worse when a minority is well-integrated, as their voices are dispersed, rather than acting as a singular bloc (Alvarez 2016, 960-965), creating tension between their identity, and presumable self-respect, and the ability to participate effectively in the democratic process.

Schuppert’s view must therefore be carefully moderated. Alvarez’s solution is to accept the presence of those who wish to self-alienate⁴⁹ as a distinctly political move. Such political idiocy would enable minorities to preserve their own self-respect and self-identity, at the cost of political capital and acknowledgement.

A means of answering the first and second problems can be found in Lukes, with a nod to Rawls. (Lukes 2005, 134-151, Rawls 1999 140-148). Lukes argues that a great deal of prejudice and illegitimate claims are in relation to “false consciousness”, and the inability of individuals to articulate their interests in a clear manner. Rather than assuming their interests or the validity of their prejudices, we should reconcile individuals with the need to recognise and respect impartiality; transcending their immediate self-interest. Lukes suggests this can be done via assessing one’s

49 To ensure there is no confusion, Schuppert, Alvarez and later Marx all use alienation in substantially different ways. Self-alienation here means the adoption of permanent residence and “political idiocy”, rejecting “mandatory citizenship” (Alvarez 2016, 972). It will be referred to hereafter as political idiocy, in the sense Alvarez uses it, to avoid it being conflated with either Schuppertian or Marxist alienation.

opinions and personal self-interest as “a function of one’s explanatory purpose, framework, and methods, which in turn have to be justified.” (Lukes 2005, 148 & Thompson 2015, 450-459)⁵⁰. In the context of Schuppertian alienation, Lukes’ justification argument can assist in two ways. Firstly, any policies, legislation and so on must be justified so they are impartial and reasonable (again, in the Rawlsian sense), ideally through consensus and discourse as favoured by Pettit (Pettit 2001, 157). To be both impartial and reasonable, any policy must treat all individuals equitably, respect discursive control, and, provided individuals respect these first two conditions, refrain from interference that would be uncontrolled. In such circumstances, there may be rational reasons to distrust government legislation, or political support of some minority group, but it is easier to identify and disavow illogical or irrational objections.

Secondly, it allows the consideration of individual conduct along similar lines. If an action would result in inequitable treatment or the disrespect of discursive control, then it should not be permissible. The threshold is not one which mere individual disrespect crosses. Even vile, unflattering stereotypes or racial slurs do not qualify, but the practical implementation of such biases would, as would language used to incite or dehumanise.

This still meets Alvarez’s worry, however: persistent minorities, by their very nature, may find it difficult to promote such impartiality, and may be ignored in widespread debate. While political idiocy may serve in part, there are doubtless socio-political, sexual or racial minorities that have no desire to remove themselves from the common society; they wish to be embraced, not kept at arm’s length by their own doing or someone else’s. It is difficult to see how such idiocy could be sustained by a sexual minority, for example, but the prospect of being dehumanised and alienated is a definite risk for them.

⁵⁰ This also has the benefit, if accepted, of supporting Pettit’s logic re: Ulysses. For interference to be condemned as arbitrary or uncontrolled, it must be demonstrated that one’s interests are not wholly selfish and/or irrational, which is not a particularly stringent requirement. It certainly supplies (more) justification for acting against an individual’s stated wishes in a crisis, for instance.

To this end, the thesis will accept the somewhat unpalatable conclusion that certain rights to free speech may be impeded to protect the self-respect of others, thus preserving overall discursive control. Ideally the rights and duties inherent in doing so could be enshrined in a constitution or legislation, but there is always the prospect of revanchism or uncontrolled interference. Should this be the case, political idiocy might be an effective remedy for certain groups, and one which could be acknowledged as a right in the same way.

Another criticism of Schuppert is that his concept of alienation is incomplete. In particular, his definition lacks a: the possibility that a person could be alienated from themselves without being aware of it, and b: an understanding of alienation whereby the individual is alienated not by a lack of respect, but by a degradation of their very existence as a person. Rather than being cast as something inferior, the individual loses something vital about their humanity. If Schuppertian alienation entails an inability to live up to one's own commitments (Pettit 2001, 82-90), then this kind of alienation entails that one cannot become a meaningful person in the first place – one is reduced to the status of an animal, with no goals beyond subsistence. Schuppert's definition necessitates awareness of one's plight.

Marx's definition of alienation includes both a and b. According to Marx, alienation arises out of the economic conditions in which mankind labours as a result of private property⁵¹ (Marx 1844). Because of the privation of these conditions, and especially because these privations only increase as an individual works harder to remove themselves from them, mankind are first alienated from their labour. Marx puts the point succinctly: "My work would be a free manifestation of life, hence an enjoyment of life. Presupposing private property, my work is an alienation of life, for I work in order to live, in order to obtain for myself the means of life. My work is not my life." (Marx 1844,

51 As opposed to personal property; see the explanation below.

Comment on James Mill.) While Marx gives this more seeming spirituality than the thesis might necessarily adopt, the concept is not intrinsically spiritual – human beings have a psychological need for accomplishment and productivity, a sense of creating or doing something of worth, that can easily be adopted in the same context (Hsee et al 2010, 928-929, Hsee & Yang 2019, 15-17, Norton et al 2012, 16-19). Labour purely to survive robs us of this vital feeling of accomplishment, of *worth*. While this is not a problem for Pettit's definition of autonomy per se, it exacerbates the problems which come after.

The second element of alienation more closely resembles Schuppert's – because of so much of what we do is labour or work of some kind, when it is alienated from us in the above way and further estranged by being done for another's behalf, it becomes repugnant to us - “mortification”, in Marx's words. “As a result, man (the worker) only feels himself active in his animal functions – eating, drinking, procreating or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc;” (Marx 1973, 111). We might extend this “feeling himself” to leisure time, in the modern day. Still, says Marx, this estranges us from ourselves, devolving into mere producers and consumers. It is this aspect of Marxist alienation that deprives us of meaningful coherence in what we are, for our existence has no content.

The third element of such Marxist alienation is that we are estranged from other men. Not only do we focus over-narrowly upon our “individual life” as opposed to our “life existence” and “species being”, but the fact that “man's species nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man's essential nature” (Marx 1973, 112-114). Thus, each person regards others not as beings like themselves, but competition, oppression, and hindrance⁵². This sense of competition is mentioned only briefly in Schuppert (Schuppert 2015,

52 The traditional Marxist critique of rights and duties, a core component of republican thinking, has also criticised rights-based theories for encouraging individuals to focus on their individual roles and practice to the detriment of solidarity; a focus on their own gain and circumstances

449-450), and even there he mainly focuses on its indirect effects. This is surely a problem for him as well, however, insofar as it makes the task of solving alienation still more difficult.

The end result of such alienation is that the average worker is bestial in appetites and sentiments, locked in a perpetual state of competition with his peers and with those above or below him in the economic structure he inhabits. Such alienation is as toxic to discursive control as Schuppert's loss of self-respect. It also seems to be an alienation in which those who are subjected to it may or may not be aware of their alienated status.

Unlike Schuppert, however, Marx's concept of alienation is highly dependent upon his understanding of class and private property, and his concept of exploitation. If it is intended to amend Schuppert's definition of alienation, then the thesis must give an account of class, private property, exploitation, and the power that accompanies them. Such an account must not only support Marxist alienation, but it must also prove coherent when dealing with republican theory. The thesis will tackle this issue of compatibility throughout the remainder of the section.

Marx's views on private property inform his theories on class and exploitation, so it is sensible to begin with it. Marxist theory draws a distinction between personal property – individual goods or commodities for consumption – and private property, the latter consisting in the means of production, land, and capital. The means of production are things like tools, factories, and raw resources in bulk; land accounts not only in terms of the actual physical land itself but in the rent due on such land; and capital consists of liquid wealth, shares, loans and other such financial assets. Human capital, in terms of skills and people alike, is merely another commodity to be bought and sold, (Marx 2008, 18-20, Marx 1867, etc). While Pettit supports the ownership of private property,

over the common good. This thesis takes no particular stance on the issue, and the Marxist conceptions of alienation, private property, and class need not be attached to any communitarian critique of rights.

he does not make a distinction between the two as Marx does (Pettit 2014, 67-72, 85). For the sake of clarity, the thesis will adopt the Marxist terminology. Thus, it may be possible for individuals to have a very large amount of personal property but no private property.

Marx's understanding of class is closely related to his theory of historical materialism, but the latter need not be accepted for the former to be coherent. The thesis will, to avoid a digression, discuss the former and take no particular stand on the latter. Marx argues that in the post-industrial society, class arises out of the ownership of private property. Those who own it have social, political, and economic power; those without are forced to sell their labour, resulting either in a precarious existence, or outright wage-slavery (Engels 1847, Sections 7 & 8). Thus, the great masses of the people become the proletariat; those with capital or land become the bourgeoisie. There are other classes, in Marx's view, and there is the prospect for stratification: the lumpenproletariat and aristocracy are examples of the first, and one can readily distinguish between the interests of a foreman and the workmen he oversees. But these are insignificant in the long run, from Marx's viewpoint.

In the more modern era, such sweeping class distinctions only make sense under considerable strain, although Piketty argues that we are rapidly approaching similar socio-economic conditions to Marx's own time (Piketty 2014, 20-27)⁵³. Even so, a large proportion of the United States' wealthiest gain their income from wages, not just capital and the management thereof. Stratification of the labour market has resulted in a dizzying array of jobs, payments and interests. The globalised nature of the world economy has introduced further complexity. It is plausible to speak of a global proletariat; it is also plausible to speak of wage-slavery on a grand scale.

⁵³ It is worth noting that Piketty makes little analysis of class himself (Olin Wright 2015, 134-138), but the data remains relevant for such analysis.

The term predates Marx, and hearkens back to older, “labour republican” (Gourevitch 2013, Claeys 1994, 252-257, etc) texts. Marxist and republican usage differ, by time as much as anything else. For such labour republicans it is a loss of economic independence, and submission to the will of another – wages represented a threat, one to be fought off with co-operation, averting structural domination (Gourevitch 2013, 595-598, Anderson 2017, 35-36). Marxist usage draws upon this in spirit, but Marx’s concern is twofold. First, by being placed into a position whereby their labour is sold for survival, the worker’s labour becomes a commodity. He is thus less well-treated even than a slave, who is a paradigm case for subservience and domination, because a slave is property, and represents to some degree an investment. The worker is replaceable from day to day, and is owned by the entire spectrum of those he would bargain for (Marx 1847). This is a key component of alienation, to be discussed later. It also broadens the conflict to one of class antagonisms, as opposed to individual workers or groups thereof. Second, Marxist wage-slavery accurately denotes that the division of property and the division of labour guarantee this in perpetuity. It is not possible to oppose it by trade-unionism or the like alone, nor does an improvement in living conditions which does not secure for the workers the opportunity to work on their own terms actually remove it; even the cooperatives Gourevitch suggests (Gourevitch 2013, 597) are palliative. An illustrative example of their distinctions can be shown in attitudes towards self-employment; under the labour republican account, self-employment would avert their concerns, in the main. For Marx, it is mostly irrelevant – the self-employed remain in a position where their labour must be sold, and even an enlightened employer is, in some way, exploitative.

The Marxist usage is probably more accurate to a post-industrial revolution capitalism, but the republican usage does highlight a particular republican difficulty with the wage economy. No man

can be the ruler of himself when he is dependent upon the good graces of another simply not to starve⁵⁴.

A more insidious problem, and one which the republican tradition emphasises over the Marxist one, is that of social status. For Marx, economic power confers status. Yet in the modern day, there are no small number of people for whom the reverse is true; by amassing rapid societal approval, it is possible to market and monetise one's own self. Celebrity culture allows personalities like Arnold Schwarzenegger to turn a film career into business capital and finally a political position. He is by no means the most egregious example.

We might therefore be more tempted to refer to Max Weber. Weber's account of class and power is very different; indeed, he notes that "the emergence of economic power may be the consequence of power existing on other grounds" (Weber Archive, 9.6). Class situation remains "ultimately market situation". But no true sentiment or class interest or class consciousness arises; what arises are reactions, which may share common trends in forms of "mass behaviour" (Gane 2005, 215-217, Weber Archive 9.6), but which give no sense of belonging or group identity. He distinguishes this from status, contrasting the American and German approach of businessmen towards their (class) inferiors; "it would be considered strictly repugnant – wherever the old tradition still prevails – if even the richest boss, while playing billiards or cards in his club would not treat his clerk as in every sense fully his equal" (Weber Archive, 9.6), to be contrasted with the German's socially conscious (and paternalistic) benevolence⁵⁵. Weber also differs by suggesting that status comes first; from this, social and economic monopolies soon spring:

54 Both republican and Marxist wage-slavery are exacerbated by the "Great Money Trick" (Tressell 1914, chapter 21); when wages, rent and jobs all depend on the same class, who also profit from the sold goods and squeeze the workers at each stage, the sheer hypocrisy of claiming markets embody freedom, or that freedom to sell one's labour is a guarantee of freedom (Nozick 2013 149-174, Mises 1998, 238-244, 279-285) is even more acute. This is discussed further in chapter three, section four.

55 He also discusses party affiliations, but these are of relatively little interest to the arguments here, save to note their theorised and observable tendency to turn bureaucratic (Gane 2005, 220).

“For all practical purposes, stratification by status goes hand in hand with a monopolization of ideal and material goods or opportunities... With an increased closure of the status group, the conventional preferential opportunities for special employment grow into a legal monopoly of special offices for the members. Certain goods become objects for monopolization by status groups, typically, entailed estates, and frequently also the possession of serfs or bondsmen and, finally, special trades.”

(Weber Archive, 9.6)

Setting power to one side, to be discussed later, Weber offers a more complex theory, but one which helps to explain the more complex nature of modern society, and thus may appeal more than the orthodox Marxist viewpoint (Burris 1987, 67). As Burris takes pains to explain, however, the Weberian account exists primarily as a theory of social action (Burris 1987, 69-72), and this too seems incomplete. Burris’ account of later Marxist thought suggests a synthesis is possible, where both the structure of society – and its accompanying demands – and the “fractional divisions within classes”, the narrower details, must be considered (Burris 1987, 86-87).

The end result is to consider “class” as much a matter of socio-political primacy as economic, and for the possibility of there being subdivisions within the Marxist proletariat and bourgeois based on these divisions (Olin Wright 2015, 13-14). One might consider the distinction between the “Nouveau Riche” and “Old Money” as being exactly this sort of social snobbery, despite effectively identical economic identities. But this does not mean we must embrace the Weberian apparatus entirely. Weberian analysis does not focus on class antagonisms, and instead focuses upon distribution and its effects on life-outcomes. Moreover, Weber does not believe such classes, and their interests, must perpetually be at odds (R Breen 2005, 32-24), nor does he account for

exploitation. There is a distinction in their views on the “long term trajectory” of capitalism (Olin Wright 2015, 38-39).

For, again following Piketty and the vast swathes of evidence available⁵⁶, inequality in many modern societies ensures that these divisions are mere taxonomies of the proletariat. There is an overwhelming majority who owns nothing, a smaller, rising gradient who own a little, and a handful who own increasingly vast amounts. The varying status differences mean very little in this context. Marx’s own definition of class lacks much account of social power. This does not mean that he was fundamentally wrong, merely incomplete. On this account, favoured by the thesis, economic class defines one’s position in society as the first and fundamental step. But social statuses of race, orientation, personal property and income, old money vs nouveau riche, etc, stratify and run through the class structure like veins of ore through rock. These divisions transcend class, and need to be taken into account. Fundamentally, class is about where one stands in relation to the means of production, and not distribution. Piketty’s analysis is troubling not simply because of the problems of distribution, but because it makes it clear that society never achieved control of production even during the “belle epoque”, etc. Because social status intersects with class, it can lead to problems Marx did not consider; Weber’s example of American businessmen and labourers is exactly this. And the need for recognition can obscure the need for redistribution, besides, which the thesis discusses now.

This understanding of class and status can shore up a particular facet of Schuppertian versus Marxist alienation. In *Redistribution or Recognition*, Nancy Fraser argues – in contrast to Honneth’s view in the same book – that unjust distribution and unjust recognition go hand in hand, although the two are not the same. She argues for a perspectival dualism, where each instance of

56 OECD data (OECD Inequality), UN data (UN 2018) CIA world factbook, (CIA.gov, World Factbook) and so on.

such must be unpacked into its separate components (Fraser & Honneth 2003, 60-94, 218)⁵⁷. This can be readily applied to alienation and class in the same way – almost every element of Marxist class struggle also involves some element of struggle for recognition, and his account of alienation is at least as much concerned with the dehumanising nature of the work as its complete severance of the rewards and fulfilment due to the worker. Weber’s concept of social status works in reverse; social status is at the very least helpful to amassing economic privilege. Schuppert’s view of alienation is concerned mostly with this lack of recognition and respect. If Marxist concerns about class and distribution are addressed simultaneously with Schuppert’s concerns about self-respect and republican concerns about discursive control, then both recognition and redistribution are achievable for the new theory⁵⁸. This would seem ideal.

Power and exploitation, for Marxist theory, go hand in hand. Unfortunately, Marxist exploitation has come under severe criticism to the point that there are not only competing definitions of what constitutes exploitation (Marx’s original view, Cohen, Roemer, Reiff etc – the Stanford Encyclopedia page (Stanford, Exploitation) has quite the range) but that it simply does not exist in a properly run economy (Hoppe 1993, 86-90), a view which is not endorsed by the thesis (Zafirovski 2003, 462-684). Defining it in traditional Marxist terms additionally requires an understanding of the labour theory of value (Whitaker, 22-32, Marx 1912, 145-202), which remains contested and is considered disproven (von Böhm-Bawerk 1949, etc), at least following most modern economic theorists. To cover the intricacies of this topic in sufficient detail might take an entirely separate thesis.

Understanding alienation without some view of exploitation is difficult, however. It is precisely because the worker, in Marx’s view, is deprived of the value (both in economic and in self-

⁵⁷ This argument is revisited in chapter five, section two.

⁵⁸ It should also be noted that Fraser’s correctness is not entirely necessary for this to be intelligible; it merely helps to explain the seeming blur between recognition and redistribution and Marx, and why Schuppert’s attempt to address the economic element of alienation falls slightly short.

realisation terms) of his labour that he is alienated from it; it is by the process of exploitation that he is so deprived. A different approach may be required; does republicanism have a concept of exploitation?

Pettit offers no such account. Vrousalis, however, offers a definition of exploitation that – while differing from the standard Marxist accounts – makes use of the same terminology and very similar principles, which he states in the paper *Exploitation, Vulnerability, and Social Domination* (Vrousalis 2013, 8). Vrousalis argues that material inequality and exploitation are distinct; exploitation is when one's economic vulnerability is utilised to obtain one's labour, or the fruits thereof (Vrousalis 2013, 6). He does not use Pettit's account of domination (Vrousalis 2013, 7-10) but his account is entirely compatible with it. Vrousalis concludes that exploitation is itself a kind of domination (Vrousalis 2013, 11), which may be individual or class-based. This distinction is worth drawing because a class-based exploitation/domination, which is systemic in nature, may lead to an individual, personal alienation, although the individual may not be personally dominated⁵⁹. The thesis will endorse Vrousalis' account, amended for Pettit's definition of domination, as an understanding of exploitation. While not explicitly Marxist, it allows for a class-based account of exploitation and domination (Vrousalis 2013, 10-11) which Pettit lacks and which is necessary for an intelligible account of Marxist alienation. Usefully, it also continues the "Neo-Marxist Synthesis" between Weber, Marx, and Pettit (Burris 1987, 79-82), as Vrousalis draws upon and expounds concepts mutually intelligible to all three. The end result is that the understanding of domination and class outlined here is explicitly Marxist, in that it focuses upon "patterns of exploitation and domination" as opposed to simple distribution and life chances (Olin Wright 2005, 23-28).

Two further points are worth considering. To forestall any objections in that vein, the thesis argues that just as collective subjects can be free or un-free, dominated or un-dominated, collective

59 Without such a distinction, any case of alienation would be a case of domination, and no additional principle would be necessary.

subjects can also be exploited. It is unclear whether they can be alienated, but if all members of a given group are alienated – if to be alienated is a pre-condition of being part of the group – it would seem absurd to argue that the group as a whole remains un-alienated. Following Pettit’s logic (Pettit 2001, 115-123), such a group can be exploited in the same way as an individual⁶⁰. Some collectives are, equally, fit to be held responsible for their actions (Pettit 2017, 1-23), especially if they are what Pettit calls conversable⁶¹.

Additionally, this kind of exploitation and ensuing domination should be of particular concern to republicans, as it allows for greater and greater distortions of economic power, privilege, and (in)vulnerability. Without some form of redistribution towards the poor – a redistribution that unfettered capitalism and a totally deregulated⁶² market does not provide – social mobility becomes crippled, wealth becomes stagnant and inherited, and domination easily ensues between those with wealth (and the power to match), and those without.

What then is power? For Marx, all political power springs from economic power, from the “dominant material relations” (Marx 2007, 64). Any “ruling ideas” spring from the same source (Marx 2007, 64). Depending on the division of property and labour, the class with the greater sum inevitably exerts socio-political power, and this translates to legal and ideological power. And this power is inevitably protected and sustained by the class structure about itself (Palermo 2007, 548-556), and parts of its apparatus (Miller 1984, 106-108). Later writers in the Marxist tradition have extended this further. Gramsci argues for a cultural hegemony, in that the ruling class not only exerts power in structuring society, but maintains power through presenting an ideology where

60 This is separate, but compounded by, Cohen’s arguments regarding collective unfreedom: if it is possible for any given individual to become un-exploited, but their un-exploitation requires that the remainder (or the vast majority) remain exploited, the group of individuals as a whole remains exploited, to recap.

61 A Marxist argument could be made at this point for the conversability of classes, arguing that bourgeois political parties speak for the ideology of the bourgeois as such, but this is not necessary for the thesis’ arguments. A class may not be a free agent in Pettit’s sense, even on a collective level, but such a class could still exist and still be a major component of systemic domination, which obviously requires no particular agent to occur.

62 There has never been a market without any regulations or rules whatsoever, but the presence of government or social regulation has a demonstrable trend towards controlling inequality (Calderon & Chong 2009, 65-79, Doerrrenberg & Peichl 2014, 1-21)

these structures are natural, beneficial for all, etc. Such ideological justification helps to obscure the true nature of these structures – that they are artificial, primarily beneficial to the ruling economic class, ruling social group, etc. It is not as straightforward as the ruling class simply handing values down to their “inferiors”, although they do provide “intellectual and moral leadership” (Gramsci 1999, 212).

Instead, unlike Marx, Gramsci argues for an “organic ideology” (Ramos 1982, S1-2), disparate elements are wedded into the ruling class’ interests and unified – not coerced, but co-opted. Thus Gramsci’s view is better able to explain the many divergent schools of thought and what seem to be political setbacks for the bourgeoisie. Useful opinions are not handed down but rather brought into the fold; defence of the status quo becomes praiseworthy and quietly claimed as their own (Ramos 1982, S2). Thus, we cannot simply think of the state – and its interests – as handing down their ruling ideas onto civil society, which will instead be influenced in part by their ideas, with others arising spontaneously. Of these ideas, the ruling hegemony will corrupt whatever they can into additional defences and justifications. Consider editorial decisions towards media from their corporate owners, scholarships offered by millionaires for anti-taxation economic research, or even the “prosperity theology” popular in the United States. Gramsci makes use of a metaphor of ditches and earthworks wherein the state is merely the outer and most difficult defence. This metaphor seems perhaps confused, but the overall sentiment remains valid: the hegemony as a whole must be overcome to enact revolutionary change and society provides considerable socio-political support to the state, by justification and otherwise (Egan 2014, 522-523, 532-535). Political power therefore does not simply spring from economic power, but from the ability to parlay that into greater and greater social control, which in a vicious cycle, justifies the economic power and status quo⁶³.

63 The Marxist account described here is not uncontested. Weber himself defines power as “the ability of an individual or group to achieve their own goals or aims when others are trying to prevent them from realising them”. He defines authority in a triadic way, not relying upon a class

Lukes argues that there are “three faces of power” - the making of decisions, the deliberate non-making of decisions, and ideological power in a similar fashion to Gramsci (Lukes 2005, 28-48).

The two views are thus complimentary. Each of these three faces of power can be applied economically, or socio-politically, to achieve a culture – “an ideological unity of a whole social bloc” (Bates 1975, 351) favourable to the rulers without them ever lifting a finger.

They do this by exerting themselves in the “iron hand” of political organisation and state apparatus (Pettit & Brennan 2004, 246, 255-256) when necessary, but more frequently in intellectual and media control⁶⁴ whereby their interests are defended as natural, eternal, and justified. Hegemony directs one to the invisible and intangible hands (Pettit & Brennan 2004, 245-246, 255-257) which have much the same effect. The “free marketplace of ideas” and communication in general is easily captured, because as a marketplace, those with the greatest economic power to support their ideas tend to win. In the intangible hand, it is easy to cast those unfavourable to the status quo as unfavourable altogether. The individuals who support this are not necessarily part of the ruling class, but are propped up by them and given a platform. They thereby “secure the “free” consent of the masses” (Bates 1975, 353).

For clarity, one should avoid thinking of current capitalism and the thinkers who support it as a wall, which must be knocked down or climbed over by new ideas, and which the bourgeois class will defend – possibly through violent means. Instead, it would be better to think in terms of constantly shifting webs or nets, which are produced by many different intellectual positions. As soon as one

definition (Lumen), which again means a conflict with Marxist thought. Lukes points out in his discussion of Marx and Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony that Gramsci’s account relies on “privileged access”, that Marxism does not explain how its thinkers are able to see “real interests” when others do not (Lukes 2005, 144-145). Lukes also points out the “dogmatism” inherent in Marxist accounts. Lastly, there are concerns that by conflating the ruling class with the ruling government of a given state, Marxism obscures the often substantial differences between the two (Miliband 1983, 63-76). This may only be more pronounced in an age of global capital, absent a global state, though one might claim in turn that this only shows a “triumph” of capitalism. To attend to all such challenges is beyond the scope of this thesis – indeed, a proper account of the concept of power in Marxism might require several volumes more.

⁶⁴ An issue to which the thesis returns in chapter three, in support of this exact point.

net is torn apart, another is cast over the individual (Bates 1975, 353-354). This is combined with the sheer exhaustion and futility of daily life: when one is concerned primarily with survival, one has little time to think about change. When one is systematically disrespected, one also loses the will to change things. This is why many dispossessed or disrespected groups are still further ground down, despite having the most reason to seek to change the current hegemony, thus fuelling Schuppertian alienation.

This can be adjusted in accordance with the previously adopted views from Weber and Vrousalis; there may be multiple, overlapping “ruling ideas”, which may come into conflict. An example may be the tensions between evangelical Christianity and financial interests in the United States. Likewise, there may be social movements which do not threaten the ruling status quo per se, and which can therefore be accepted. This is not enough, however, because as Gramsci notes (Lears 1985, 574-578), these ideas simply result into a divided, compartmentalised consciousness. Without opposition to the ruling hegemony as a hegemony, the discourse is inevitably rerouted to favourable ground, or even taken into the opposing ideological “space”, resulting in contradictory ideas. No sooner has opposition arisen than it is co-opted, with rare exceptions (Lears 1985, 577-579, 581), or else crushed. Disparate ideas serve little chance of genuine change, and as such, they only need to be opposed with great force when they show such signs. Otherwise, a benevolent neglect, a quiet scoffing of impracticality, is sufficient.

Ideological power must therefore be distinguished from economic power. It would not be sufficient to address the former alone, because ideological power A: props up the current economic power (Fontana 1993, 27-44, esp 32-33), and B: would serve as a method for the ruling classes, if displaced, to return to a position of influence, if not checked. To put it another way, social status

provides opportunities to become part of the true, economic elite⁶⁵, and ideological power is the expression of that status.

Marx's original critique would have posed something of a problem; because the thesis has already argued that class is not purely a matter of economic position, the theory would become somewhat incoherent. However, with the addition of ideological power, the view of class in the thesis is compatible with the more developed Marxist view on power which follows Gramsci. On such an account, while economic power is of primary importance, the social power exerted is still problematic because it can accomplish numerous ends for the status quo – especially backed by said economic power⁶⁶. Worse still, it obscures the artificial nature of that economic and social power, by acting as justification that may seem detached from it.

Pettit, by contrast, has a much more contained view. In *Republicanism*, he includes an appendix which contains a schema relating to power; he states that conceptions of power make different decisions at different choice points in the schema.

“1: Power is possessed by an agent (person/group/agency) OR by a system. 2: so far as that entity exercises OR is able (actually or virtually) to exercise. 3: intentional OR non-intentional influence. 4: negative OR positive. 5: in advancing any kind of result whatever OR, more specifically, in helping to construct certain forms of agency OR shape the choices of certain agents” (Pettit 1997, 79).

Pettit defines dominating power as an agent (individual or corporate) that is (actually) able to exercise intentional influence of a negative, damaging kind, in shaping what other people do (Pettit

⁶⁵ Or at least to suckle and feed upon them like a parasite (Galbraith 1992).

⁶⁶ The criticism of “millionaires being paid by billionaires” to propagate ideas favourable to them (Talking Points 2019) is of just this kind.

1997, 79). Two points merit attention. First, with Schuppert's critique of structural/systemic domination, the conception of power Pettit should endorse, and which the thesis endorses, involves an agent *and/or* a system on the first choice. Second, the Marxist conception of power would, if run through the same schema, thereafter neatly match up to this new conception with one important disagreement, this being number five⁶⁷.

This disagreement is not irreconcilable. It would be reasonable to concede that there may be many forms of power which are not a concern on normative grounds. For example, control of the means of production signifies that one has the power to destroy such means of production. Such a power dominates no-one in the process, but it is still a kind of power and authority. The concern for the thesis is clearly limited to power which results in domination.

The thesis will endorse a view of class as fundamentally Marxist with acknowledgement to social status as an important "trump" in conflicts, of private property in the strictly Marxist sense, of exploitation following Vrousalis, and power in both the broad (Marxist) and narrow (dominating) senses. Such are intelligible both to republican and Marxist theory. The thesis' principle of non-alienation is therefore the following:

"A society should protect its members against socio-economic relationships and structures in which inequalities in power/wealth/property, status differences, institutional mechanisms, social practices, cultural artefacts or economic competition lead to a person's loss of self-respect or alienation from the value of their work, humanity or discursive relationships through the explicit or systematic disrespect of the affected party's status as socially free and equal, or through the attendant economic vulnerability such relationships and structures permit."

⁶⁷ There may be an argument as to whether Marx, or succeeding Marxist theories (Gramsci, etc) allow for non-intentional usage of power. This is somewhat hamstrung, however, by the assumption of class-based domination and control, and in Gramsci's case, cultural hegemony. The bourgeois are unlikely to be unaware they are bourgeois, and the systems they construct (or support the construction of, following Gramsci) are designed for the sake of the bourgeois; this would seem to qualify as intentional.

Armed with a philosophically thicker concept of alienation, and the quasi-Marxist conceptual framework to support it, the thesis will now consider if there are any inequalities in power, differences in status, etc, which plague, as but one example, the United Kingdom. A moment's reflection suggests that there are a legion of such alienating factors, but they are not all equally pressing. In an ideal world, all such factors would be removed, but lamentably, we do not inhabit such an ideal world – as with government power, any given society will be more or less alienating, and preferable to the degree in which it is less so.

With that in mind, the most alienating factors should presumably be addressed first, to minimise the harms involved, following Pettit's consequentialist logic (Pettit 1997, 97-102). This can be judged in much the same way as Pettit argues; just as domination with interference and frustration is worse than domination with interference, but no frustration, which is in turn worse than domination without either (Pettit 2012, 68), an alienating factor will be more harmful to the extent it allows for more kinds and more severity of alienation. Exact precision is unnecessary; where a given factor falls may differ from person to person, but an overall picture can be constructed that serves to address a majority of alienating factors and/or entities.

This picture is incomplete, however, without considering the effect of power. Pettit distinguishes between dominium and imperium, private and public power. Both must be safeguarded against (Pettit 2011, 2014). Following Gramsci, one may often inform the other, and both are troublesome. Most alienating factors will have private power, but presumably, all other factors of severity being equal, alienating factors which exert public power should be treated as more harmful.

The thesis will focus on one factor of alienation in particular. It is severely harmful – it accounts for both the Marxist and Schuppertian ideas of alienation, in many different ways. It also makes use of public power, both in terms of drawing upon actual government power, and in exerting power akin to a government's, being inescapable, coercive on a broad and institutional scale⁶⁸, and being dominating to the extent that individuals have no voice, no authorial or editorial control over it (Pettit 2001, 153-156). This factor is what Hegel called “the rabble rich” (Hardimon 1994, 236-250, note footnote 8 on page 238), those whose wealth and power have arisen through the capitalist system, and who have parlayed that wealth and power into control, coercion, and domination.

Further detail is required for this view to be coherent. Pettit acknowledges material inequality's harm, as previously mentioned, and highlights corporate entities as potentially troublesome for freedom (Pettit 2014, 90-93), given their rights and powers. Pettit's solution will be discussed later in the thesis, but his discussion of such corporate domination is incomplete. He is right to be wary of corporate domination and power: corporations have corrupted governments and their apparatus (Caro & Ortega 2012, 48, Lawrence 2018 2-20), waged what amount to private wars in the developing world, sometimes via proxies (Montague 2002, 103-117), sometimes not (BBC 2012, Rajak 2016),⁶⁹ trampled the rights of indigenous populations (Jenkins & Yakovleva 2006 275, Miranda 2007 651-672) and so on. It is clear that a vital restraint is needed, and that government authority currently does not provide it to a sufficient degree. This too will be discussed later. If Vrousalis and the Marxist tradition are right, however, there may be systemic exploitation, and thus domination, on a larger and more general scale. Private interests, such as Pettit identifies, produce significant individual domination, and it is this that he has correctly identified as a threat. Such private interests also further the goals of a protected and entrenched class, however, creating privileges of wealth and power, and generating class-based antagonisms which are inherently

68 Though also, as with government power, allowing for conditions ripe for personal domination, e.g.: a politician using government funds to silence critics, an executive abusing his position in his company to dominate a secretary.

69 This is without Anderson's account of most capitalist enterprises as authoritarian dictatorships themselves (Anderson 2017, 40).

against the principle of non-alienation as the thesis defines it, being hostile to discursive control and self-respect, and exploiting economic vulnerability (Marx 2007, 52-57).

A much more extensive discussion is needed, and supplied in chapter three. A recap of chapter two thus far would be helpful before we proceed. Beginning from Pettit's own discussions of discursive control, autonomy, and his proposed system of government and just distributions of wealth, it was argued that non-domination, to ensure freedom, requires the socio-political support of autonomy, and its lack was considered sufficient for un-freedom, despite Pettit's concerns about overreach. It was then argued that Pettit's theorising failed to account for the possibility of systemic or structural domination, and that a form of social egalitarianism, following Schuppert, would be more desirable and better preserving of individual autonomy, allowing each individual to have security and "insulation", to use Pettit's terminology (Pettit 2014, 89-98). Schuppert's own understanding of alienation was critiqued in this last section, necessitating a mixed conception of both Schuppertian and Marxist alienation. The latter was then supported via a mixed theory of class and class interests, and a theory of power and exploitation following Vrousalis, Pettit and Marx. Finally, it was argued that if such class-based systemic domination is possible, then the greatest threat in terms of alienation, domination and economic exploitation is that of private economic interests – not only in terms of corporate domination as Pettit terms it, but in terms of the system as a whole, as it is far more equipped to take advantage of ideological power.

Alienation thus is best understood as a blend of Schuppertian and Marxist kinds, both highlighting the loss of discursive control through the means of socio-economic inequalities and especially the coercive power of certain social relationships. In particular, those from authority – the prospect of institutional prejudice and societal coercion from Schuppert, and employment and the system of capitalist labour from Marxist. It would be a mistake to think that this blend must apply in each and

every instance of alienation. Rather, they are closely connected and one often informs the other. Individuals are alienated when subjected to either kind, and one's situation is particularly awful when subjected to both.

The most important element of the chapter's overall conclusion thus far is that republicanism must be expanded if it is to fully realise freedom. It must allow for autonomy as part of said freedom. It must account for all the myriad ways of domination. And it must especially allow for the Marxist critique of wage-slavery, alienation and abuse of power, springing from inequality. It is clear that Pettit's theory is insufficient. Instead of expressive egalitarianism and loose material equality, the thesis proposes that a "neo-republican" theory should incorporate the critique of Schuppert and the Marxist tradition and impose the aforementioned strict material equality. Doing so, and allowing for the equitable treatment of citizens, would do much to support the principle of non-alienation. As such, the thesis will draw a distinction between the republicanism of Pettit and Skinner, and the neo-republican theory that it proposes, drawing upon socialist and egalitarian thought.

The next chapter will focus on corporate power as Pettit presents it, and make a much more detailed case for its systemic domination as briefly sketched here. Before that, however, there is another potential departure from Pettit to consider. Pettit's arguments, and those of the thesis and Schuppert following him, have followed the mostly implicit consequentialism outlined by Pettit. Section four considers arguments against that consequentialist ethos.

Section Four – Consequentialism and the Priority of Liberty

Earlier, the thesis noted Pettit's consequentialist approach for the implementation of non-domination. If a new republican theory of freedom is being advanced, one which considers structural/systemic domination and the need for a built-in egalitarianism, then Pettit's consequentialism should be critiqued. It is also worth considering the republican approach of liberty holding priority on all other "primary goods" (Rawls 1973, 62, 92-94)⁷⁰.

To recap, Pettit requires that a government generally try to produce and protect freedom, although not at any cost; the requirement is not of maximisation, but the guidance of a specific goal, over a specific methodology (Pettit 2001, 129, Pettit 2012, 123-124). Likewise, the principle of non-domination is supposedly well-served by consequentialism (Pettit 1997, 101), as it allows the state to "promote (by) those means, whatever they are, that prove empirically most effective." One might draw comparisons to Mill's remarks in *On Liberty* that a mingling of free thinkers was better precisely because individuals, governments and groups could experiment and debate towards the best possible outcome, resulting in better societies overall (Mill 1974, 94-100). Pettit is thus broadly consequentialist, subject to certain ironclad rules which ought not to be broken, e.g.: to give citizens equal value and respect by the law, and so on. It is consequentialism with a hard base.

Pettit's consequentialism has further use, with one argument that he embraces, and another that I think he has overlooked. Pettit also notes that "as a consequentialist philosophy, republicanism is not dogmatic or doctrinaire." (Pettit 1997, 147). This might be considered a mere continuation of the former argument, but that would misjudge Pettit's point. He remains steadfastly committed to general principles, not specific requirements. This too can be found in his expressive egalitarianism, which does not insist on any particular pattern (Pettit 2014, 100). While as argued previously there

⁷⁰ Rawls' position is worth noting because he too insists on a "serial order" whereby liberty takes priorities even over "greater social and economic advantages" (Rawls 1973, 61). This too has been subject to a great many critiques, as helpfully listed by RS Taylor (Taylor 2003, 247).

are reasons to be more specific in its approach, republicanism allows for the incorporation of other elements as they serve its normative goals or political aspirations. This flexibility allows us to speak intelligibly of a republican socialism, or even a republican polity that draws on Marxist aspirations. Marx may criticise the errant focus on rights and “bourgeois freedoms” (Marx 2008, Ch 2) that republicanism encourages, but Marx himself established a conception of freedom and justice, and if each can supplement the other, it would be better to avoid such dogmatism (Van der Veen 1984, 106-123, Blackledge 2012, 71-78).

Another argument for a consequentialist approach lies in justifying the scale of change required. As the thesis examines in detail in the last chapter, Pettit’s democratic requirements are extensive, and not observed in full by any democracy on the planet. A democracy should not have to conform to all of them perfectly to be free, and the expressions of them will change and shift, with different rules and policies. This is well within the limits of experimentation. Testing such policies and norms will require potentially quite extensive political change. Experience has shown that such change can lead to instability and a reactionary backlash. An example of such can be seen in the immediate history of France after its revolution in 1793; a repeated cycle of liberalisation and authoritarian coercion can be noted. To change a government which, may appear to be perfectly democratic, effective, and legitimate, yet which undeniably fails to protect the individual liberty of its citizens, may not be achievable without an approach outside the democratic norms and methods Pettit espouses as a result. The alternative would be to cling to these norms on a personal level while remaining ineffectual in accomplishing societal change, making the philosophy somewhat self-defeating. It would be ideal to remain within the boundaries of democratic discourse, but if it is not possible to do so, republicanism must embrace some form of teleological outlook.

One potential criticism was raised earlier in the chapter, in that a deontological approach may prove more secure, e.g.: a government should act such that it never permits or increases domination, and wherever possible, ensures that no domination occurs, rather than specifically promoting freedom. Directly against the pragmatism argument, this objection holds that granting large-scale powers must always be considered carefully, as the potential harms involved outweigh the gains. For example, if the state is obliged to support non-domination at any cost, does this justify the use of coercive tactics and intimidation against an (internally) repressive minority, for the “greater good” of individual liberty? The thesis will refer to this as the restraining objection. In part, this was accepted with regards to autonomy; due to major issues in identifying the “real will” of the individual, instead external and unchosen impediments were to be, ideally, pruned away.

Against the restraining objection, freedom and autonomy are not identical, though both have relational elements under republican theory (Pettit 2001, 177-179, Railton in Scheffler 1988, 108). The relationships in question, however, are very different. Discursive control can be threatened in either case, and non-domination from it. But the hostile relationships towards autonomy are frequently much harder to determine, often due to their ambiguity, one of the key reasons Pettit is sceptical of autonomy’s value as a political ideal. Acting to expand autonomy inside the individual requires psychological guidance that it makes little sense to speak of in maximising terms.

If this is insufficiently persuasive, one might also draw upon Pettit’s concerns for practical political guidance and point out that minimising threats to autonomy is quite feasible; one need address deliberate efforts to obfuscate, deceive, or stifle political debate. Legislation to this effect could be enacted. To maximise autonomy would require a vast commitment to psychological infrastructure, however; quite apart from the difficulties in envisaging this, the end result would be a classic case of a tyranny of the majority. It would be impossible, to form an agreement on a desired end result

that upheld Pettit's requirements of equal and equitable treatment. Freedom, following Berlin's characterisation of the absence of obstruction, and Pettit's as the absence of invasive and alien interference, along with subservience⁷¹, is more easily defined, and the limits more cleanly drawn with less psychological confusion.

There are other criticisms, however. Two key objections are raised by McBride: first, that Pettit could be equally well served by a Kantian contractualism, and second, that freedom as a sole consequentialist value may be "too narrow in focus".

McBride is sceptical of Pettit's "expressive egalitarianism" found in *Just Freedom*, best represented by the eyeball test. He compares it unfavourably with Kantianism, on two grounds. First, he remarks that the eyeball test and similar qualitative measures of freedom (as opposed to quantitative) could be easily embraced by a Kantian metric, since it already draws close to treating individuals as a "kingdom of ends". Second, he worries that taking a Benthamite, freedom-at-all-costs approach may ultimately be self-defeating, and that Pettit's commitment to realism may be harmful in normative approaches, as opposed to his efforts to offer realistic policy and goals; it is acceptable to have an ideal which is exceedingly difficult to fulfil (McBride 2015, 358-368). The thesis discusses these before turning to the second criticism of narrow focus.

The latter concern with Bentham-esque utilitarian thinking can be somewhat mitigated by Pettit's own comments and a distinction from Railton, who argues for a subjective/objective approach to consequentialist decision-making, the former being to act from a consequentialist point of view, and the latter to act in accordance with the overall ambition of consequentialism. Thus it is not that we must act to maximise freedom in each and every instance, and to relentlessly to go through our lives

⁷¹ McBride also notes that Pettit's concern with vitiating hindrances "open(s) the door to giving some formal version of positive freedom" (McBride 2015, 366)

– or at least our political lives – with a hopelessly narrow viewpoint. Pettit’s consequentialism can be of this objective kind, where sometimes an action may inadvertently or even deliberately foster domination because it is being done in an attempt to “perform the most beneficial overall sequence of acts” (Railton in Scheffler 1988, 102-121).

Pettit’s comments elsewhere support this. He argues against the classic letting-an-innocent-be-lynched moral case partially by reference to moral catastrophes – that is, sooner or later there is a case where the consequences truly are sufficiently abhorrent to justify the immoral act – but more usefully by noting that there is a “severe limit” on “breaking roles” because of the harm involved in so doing to the overall value, again following Railton. Individuals should be on “automatic pilot”, “self-restrictive consequentialists”. He notes there are values which require the individual to act in accordance with them, without fixing them stalwartly in their mind. Presumably, freedom is not one of these, but the various norms that foster freedom might be. For example, civility is rather undermined when everyone is making a conscious effort to be civil (Pettit 1997, 154-163).

As for Kantian contractualism as an alternative, Pettit himself declares “a stalemate” with regards to Scanlon and Williams’ proposals as moral guidelines, while dismissing the Kantian categorical imperative with the traditional apprehension over its applicability (Pettit 2012b, 58-59). But he attempts a rebuttal of Scanlon’s arguments as a political theory by suggesting that any contractarian argument ultimately breaks down into consequentialism itself (Pettit 2012b, 63-64).

One might plausibly question if this is entirely fair to the contractualist approach, or whether Pettit is right, and the distinctions grow increasingly narrow. One point would be to rephrase the original critique; we might well accept the inevitability of a teleological approach but maintain that Pettit’s

particular formulation of it is inadequate (McBride 2015, 368). After all, the neo-republican thesis has already included much within freedom that Pettit himself does not.

McBride is on firmer ground with the second criticism, that Pettit's freedom is too narrowly focused. The thesis has already taken on board numerous socialist and social egalitarian concerns, most notably the more developed view of structural domination and alienation, in both the Schuppertian and Marxist sense. McBride cites Scanlon, who notes that there may be "only honor or the opportunity for a more pleasant and rewarding life" as a result of inequality, but that this is still intuitively unfair and problematic (McBride 2015, 368). If the focus is purely on domination, and not on other factors that may contribute towards it, Scanlon's concerns have considerable merit.

It is not necessary, however, that "freedom as non-domination must exclude a number of traditional egalitarian concerns" (McBride 2015, 368). Freedom and equality go hand in hand, as Lovett notes, and in the same way, Fraser's point that each instance of misrecognition implies a case of misdistribution and vice versa, undermine this distinction. Absolute freedom with absolute inequality is brittle; all it takes is the slightest push to become corrupt and for freedom to be lost. Absolute equality with no freedom is simple tyranny.

It might be objected that Pettit wraps loose material equality into his definition of freedom, and therefore to make a claim for strict material equality as a semi-separate value, as the thesis does, is against Pettit. But this is not so. Strict material equality supports freedom as non-domination precisely because it is extended further; the claim is that Pettit underestimates the resources necessary and thus is unwilling to commit to equality in and of itself. The argument remains the same: individuals must possess resources and respect, again following Fraser's point, to avert domination and alienation in equal measure. This does mean a commitment, as McBride puts it, to a

“formal version of positive freedom” (McBride 2015, 366), or at least that Pettit must also incorporate autonomy into non-domination. And this may make the argument more intricate; it also commits Pettit to promoting secondary values such as McBride outlines, as part of the overall consequentialist thrust. It could be objected that this would no longer be non-domination; it would be discursive control. Either way, it seems a worthwhile project.

An additional republican concern is if the desire for equality could then go too far. Scanlon’s argument could be applied to many instances of social and economic gain, wherein an individual might profit and then be able to dominate those around him. If consequentialism of Pettit’s kind were to direct us to restrict all such actions, then it would clearly be a very drab, tedious philosophy, one which might well make life not worth living. Against this, the point is that these various activities be neutralised, not condemned outright; they should do no harm nor develop so as to cause harm. The potential for exerting domination in and by acquiring fame and success is not low⁷², but it is equally reliant on acquiescing to it; it relies on the absence of a robust framework of legislation and norms to combat it. It is precisely this framework that republicanism and strict material equality offers, especially supplemented by a renewed concern on the effects of class and alienation.

Thus Pettit’s consequentialist ethos, while necessitating a stronger framework around it following McBride’s criticisms – in particular, a much stronger commitment to equality than expressive egalitarianism – remains morally justifiable and practically necessary to accomplish republican goals in practice.

72 The risks of social esteem are considered in more detail in chapter five.

Chapter Three

Section One – Corporate Power and its threat to democracy

Chapter one set out the case for conceiving of liberty in republican terms of non-domination.

Chapter two set out the case for how non-domination should be understood – namely, that it also requires the protection of autonomy and protection against systemic domination – and laid out a framework of Marxist and egalitarian critique which concluded in on two major points. Firstly, strict material equality must be preserved in order to allow for liberty to be maintained. Secondly, inequality and in particular the private control of the means of production, which necessitates exploitation of a Vrousalian kind and class antagonisms of a Marxist kind, represent a massive threat to non-domination. In particular, this is due to the violation of the eyeball test and the establishment of immense corporate power. This chapter examines this in greater detail.

Despite potential concerns, the thesis holds that domination of any kind must be minimised. Thus, it asks how this can be achieved within our current society. There are many individual concerns within individual nations, whether the voting suppression tactics in the United States (Manheim & Porter 2019 213-224 & 228-230, Epperly et al 2019, 7-10, Ravel 2018, 1020-1042, 1056-1061, Karl 2019, 165-185)⁷³, government corruption (Ravel 2018, 1027-1028, Shleifer & Vishny 1993, 3-20, Pettit 1997, 210-211, 216-219), or the previously mentioned use of corporate violence. Addressing all such concerns is beyond the scope of this thesis. One universal concern in modern civil society is the role of free market economic systems, and the thesis will concern itself with these. In the modern day, such systems are characterised by an increasing (Piketty 2014 435-447, BBC 2017) quantity of corporate and commercial actors with enormous power. Such actors present a vital threat to non-domination. They contribute to both alienation and an overall structural domination

73 This is but one pertinent example of many. Modern research is used to highlight that this is not merely a theoretical concern.

that threatens freedom. This is combined with inequalities and – due to said structural domination – an environment and culture of social norms that promote personal domination.

Each of these claims must be established in full. As regards alienation in the Marxist sense, the link is obvious. Each agent in a free market economy must be competitive. This does not mean they will always act competitively, or always make rational decisions. However, those that do will have a decisive advantage. This naturally diminishes altruistic sentiments, and only encourages cooperation when useful to each individual. Arguably, any system where profits and losses are possible will result in such alienation. The thesis will discuss in greater detail later whether this is the case. What would be more profitable is to ask if there are degrees and kinds of alienation, or if there are systems which result in more people being alienated. Consider a hypothetical socio-economic state that ensured each person's labour was highly rewarding and personally associated to them, but in which they were set aggressively against each fellow competitor, and indeed their employers. Consider another hypothetical state wherein strong union or syndicalist support ensured that the workers were full of solidarity and fraternity of one another, but where their work was menial drudgery, performed solely for the benefit of others, with no regard to their own aptitudes. Lastly, consider a state wherein public opinion rapidly shifted about various ethnic groups, frequently resulting in the devaluation and disrespect of their culture and lives.

Such thought-experiments show clearly that different kinds of alienation are possible, although it may not be in terms of degree – it may be that any alienation at all is sufficient to be fully alienated. Presumably a society or socio-economic circumstance is more or less alienating according to how many kinds of alienation it allows for, and to what degree they are easier or harder to succumb to. Modern capitalist society may not be the worst possible society where alienation is concerned, but it cannot be far off. Marx points to many reasons in his own writings – estrangement from others, estrangement from work, estrangement from one's own self-identity, estrangement from

government – controlled as it is by bourgeois interests – and estrangement in the form of class antagonisms. Such alienation frequently, though not always, overlaps with domination. Of particular interest to this thesis⁷⁴ is estrangement from government, and why this remains the case.

In many ways, governments have become less susceptible to outside influences and should, in theory, be more applicable to the voice of the people than in Marx's day, thanks to developments like universal suffrage. This has not always proven to be the case, however. In the United States, for example, it has been demonstrated that there is almost no correlation between the opinions and desires of the electorate, and actual government policy (Gilens & Page 2014, 570-574), though the two may sometimes align.

This can be explained. Piketty notes that in the modern day (post 1980s), accumulation of capital and wealth by the very wealthy has grown to heights not seen since the early 20th century (Piketty 2014, 375-376). This has benefited from⁷⁵ a drastic swing towards neo-liberal ideology in the 1980s, not just in states such as the United States and United Kingdom, but in bodies like the IMF (Ian Taylor in Boas & McNeill 2004; Clift and Tomlinson 2012, 481-495). This ideology has prioritised globalised free trade, removal of restrictions on capital flows, and reduction of taxation, to encourage investment and utilisation of more efficient market systems; conceiving of government practice and nationalised industries as bloated, corrupt, and inefficient (Friedman 1990, etc).

At the same time, however, many of the states had social welfare and/or military commitments. The United Kingdom, for example, had the NHS for the former, and the United States, who undoubtedly have the largest military commitments overall, continued to soar in military spending, especially past the millennium. Even with a decline in funding, it remains exceptionally high and protected by

⁷⁴ Examining each instance of alienation, domination and their overlaps would require far more time and space to do justice to than the thesis has available.

⁷⁵ Whether the political changes were the cause of the economic or vice versa is irrelevant for the thesis; the two are interconnected and addressing both is necessary for any solution.

political interests. (Wikipedia, Military Budget of the United States, Fullfact, NHS Spending, Walker 2014). Decreased tax revenues necessitated spending cuts, but removing too much would result in political agitation (Streeck 2014 80-90, Galbraith 1992, 25-29). This necessitated political sleight of hand, or the doctrinal (and absolutely unsupported) assertion that deregulation and privatisation was good for everyone.

Increasing globalisation and lax control of capital investment⁷⁶, meanwhile, produced a class of what Marx might call *rentiers*: unconnected to any country, save as would produce the most profit, storing much of their wealth in offshore tax havens (Lenin 1916, S8, Marx Capital Vol 3, 776-777, Henry 2012, 5-42) to avoid paying tax, despite the tax reductions offered by governments and the global decrease in tax overall (Bunn 2018, Markle & Shackelford 17-34). Such unfettered investors would invest in a country only if they could be certain of profit, and a “business-friendly” attitude (Streeck 2014, 60, 67-87).

Governments were running out of money, which the aforementioned rentiers had in abundance. Thus, argues Streeck, post-war governments and the promises of post-war capitalism collapsed into the “debt state”. Balancing tension between their citizens (*staatsvolk*, in Streeck’s terms) and their creditors/investors/financial experts (*marktvolk*, to Streeck), governments were stuck with the unenviable position of deregulation, financial austerity, and selling this to their voters as a good thing⁷⁷. It has not been (Streeck 2014, 81). Wages have stagnated, internal inequality has risen, and the wealthy have more social, economic and political power than at any time since the Victorian era (Piketty 2014 458-476, etc). On the systemic level, such austerity typically requires scapegoats or political manipulation from governments and *marktvolk*. The scapegoats are the usual suspects –

⁷⁶ Although most capital does have some affiliation to a given country (Chang 2010, 74-87) it is equally true that FDI (foreign direct investment), goes where the most profit can be found.

⁷⁷ Galbraith argues in *The Culture of Contentment* that it is a good thing, at least for the people who do much of the voting; the wealthier classes, who need less of the welfare state, and thus do not complain about the undesirable parts getting cut. This theory has limits, but it would explain some of the continued enthusiasm for ideas that have long been absent of good practice (Galbraith 1992, 47-49).

immigrants, the poor and those unable to work – and stripping necessary protections from them qualifies as “acute social vulnerability”, to call back to Schuppert.

This may conjure up a conspiracy theory of plutocrats and corrupt politicians hell-bent on establishing a new world order. This is not remotely the case, nor does the thesis advance this position. Rather, each element – a corporation, a millionaire, a political party – seeks its own advantage, where possible, and the average citizen has lost out in such struggles. The thesis can thus return to its earlier claims about domination. Inequality of capital, wealth, and power is now a constant, rapidly approaching the levels of Victorian England or “gilded age” America.

Pettit notes that this is undesirable in *On the People’s Terms*, as on a personal level, it entirely violates the eyeball test: “The level of resources and protections required for undominated status – the threshold of provision necessary – is determined on a basis that takes into account the resources and protections available to others.” While Pettit is comfortable with “differences of private wealth and power”, these must not be allowed to grow excessively (Pettit 2012, 90). The key critique of the neo-republican thesis presented here is that free market capitalism readily enables the growth of these differences and, equally importantly, gives a tiny handful the wealth, power and privilege to exploit the vulnerability of others and corrupt democratic institutions.

Structurally, the overall system is itself dominating because it has become functionally designed to keep individuals subservient. Wealth translates to socio-political power and status, perpetuating extraction of wealth upwards from the poor to the rich, absent efforts of governments (or more rarely, unions) to achieve a more equitable distribution. Even in cases of high social mobility, a relatively tiny handful still exert undue socio-political power, and society remains highly stratified. The exact individuals comprising the strata may change more or less radically over time, but this means nothing in practical terms. In cases of low social mobility, stratification with the loss of

resources to the lower strata, as Streeck and Piketty indicate, the situation is basically hopeless. No one individual is responsible for their impoverishment; education, financial security and even nutrition are withheld, not out of any individual malice, but simply because they exist to an inferior degree, if at all.

The system is also structurally dominating because it facilitates personal domination. An example may be helpful. A foreman or manager is willing to extend or protect an individual's employment in exchange for a bribe of some kind (financial, sexual, etc). Reporting such an offer is incredibly risky, as any misstep could see the individual fired, or even blacklisted entirely. While corporate power accomplishes a similar goal writ large, within each corporation are many individual instances where individuals could be subjected to the demands and desires of others, with no way to fight back or assert their own control.

Related to this is the concept of wage-slavery. The thesis has already discussed the possibility of individuals becoming subservient or alienated through this, along with the Marxist and labour-republican critique, but various thinkers posit that insufficient wages can trap individuals within a vicious cycle in simple economic terms (Marx 1912, 231-240, Ellerman 2005 466-476). Because their wage merely meets basic living costs, they have next to nothing for emergencies, and no stability to move to other jobs⁷⁸. Thus, even a perfectly amicable contract without any trace of personal domination, in which blatant systemic or structural domination does not occur, may cause individuals to be "bled dry" and in a position where they must work as hard as possible, never missing a day, simply to survive. This makes them acutely vulnerable to personal domination of the

⁷⁸ Pettit is aware of this and argues for medical insurance and some form of social safety net in *Just Freedom*. Lovett argues for an unconditional basic income on very similar grounds (Lovett 2009, 822, 825-828)

aforementioned kind, and it reduces their ability to cope with structural domination: they have the most to lose by protesting the current system⁷⁹.

A further prop against change comes from control of political debate and media discussion. As is discussed later, much traditional media is owned by corporate entities or backed by them. The United States' media in all its myriad forms – save social media – is now controlled by six major companies. Australian media, as noted, is concentrated into similarly dense hands.

This is problematic for several reasons, not least the economic disparity such oligopolistic competition invokes, but also for their role in what Chomsky refers to as manufacturing consent, especially with regards to traditional print media and news. By framing the conversation, by selectively questioning or presenting data, and by allowing for a very vibrant band of debate within a very limited spectrum (Chomsky 1998, 43), there is an illusion of strong debate and discourse where little of significance actually exists. Further, such media will selectively pursue or avoid certain topics, with an interest of course to the status quo as it suits them. This means there is little hope of anti-corporate agendas of any kind being discussed. Thus is Gramsci's hegemony once more reinforced, not only by the media themselves, but by the creation of new social norms and a new "normal". Media personalities are promoted because of their beliefs.

On the systemic level, such media concentration is equally problematic, not only by blunting access to positions outside of the desired norm and thereby diminishing the prospects of genuine political change, but by allowing for impersonal corporate influence. Said influence extends into politics and civil society, which has deleterious effects on the quality of public discourse. As the media, rightfully, becomes less trusted and its overall sincerity comes into doubt, it ceases to have any real

⁷⁹ Marx predicted that capitalists would be unable to resist paying wages that would prove insufficient to live on. While part-time work and the "gig economy" (Friedman 2014, 172-174) rarely provide a living wage without other support, salaried work does allow a survival wage in general, and often more. Thus, capitalism has yet to follow his dire predictions and collapse outright.

meaning save for entertainment. This can create an atmosphere where politics is little more than a team sport. This too places further power to the “contented” and marktvolk, and diminishes the influence available to the remainder of the citizenry. This is problematic for, due to Pettit’s democratic requirements.

This may seem closer to the conspiracy theories that were denounced as inaccurate and misleading. Not only this, it may seem odd that corporate power is so extensive – into media, governments and everyday life – and yet frequently governments still seem to exert power over them, and life does not resemble one of the many works of dystopian fiction where corporations rule unopposed. Different corporations have different interests, but this still seems a partial explanation. One might also wonder why corporate capture would aim at media, rather than just regulations or governing bodies (Bó 2006, 209-223). If corporate interests already run the world, what is the point?

One rationale, following Gramsci, is that multiple defences are stronger – to borrow an expression, diversifying the defensive portfolio. Corporate-run media is unlikely to argue against the corporate structure as a whole – empty phrases like “corporate social responsibility” (McWilliams et al 2006, 4-8, Sklair & Miller 2010, 17-21) desperately struggle to put a bright gloss on ruthless self-interest. The more people who believe in the overall success of corporate capitalism, that it is the natural state of affairs, etc, the better its odds of continuing. Streeck writes of a tension between marktvolk and staatsvolk – far better that the latter believe their situations to be ordained by some divine economic law, than that they be allowed to change, or that they even consider widespread change possible (Streeck 2014, 81-83). Corporations, whilst independent of each other, share an interest in preserving the status quo, and especially the current socio-economic system. Some may argue for reform or compliance so as to prevent revolution, but it would be a mistake to conflate this with genuine moral sentiment.

In summary, corporate power is insidious, and almost everywhere. It is drastically underestimated by current republican scholarship, who at least acknowledge the problem in social terms. To address it, an effective response is needed. The thesis now considers Pettit's.

Section Two – Pettit’s response to corporate power and corporate domination

Corporate domination thus constitutes a considerable threat to republicanism. In chapter two, Pettit’s response was briefly mentioned. In this section, it will be explored in more detail, and will be argued as thoroughly inadequate. Before proceeding, note that Pettit’s response does not include any of the changes the thesis has argued for thus far. This is particularly relevant for two changes. First, the thesis’ acceptance of structural domination might cause Pettit to reconsider his views on the sheer danger corporate domination poses, because – as argued in the prior section – much of the domination is systemic or systemically compatible with personal domination. Second, as Pettit does not embrace any concept of exploitation or power exerted by non-agents, the thesis’ post-Pettitian view is much more critical of current capitalism than Pettit is. Therefore, the section will first consider if Pettit’s response to corporate power is insufficient on his own grounds, before seeing if it can be amended by referring to the changes the thesis has already mandated.

Pettit’s response to corporate domination has two strands. The first is via the eyeball test. Because large material inequalities are inherently toxic to the eyeball test (Pettit 2012 85-90), Pettit argues for a comprehensive set of economic resources to support “basic liberties”. Given that his (non-exhaustive) list includes the right to change one’s employment (Pettit 2014, 76), this suggests at the very least an end to wage-slavery and a strong social safety net – and this is but one of such liberties. Unlike Rawls, which Pettit takes pains to point out, republican liberty pre-supposes a certain amount of equalisation

of resources, which is why a Rawlsian principle of justice is not required (Pettit 2014, 102-103). He gives a more extensive listing of potential features in *Just Freedom* (Pettit 2014, 103-106), which specifically includes financial, medical, judicial and social security. He notes, with some self-praise, that his list is more extensive than the “run of the mill programs political parties provide” (Pettit 2014, 107). It certainly compares well to the trimmed-down governments of neo-liberal policy.

Pettit’s logic thus far seems sound. Naturally, his list is an ideal, so practical implementation can only succeed to the extent it conforms to said list. The measures proposed would greatly curb personal domination, as they remove much of the leverage individual employers have, and if applied on an individual rather than familial level, would also help considerably to prevent cases of domestic abuse, debt-based domination, etc. Pettit does not, however, give specific advice as to how equal the distribution of income should be, besides his frequent notes that strict, deliberately patterned material equality is not the intention, and that it should comply with the eyeball test. Such measures could aid in eliminating the current, massively disproportionate distribution of wealth outlined in the prior section. Problematically, the securities he offers might not eliminate the unfair benefits of such wealth entirely. An element that Pettit does not discuss in *Just Freedom* is that of education and health. Even a casual imbalance of wealth permits private tutors, greater ease in the selection of work, potentially private healthcare – the list continues. None of this is impossible to correct, but it suggests that preserving non-domination may require more intervention in private economic life than

Pettit allows in the argument. It would certainly require a more robust commitment to equality of opportunity, which he does not explicitly offer.

Pettit's second strand, his discussion of corporate power in *Just Freedom* (and fragments in other works), is less helpful. He notes that corporations⁸⁰ can become vehicles for enormous personal power, without proper accountability; the legal fiction of corporations as persons⁸¹ shields owners from legal and financial repercussions. The concentration of wealth in the hands of a few is obviously a problem, but equally harmful is their ability to silence dissent.

He admits outright he has no easy solution to offer (Pettit 2014, 91-92), suggesting two avenues of attack: making corporate entities subject to criminal proceedings with greater ease and regularity, and making use of bad publicity, the fear of which deters such corporate bodies. In support of the former view, Pettit also published a paper in *The Moral Responsibility of Firms* (Pettit 2017, 1-26), where he argues that corporations are “conversable agents”, and have the same status as individual persons to be held responsible, following from his arguments in *A Theory of Freedom* about collective agency. Corporations already have the legal rights of persons, but thus far, they have not been legally penalised as persons, though they have been financially penalised.

The solution of publicity is, unfortunately, limited in scope. Research on boycotts has shown differing and inconclusive results. There is no long-term negative decline

⁸⁰ He includes organised religions, social movements etc, under the same banner. It is equally plausible to discuss limiting the power directed by Islam in Malaysia, for but one example (Martinez 2001, 475-500), but the thesis primarily focuses on economic, corporate interests in discussion. All corporate bodies are capable of exerting great power.

⁸¹ The “corporate veil” (Investopedia, Corporate Veil) is a related concept.

associated with boycotts (Tyran & Engelmann 2002, 13-22, White and Kare 1990, 63-70, Teoh et al 1999, 42-83, Koku et al 1997 16-20). Bad publicity can and has caused corporate decisions to be revised, but this has several major limitations and caveats that undermine it. The first is that corporate entities also control huge swathes of traditional and now social media, ranging from the near monopoly Rupert Murdoch has on Australian media, to the behemoths of Facebook and Twitter. None of these have any particular desire to publish content that is anti-corporate, though they might entertain criticism of one another. For bad publicity to take effect, it must first overcome this problem⁸². This is not always insurmountable, and iniquities such as Facebook's widescale data-harvesting and selling (Andrews 2012) have come under widespread criticism. It is, however, a significant hurdle, and in the more extreme cases like Australia (The Conversation), may find itself shut out by an effective media monopoly.

The existence of corporate monopolies and oligopolies also diffuses the impact of publicity. At a national level, there are relatively few true monopolies, but oligopolies are common. Many goods are sold⁸³ by a handful of effective competitors, or as in the automobile industry, similar goods may be produced by competitors using similar techniques – monopolistic competition. Internet provision in the United States of America is a good example. Many areas have a single internet provider. Thus, despite repeated negative publicity about Comcast, many people are obliged to use their

⁸² Government opposition has proven to be an impediment, at least – the EU's cracking down on Google is a good start (Deutsche Welle 2018), but much more in this vein must be done.

⁸³ Again on a national level. A single large Walmart or Tesco complex may effectively be a supermarket monopoly in a given geographical area.

services⁸⁴. There are countless other examples. Negative publicity works best against the vulnerable, and some companies are simply not.

A third such problem is that much corporate abuse happens “somewhere else”. Most corporations are owned and operated from MEDCs⁸⁵ (and increasingly, China). Their shareholders, likewise, are usually from similarly wealthy nations or the most elite citizens of LEDCs. Where public opinion might very easily condemn sweatshop labour in, for example, the UK, vast abuse of labour – even children’s labour – in the developing world is easily ignored. In countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, mining companies such as Glencore routinely make use of violence to support their economic intentions. Historically, entire coups have been engineered for the benefit of American fruit companies (Peyer et al 2014, 19 (see footnote 36), 47-69, Kinzer & Schlesinger 2005). The governments of such nations have little ability to hold corporations accountable, let alone persuade the “home nation” to take action against a parasitical relationship that benefits them.

Last and notably, corporate and government power is frequently interlinked. The United States of America gives an excellent example. Quite apart from its notorious lobbying laws, US senators and congressman (to say nothing of potential presidents) rely on funding from corporations and social movements like the NRA (National Rifle Association), ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), etc. Although lobbying serves as an effective way to communicate the needs of interests who might not otherwise enter

⁸⁴ To the point some cities have begun setting up municipal internet services (Vice 2018, Talbot et al 2017, 3, 7-14). This does not speak well for the provision from the market.

⁸⁵ MEDCs stands for “More Economically Developed Countries”; LEDCs stands for less.

political discourse, it can easily become little more than outright bribery. It is unsurprising that the United States' government has been known to act in accordance with corporate interests, whether abroad (the previously mentioned United Fruit Company coup) or domestically, when ample "dark money" continues to be available politically (Mayer 2017) and wealthy donors demand "a return on their investment" (Public Integrity).

Therefore it is unsurprising that corporate power remains mostly unchecked in many places. The effort and governmental strength needed to curb corporate power is mostly incompatible with modern liberal democratic practice. Moreover, the increasingly globalised nature of many national economies means the movement of capital has never been easier. Addressing corporate power thus necessitates large-scale opposition; the European Union, the United States of America, China, etc, who might all have the power to do so, lack the motivation. Negative publicity is thus toothless. It is even more ineffectual when one considers that no small portion of corporate domination is on a systemic and technical level. An illustrative example is the United States system of patents, which allows for extensions provided alterations to the design have been made. This has been used to extend patents on almost identical medical drugs and treatments (NBC 2018). While this has gained negative publicity when proven or demonstrated (The Guardian 2018), it is harder to track or observe. Moreover, it again inflicts no particular misery on no particular person. Thus, it must be suitably widely affecting or particularly malicious to arouse outrage.

Meanwhile, Pettit's suggestion of criminal accountability fails for three major reasons. The first is a similar rationale to negative publicity: effective government aid is difficult to procure. The second is that Pettit, while he considers both the correction of material inequality and corporate power, does not suitably address the fact that corporate power fuels such inequalities. Besides the ways already outlined in the first section, the very nature of corporations and tax havens makes it easy for both to obscure the flow of money. This facilitates lobbying and the corruption of democratic processes. Even without considering structural domination, it is entirely plausible for a pervasive web of corruption to develop that ensures the growth of personal power, and an accompanying ability to dominate.

Capitalism by its nature compels corporations to seek profit⁸⁶. Such profit is incompatible with the eyeball test above a certain and easily passed point. As soon as profit is sufficient to attend to all immediate needs (wages, administrative costs, taxes, etc) and allow sufficient reinvestment, there is a surplus. That surplus might be spent on consumption, or on greater reinvestment; it might instead be hoarded or politically leveraged. Whatever the form, however, a sufficiently large surplus directly threatens the eyeball test. Because economic power so readily translates to socio-political power, any inequality of this kind has the potential to become a problem for republicanism. A five percent profit may not seem outrageous, but over a large enough period of time, it is leveraged into greater and greater wealth (Piketty 2014, 205-206).

⁸⁶ Whether this compulsion is all-consuming or is merely one of a set of such drives is irrelevant for the argument. So long as a motivator and drive for corporate profit exists, which is clearly true, the argument holds to a greater or lesser extent. A section on corporate motivation, while useful, is beyond the scope of the thesis, but would aid in addressing micro-economic policy.

Thirdly, obfuscation of wrongdoing is relatively easy for a corporate entity. There is the traditional trick of finding a convenient scapegoat, who becomes the face of everything wrong with the company and “leaves to pursue other interests”, or takes a relatively insignificant (Reiman 2004, 114-132) punishment vastly disproportionate to the harm inflicted. Moreover, such crime is rarely considered as “true” crime, the sort of thing that must be stamped out at any cost. This makes it easy, except in cases of truly horrific malpractice⁸⁷, to disregard and delicately sweep away. Corporate media has a vested interest in discouraging too much socio-political awareness.

On the assumption there is some terrible harm, which cannot be disguised⁸⁸, a secondary part of such obfuscation comes into play. With the benefits of tax havens, shell companies and similar tools, to say nothing of simple investment in multiple countries, actually enforcing a given punishment is a herculean task. Capital can be moved around and away from countries which do not pursue “business friendly” policies. If the problem is not with the “host” country, malpractice from direct investment may persist indefinitely. Lobbying, bribery and other tools may come into play to smooth out any remaining difficulties.

Thus, Pettit’s suggestions are at best highly flawed and hamstrung by practical considerations, and at worst, present a comforting veneer of respectability over a deeply broken system.

⁸⁷ An example of this would be the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Wikipedia, Deepwater Horizon), which was both extraordinarily damaging and wasteful, and thus impossible to ignore. Even then, criticism rarely spun out into the practices of the crude oil industry as a whole.

⁸⁸ Or conveniently blamed on another company.

A more insidious problem is that corporations do not think and feel like persons do, despite the legal fiction. Any decision a corporation enacts is with a rational view towards its own profit, at least in theory – no entity is ever perfectly rational. While Pettit argues that corporations are conversable (Pettit 2017, 22), and thus capable of discussion and dialogue as persons are, it would be a mistake to consider them as identical to individual human persons. A critical difference lies in their continuity. Were an individual's memories to fail, and their driving plans and motivations to alter radically, neither Pettit nor intuition would expect us to consider them the same. Yet this is no different from a radical reconstitution of a company; the same name and format may be present, but it is not the same "person". In general, a corporation can never have the same interests as a human, and will tend towards profit-seeking. Pettit is correct that corporations need to be made further legally accountable; it would be a mistake to acknowledge them as having personal responses.

This is without any reference to structural or systemic domination, either. While these compound the potential dangers of corporate domination and power, as well as the concentration of wealth and power, it is clear on the grounds already outlined that corporate power represents as strong a threat to non-domination as a hostile government might. Indeed, it is entirely possible that a corporation could wield power as imperium, not dominium: inescapable, coercive, and without any regard for our interests, avowed or otherwise. To escape such abuse of power, Pettit's material redistribution may not be enough.

Section Three – Markets and Domination

Corporate domination is thus well-established as a problem, not only for enabling personal domination and contributing towards systemic domination, but in its corrosive effects on democratic control and legitimacy. Some examples of corporate power have already been given; transnational corporations, overbearing religions, and even social movements. These are relatively easy to identify. They can be considered fit to hold themselves responsible, free to act (Pettit 2001, 121), and perhaps even persons of a sort (Pettit 2017, 17-23). They have goals and agendas, although in aggregate, their decision-making processes may not resemble individual human ones in any way (Pettit 2018, 257).

An immediate issue to consider is the market system as a whole. This needs to be addressed from several angles. Firstly, one might ask if the global market (or indeed, any market of sufficient size and complexity) is itself a purveyor of personal or systemic domination, whether in creating dominating conditions or in creating conditions where domination is quicker and easier. Second, it needs to be considered whether the modern market system has a pernicious effect on individual behaviour and social norms; that a properly constituted market might avert some, if not all, of the problems raised far. Third, given the reliance upon certain elements of Marxist theory, most notably definitions of alienation and power (albeit with concessions to republican and social egalitarian theory), it would be remiss not to ask if markets are inherently reliant on unacceptable practices which, even if the markets achieved both complete material equality and caused no further harm, continued to result in alienation of either a Marxist or Schuppertian kind. Fourth, it might be objected to any or all of these points that markets and market

functions in fact *oppose* domination, and any attempt to “correct” markets would only result in a flawed and broken system. The inequity of modern day capitalism is due to distortions caused by such foolish, if well-meaning, attempts (Friedman 1990, Hayek 1948, Bronk 2013 89-91⁸⁹ etc).

This last point will be covered in far greater detail in section four. Its strength as an argument is inversely related to the strength of the previous three. The remainder will be discussed in the order presented, thus beginning with the market-as-domination argument.

According to Pettit, markets are not substantially dominating in character. He is happy to support regulation and observes that, just as with his ideals of contestatory democracy, the same scandal→pushback→reform loop can be observed and enacted within markets. It is possible for markets to be abused, and for the power within them to conflict with the eyeball test and loose material equality. The market in itself is not dominating, however, and does not coerce individuals (Pettit 2014, 19, 85, 140). One might consider the distinction between threats and offers once again; the market does not threaten, it only ever offers⁹⁰. But this is Pettit’s view, unmoderated by that of social egalitarianism or the thesis’ commitment to autonomy.

A relevant point before proceeding is to consider personal and systemic domination nesting. Nesting here means that entities which dominate may find themselves dominated, and that individual components of those entities may dominate in turn. Nothing in Pettit’s

89 Bronk goes on to critique Hayek (Bronk 2013, 94-105) and expand on the role of government intervention, it should be noted, but he contends that “gross controls” are still actively harmful.

90 In an ideal world; the lack of an ideal world is what regulation is for, and which distinguishes Pettit from the naive optimism of so many in the libertarian tradition.

writing suggests that his intent is that dominators cannot, in different times and contexts, be the dominated; consider a foreman who tyrannises his workers but must equally prostrate himself before his own employers. This is particularly relevant if the market is itself dominating, empowering corporations which dominate and may dominate in different ways, *in different contexts*. And this is precisely the position the thesis adopts, contra Pettit, which we turn to shortly. Their wealthiest and most influential shareholders may turn the corporation to their personal advantage, and this is not identical to the corporation doing so itself. Thus a subsidiary of Nestlé may dominate, Nestlé as a whole may dominate, and the systems in which they operate may dominate, simultaneously.

On the more nuanced neo-republican account, the modern market in its entirety is undoubtedly dominating, on several grounds. First, it creates conditions which make personal domination easier and quicker. On the smaller national scale, gross inequality violates the eyeball test and ensures the perpetuation of some form of class system. On the global scale, practices such as sexual tourism are little better than modern slavery⁹¹, as are the use of illegal or semi-legal migrants as nearly unpaid labour, on which vast swathes of western agriculture rely (Martin 1985, 135-143, Rye & Scott 2018, 928-945, etc). Markets act to concentrate wealth and power into corporate entities, or smaller numbers of the ultra-rich; individuals are given little recourse or the prospect of opposition.

Contesting these practices of personal domination, as one might contest democratic government by Pettit's methods, is certainly possible. To do so on a global scale may be

91 Modern slavery exists as well, of course, and directly feeds into such practices.

exceedingly difficult, however. One major problem is that different nations will have different interests and concerns, and unless a scandal is of sufficient moral disgust or scope to affect a company internationally, contestation is most effective on the national level, and sometimes not even then. For example, Nike was widely condemned over two decades ago when it became obvious that their products were mostly reliant on sweatshop labour, yet while there has been a documented response to this, the labour still remains subjected to these issues and lacks prospects for immediate change. (WRC (Hansae), McDonnell et al 2015, 3-37, Soule 2009).

Another concern with contestation via scandal or oversight is that it is simply contrary to the interests of the consumer in MEDCs to look too closely at what occurs to provide them with cheap goods and commodities. Were genuine legal recourse available, were personal domination blocked, were higher wages available, etc, the costs of various commodities or services would undoubtedly increase. Individuals who are already impoverished, as the note of greater internal inequality above displays, are unlikely to welcome such an increase even if it means others are better off. So the enthusiasm for such accountability, on a scale that truly matters, is likely to be limited to idealists, as the Nike account implies.

A last consideration is that changes implemented as a result of scandal may vary in impact. They are more likely to address hazardous or unpleasant working conditions than the cases of personal domination which may exist in a legal firm or a sweatshop with equal ease. This is not so much a rebuttal to Pettit's point as an observation that what one

might rightfully criticise, such as a strictly hierarchical business design which ensures those at the bottom have little ability to articulate complaints, may be ignored in favour of correcting more obvious problems. While laudable, it leaves the subtler issues still in place.

Second on the neo-republican account, it allows for systemic domination by its very existence. The economy of the world has always been global to an extent, but it has blossomed today to a degree previously unforeseen. Unfortunately, as with the barbarities of colonial empires in the 18th to 20th centuries, the system as a whole has wealthy and successful parasites drawing upon the labours of billions in LEDCs. This is a simplification and generalisation, naturally; if it were the exact, immutable case, China's rapid economic development (and before it, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Brazil, etc) would not have occurred. . The modern global market is deeply inequitable, however, and this problem does not appear to have an easy solution.

This is partly due to the liquidity and lack of nationality of capital. While capital has home countries, who benefit from having the “nerve centers” of transnational corporations and the *potential* of taxable profits (Chang 2010, 74-87), the global market relies upon the global liquidity of capital, to allow for investments wherever seems most efficient. This encourages either investment in enterprises simply too profitable to be untapped, despite heavy regulation, or the stripping of workers' rights and other

regulations in order to tempt investment with fewer administrative overheads like “health and safety”.⁹²

Third, in the judgement of neo-republicanism, Pettit underestimates the coercive possibilities of the market. It is true that the market is, following a roundabout Hayekian argument, non-dominating and fair in the ideal; any misfortunes are tough luck. But in a non-ideal world, the line between threat and offer can blur, because of the knowledge of grotesque consequences for refusal. The personal domination arises purely out of the system, because the system does the punishment all on its own. Consider Pettit’s case of the toady. Without protection against poverty, the spectre of unemployment is much more of a threat. An employer who expects to be treated as an authority, who thus endeavours to gain revenge or otherwise maliciously inconvenience an employee who does not adopt a servile position, may gain far more licence for their boorish behaviour because of the unspoken implication: this work is worth the abuse, or more to the point, dignity can be abandoned for survival. Even a well-regulated market, if there is sufficient poverty and deprivation, could succumb to this flaw. Pettit’s range of protections would doubtless include unemployment benefit, protection against being fired without good reason, etc. But again, it is a question of underestimation – he fails to acknowledge the sheer disparity of power that the market can bring to an employer.

How might a market be amended to avoid these issues? The first and most notable point is that it must be effective and appropriate regulation against personal domination. The legislation must be neither rooted in too much bureaucracy nor uneven in its

92 Again, a generalisation.

implementation. Second, individuals must have the resources necessary to achieve the eyeball test no matter their life circumstances. Pettit suggests protections for vulnerable partners, workers, and even employers (Pettit 2014, 105-107). Mysteriously, the only financial security he mentions relates to banking regulation and the guarantee of savings (Pettit 2014, 88-89, 105). Finally, the systemic domination of the market must be addressed such that individuals are controlled neither by wage-slavery, nor by exploitation in Vrousalis', and the thesis' usage.

Solutions that might enable these things are discussed in great detail in chapter four and five; capital flight and its particular difficulties are also discussed in chapter five. The concern the thesis now turns to is one of scale. Despite the fact that capital is not perfectly liquid, and that certain markets require adherence to strict regulations (most notably the European Union), patterns of investment still tend towards the most profitable locations in the globalised economy, as noted above. The concern is thus that for many industries and many investors, it is far better to be unethical than unprofitable.

To address this sufficiently challenges modern day economists as much as anyone else. Various policy proposals have been offered (Stiglitz 2019, 79-100, 179-208), yet they are counteracted by the disparate interests of different states and peoples. Hayek theorised that people of half a dozen countries were unlikely to come together and work for the common good⁹³ (Hayek 2017, Sections 1-4), and opined that the net result would be some form of free trade agreement and basic regulations and little else. While we need not share Hayek's enthusiasm for this outcome, when two nations are on opposite sides

93 Again, the European Union has outgrown Hayek's expectations, so his argument should be treated with some scepticism.

of the world – yet it is cheaper to take advantage of low wages in one and ship fish the vast distances to the other (Daily Mail 2017) – there seems little hope for the kind of overarching and effective regulation needed to stop personal or systemic domination.

The modern market is thus not *necessarily* dominating, but its complexity on the global scale makes it easier than ever for domination to occur without the prospect of challenge or punishment. In almost every circumstance, the market is a, or supports, dominating agent(s). Moreover, the liquidity of capital ensures that a singular response is insufficient. Thus, the global market eliminates the capacity for domination to be corrected, even if it lacks the intent and ability to dominate, as it is not conversable in Pettit's sense. It is also worth noting that the market requires far more substantial changes than Pettit envisages, let alone the proposals of all except the most "radical" egalitarians and socialists. The net result of this is that even if a suitable arrangement of a market was implemented successfully, with no prospect for domination, sustaining it would be nigh impossible. Therefore, the market is not *necessarily* dominating only in point of logic. In reality, it is and will remain dominating. Full change on a systemic level is necessary, ideally accompanied by socio-political change as well, on as large a scale as possible. This is, admittedly, a high bar to clear.

As for social norms, it is obvious the modern market system will have *some* effect on what is considered permissible. But precisely because it is so obvious, such a claim lacks any content. Refining it further, the question is whether the behaviour is contrary to the social norms and behaviours republicanism wishes to inculcate, and whether this is a

particular feature of modern free-market capitalism. It could be that any system of voluntary exchange will have conflicting social norms.

Republican social norms include such concepts as civility, respect for others (or at least other citizens), strong political awareness, etc. The norms that arise from capitalism seem at best tangential to these, and frequently stand in opposition: primacy of the self, trust in economic solutions and decentralisation, etc. Obviously, these norms are not logically necessary, but they seem compelled by the way capitalism operates; it does not take an economic genius, Smith aside, to notice that self-interest is rampant and even rewarded in modern capitalism. Greed, one might say, is good. The extent to which individuals really are rational, self-interested beings is hotly contested, in psychology, economics, and even political science (Marsh & Stoker 2010, 42-59), but that there is a strong measure of self-interest at stake is not really in dispute.

To accommodate this, and yet enable republican social norms to be inculcated effectively – without being subverted in any way – seems implausible, but not impossible. One would need to allow for the efficiency of the market underpinned by more laudatory motivations. This would probably reduce that efficiency; after all, profit is an excellent motivator. Additionally, one would need to present recurring social norms which actively regarded the selfish desires that capitalism engenders as morally wrong and, importantly, worthy of disesteem.

Allowing for this possibility, even on a national scale – let alone an international – would require inculcation of republican social norms on a scale Pettit barely acknowledges. And it would need to do so to an extremely strong degree. Confucius stated that one does not reform individuals by shame and punishment, one must lead by example (Confucius 2003, 8). Chapter five offers a way in which this might be accomplished nationally.

A brief recap on alienation and power before the third argument. Two kinds of interconnected alienation are a considerable threat to discursive control and autonomy: thus non-domination also. The first, Schuppertian, emphasises alienation as a disrespect or loss of self-respect for a person's status as socially free and equal. Marxist alienation occurs when an individual is divorced from their labour, from other human beings, and even from themselves, due to the competition, pressures and dehumanisation of capitalist work. They become little better than animals, in Marx's view, and take no pride in themselves, regarding others purely as threats or tools. The net result of either is that individuals lose their capacity for free will and free action, losing autonomy, and frequently becoming subservient.

To give the strongest argument possible, briefly imagine a republican state which held a completely responsible and legitimate democratic state, and utilised a controlled free market with voluntary exchange, with government oversight to ensure the miraculous accomplishment of complete non-domination and material inequality to the point that the eyeball test was not only passed, but that no individual or group could threaten to

overturn it *ever* again: a true utopia. Could the market still result in alienation of either kind?

Schuppertian alienation would seem thwarted by the presence of total material equality, at least provided there was some element of social equality commensurate with the eyeball test. Marxist alienation, by contrast, is not solved so long as the system still necessitates any one of four things: personal competition for resources at the expense of others, rewards disproportionate with the value of their labour⁹⁴, opposing interests between labour and capital, and power remaining in the hands of capital, rather than being shared.

Of these four, the first may seem unduly demanding. If Marxist alienation is only thwarted in a post-scarcity society, then it is impossible to be adequately fulfilled, at least without massive technological or economic development. It may be satiated in part by directing resources based on need, or by ensuring a high threshold of basic needs (food, shelter, etc) but this is not a given. Still, if it cannot be guaranteed, then by the same token, there can be no normative or political obligation to fulfil it, merely minimise it. The market would thus need to minimise the harms inherent in such competition, and reduce the danger – as well as the meaning – thereof. The second and fourth are not dependent upon voluntary market exchange, but they do imply that a specifically *capitalist* market, by its very nature, is inherently alienating and can never be otherwise

94 It must be noted here that, due to the clear inadequacy of Marx's theory of labour-as-value, this is in some sense subject to the perception of their labour's value. This might lead one to question if alienation is ever avertable if a sub-group of individuals is incapable of perceiving their labour as anything less than vital, no matter its actual value, especially in service or financial industries, as opposed to those where the final value of a commodity can be established by the market.

by definition.⁹⁵ If that is so, then the third can be answered by organising the market along principles whereby labour and capital's interests are one and the same. Whether this is entirely possible is considered in chapter four, section three, but in principle, this could be accomplished via some form of market socialism.

Therefore, in order for a market system to be non-dominating and to not counteract republican social norms, nor to alienate, the market would need to be rather more tightly regulated than currently. In addition, the way in which it would function cannot be capitalist; it must be constituted so as to achieve neo-republican and egalitarian goals. This necessitates a distortion in the function of the markets. The worth of this proposal is considered in the next section.

⁹⁵ This directly influences the decision between Rawls and the egalitarian system in chapters four and five, also. The former still allows for these problems to arise, although in a way that is far less damaging than modern or historical capitalism; the egalitarian system does not.

Section Four – Markets as Freedom

The thesis must discuss a certain kind of objection at this point. Accepting markets' corrosive effects, and the ethical/organisational problems inherent in capitalist society, it may be objected that this – while horrible – is entirely preferable to interference in a functioning market system. There are many such arguments as a mainstay of what could be called right-libertarian or anarcho-capitalist thinking, ranging from philosophical authors such as Nozick and Hayek to Friedman and a large selection of neoclassical economists. They differ in scope and fervency – for example, Hayek goes so far as to allow for Rawlsian redistribution of a procedural kind (Lister 2011, 1-5, 23-26), while writers such as Rothbard reject almost all government functions (Rothbard 1977). The thesis will therefore restrict itself to considering only the strongest arguments that remain compatible with non-domination.

This naturally eliminates a few varieties of argument immediately. Those that rely on a pure negative conception of liberty can be dispensed with, because republicanism denies non-interference, as established in chapter one, section three. As noted in the introduction, the proposed solution does not remove the system of voluntary exchange, so any variation on the epistemic objection – that markets act to transfer information, the absence of which drastically undermines central planning and/or market efficiency (Hayek 1948, Hayek 2001, 51-58, etc) – will remain valid, but not necessarily persuasive. And unless the proposed solution is inefficient to the point it would threaten non-domination⁹⁶, the thesis will continue to follow Pettit's logic and maximise non-domination over economic output. This eliminates all but the most strident arguments over efficiency. Moreover, arguments such as Rothbard's which decry *any* government functioning would be contrary to Pettit's political requirements, and thus unintelligible to republicanism.

96

Some variant of "Rawls' paradox" that to aim at non-domination would fail to bring it about (Brennan 2007, 290-299).

What remains? The aforementioned efficiency arguments, if taken to extremes, become overly demanding and nonsensical. Government intervention has been demonstrated to be useful for market efficiency (Stiglitz 1992, 270-303, Chang 2010 125-136, etc). Even were this not the case, one would need to assert that only a market lacking almost any non-market (and especially governmental) interference would be efficient enough to serve as a worthwhile mode of economic organisation, which is ludicrous. Efficiency will concern the thesis only insofar as the preservation of the basic liberties Pettit envisages must be available to all; this necessitates basic securities such as food, shelter, and good health. This allows the thesis to work with many potential economic concepts.

There are more normative arguments from the right-libertarians, and these seem worth considering. The first is that markets embody free human agency. To interfere in them at all would require illegitimate use of force or fraud, and might effectively be impossible without relying on interference that could not be controlled nor forced to track to the interests of individuals within society – even if it could, the empowerment of government agencies to engage in such interference would be a cure far worse than the disease (Gaus 2003, 65, Nozick 2013, 149-150, 169, Hayek 2001, 59-104). The second is to argue that the kind of systemic and corporate domination outlined in chapters two and three would continue to exist under any planned or distorted market, and especially under any kind of socialism, and that the only way to achieve proper non-domination is instead to work hard to remove market distortions as far as possible.

The first argument relies heavily upon a variant of Nozick's arguments in *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. Nozick argues that liberty upsets and cannot maintain patterns, and attempts to impose such

patterns are doomed to failure, unless “capitalist acts were prohibited between consenting adults”. He combines this with an argument that what arises out of just steps is itself just. Justice, except as an instrumental value, does not concern the thesis,

However, as stated, this is a variant upon Nozick’s argument. We might argue, per the goal of freedom maximisation, that it would be acceptable to upset some liberty in enforcing such patterns, so long as it was controlled and pre-committed according to consistent principles. Hayek, while completely opposed to socialism via a command economy, even conceded that Rawlsian principles applied in such a manner would be perfectly consistent with a liberal framework. Nozick might advance that no such principle can ever be fully controlled consistently, and that in order to allow for the variety of actions in the market, there would need to be retroactive amendments in service to some overriding principle, in this case, liberty as non-domination (Nozick 2013, 160-174). The thesis will examine Nozick’s arguments in some detail, before we proceed to a counter-argument, by way of Cohen.

Nozick begins by referring to a state of nature and how a state might arise organically⁹⁷, articulating the beginnings of various “mutual protection arrangements” and how they do or do not resemble a state. In particular, he regards an assortment of such arrangements or agencies, with both internal and external gaps, to be an “ultra-minimal state”. This is to be contrasted with a minimal state, which unlike the former does allow for some very small redistributive purposes, e.g., taxation to ensure coverage of all by such protections. Nozick asks, however, on what grounds we might justify this redistribution. He rejects consequentialism of any sort, specifically introducing what he calls “side-constraints”, moral constraints upon actions, rather than desirable moral or socio-political elements of our end goals. (Nozick 2013, 28-35).

97 His specific phrasing is “invisible hand explanation”.

From this, he develops a morally justifiable reason to develop into the minimal state, relying upon the prohibition of private enforcement of law and justice, and a principle of compensation – rather than redistribution – to follow suit. “Any state more extensive violates people’s rights.” (Nozick 2013, 149). He then discusses distributive justice by suggesting a theory of justice that is concerned primarily with holdings of property, and the transfer thereof. The former portion does not particularly concern the thesis, as the justice of an original holding seems exceedingly difficult to establish. Such a theory is “historical”, rather than end-state (Nozick 2013, 156-158); as with the prior idea, he rejects any appeal to the consequences, and is only concerned with justice in each individual action. Some transfers may be unjust – those forced upon an individual via uncontrolled interference, for example – but the majority of actions are entirely just. In a rather famous example, he suggests that if many thousands want to see Wilt Chamberlain play, it is entirely just for him to demand a small charge from each person, and thus amass a vast quantity of money. This would be troubling for republican accounts of domination – it would seem very easy for Wilt to then parlay his economic advantages into domination, if he so chose (Nozick 2013, 161).

However, much of this argument relies on drastically different assumptions to Pettit’s. While both Nozick and Pettit focus upon individual rights, Pettit is broadly consequentialist, while Nozick is stubbornly determined to stick to justification by actions, not results. Pettit’s concerns about government overreach are somewhat different to Nozick’s, as the latter objects to all but the most minimal state. If Nozick allowed for non-domination, could his arguments be coherently preserved? It certainly seems plausible to create the same account of freedom with Wilt Chamberlain, if the example is altered slightly.

Rather than focus upon the end result of Chamberlain himself, the focus is upon two points: the individual (and entirely voluntary) transfers, and the potential domination Chamberlain's newfound wealth buys him. For the sake of completeness, let it be assumed that Chamberlain's fame and social status somehow increases in direct correlation to his wealth. Therefore, the wealthier he is, the greater his social standing (and ability to use it to his advantage in dominating others).

The prevention of such minor exchanges necessitates an awareness of how much money is being spent, if one wishes to avoid banning "capitalist acts between consenting adults" (Nozick 2013, 163). If the currency was primarily or entirely electronic in nature, tracking its flow would be easy. But who tracks this data, and who has access to it? Uncomfortable questions arise about the privacy of the individual. Offering a government complete knowledge of an individual's transactions promises nothing good, as does the ability to approve or deny such transactions. A cap on such transfers – e.g., a cap on a person's wealth – seems more plausible (Casassas & De Wispelaere 2016, 2-22). Yet unless this cap is set at a very low level⁹⁸, mandating near equality, the disparity may be sufficient to permit domination.

As for the potential of domination from the newly famous and enriched Chamberlain, it is notable that the wealth and fame in and of itself accomplishes no domination, but rather what can be bought with it: silence, consent, individuals willing to obtain a measure of either in return for doing terrible things. If Nozick were purely interested in freedom at each "step", however, it would be incoherent to dismiss the first act because of the potential consequences, rather, one ought to ensure that these potential consequences were each punished (by dint of abusing the first towards force, fraud, and similar illegitimate methods).

98 A specific figure would be arbitrary here. Such would need to be thoroughly tested.

The problem becomes very much akin to that of chapter two, section four; it is far too easy to end up in a state which is philosophically and logically plausible, yet when exposed to the realities of life, results in something much worse. In the case of permitting his largesse, Chamberlain's prestige and wealth may buy him effective immunity. In the case of tracking each transfer, the slippery slope of domination occurs not only in the potential for government overreach (negating privacy and resulting in widespread coercion) but in that of wealth transfers. Cohen argues that not only does patterned distributive justice preserve liberty (Cohen 1977, 5-21), but that Nozick fails to address an important distinction in what justice might mean (Cohen 2011, 126-131). He also explicitly argues for a consequentialist understanding of justice and liberty, as part of socialism. To paraphrase, the inviolability of a few leading to the massive practical violation of the many is incoherent (Cohen 1977, 16-17); one of the areas in which republican and socialist political thought converge.

If Cohen's arguments against the just steps argument hold, then presumably a situation could arise whereby actions which were under no uncontrolled interference produced a situation that allowed for such, e.g. Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain example. This would be even more toxic to freedom than Cohen envisages. Wealth transfers of this kind seem to qualify, which supports the intuitive disquiet one might have about the acceptability of Nozick's "just steps" arguments in the real world. There seems something terribly disingenuous about his claims when billions of tiny individual transfers can produce a corporate entity like Walmart, funnelling vast wealth upwards. There seems little hope of such wealth then being lost, absent taxation.

Instead, Nozick might acknowledge that freely chosen actions could bring about the kinds of domination the thesis has envisaged. However, he could challenge that such actions were less

dangerous to freedom, and a free society as a whole, than that of an actively engaged government willing to engage in uncontrolled interference for the sake of greater preventions elsewhere.⁹⁹ This is not to be confused with the second argument from Hayek presented below, as that instead holds that government actions of this kind *cannot* eliminate systemic or corporate dominion, and replace or displace it. Nozick's potential argument concedes that it may do so, but only at the cost of uncontrolled interference. Even for a republican consequentialism, this may be concerning.

Nozick does not adopt the Rothbardian idea that *any* taxation is illegitimate, but unlike Rawls, he does not seem to think that high taxation and mass redistribution could arise organically, and he holds a view that taxation is essentially forced labour (Nozick 2013 169-172). This might give the impression that anything above an ultra-minimal state would inevitably resort in uncontrolled interference¹⁰⁰. If the state were repeatedly to act against its citizens' avowed wishes and desires, it would fall prey to Pettit's worries about paternalism, would be forced to avoid democratic contestation or corrupt the electoral process, and so on. It would fit every account of *imperium*. This requires two things to be true, however. First, Nozick – over the philosophical and practical objections of liberals such as Rawls, socialists such as Cohen and republicans such as Pettit – would need to suggest that high taxation cannot arise with the consent of the governed – or that any consent was in some way false or fabricated, which would require further empirical explanation and some indication that the apparent consent given in say, Sweden, was irrational or unjustifiable, which seems difficult. His grounds for concern are not entirely unreasonable, however. In a system with high levels of taxation and the preservation of voluntary exchange, particularly when it comes to employment, many involved in highly skilled or highly demanding jobs may find the tax

99 Naturally, this argument is even stronger if one rejects *any* uncontrolled interference, no matter how desirable or useful it may be. Nozick adopts this, especially in regards to side-constraints (Nozick 2013, 30-33), but as Cohen notes (Cohen 1977, 16-18), this makes relatively little sense and may even be called illegitimate.

100 Presumably Nozick's ideal minarchist state would allow for taxes for the upkeep of a constabulary; it presumably being more efficient than everyone taking a turn.

demands on them to be onerous. While this may strike the reader as logically unconvincing, and perhaps unjustifiable, that does nothing to lessen such potential resentment. The interference would then be against their interests. If they had the right to emigrate, or a democratic voice¹⁰¹, then this argument would cease to have much force, however.

Second, Nozick would need to demonstrate that the usage of uncontrolled interference represents a slippery slope, appealing to the potential consequences the extreme might entail. The first approach (voluntary transfers) does not seem to be a fruitful possibility. The second (potential domination) is on firmer ground regarding slipperiness, but may be turned on its head; it seems far more likely that uncontrolled acquisition of wealth and social status will result in uncontrolled interference, than the control of wealth and social status will result in uncontrolled government; at least, if that government remains accountable to a democratic electorate.

Therefore, Nozick's arguments work only so far as one wants to reject consequentialism in the pursuit of non-domination. There are, however, very good arguments to preserve, rather than reject, consequentialism as a principle, as noted in chapter two and this section alike. If it is accepted, then most of his arguments accomplish very little.

The second argument relies upon arguments not unlike Mises' or Hayek's in the Road to Serfdom. Pettit explicitly establishes non-domination as allowing for government more "robust" than the states of classical liberalism, and this form of the argument can concede that point. There may well be room for progressive taxation, insurance and insulation, as well as a fully-fledged government on republican principles in such a state. For the sake of the argument, it will be assumed that Hayek

¹⁰¹ It does not even need to be a particularly large measure, by Pettit's "tough luck" prerequisite; they must be able to show malice, rather than misfortune, if they are well-paid and highly taxed. By dint of the "well-paid" portion, this is implausible.

accepts liberty as non-domination¹⁰². Hayek favours proceduralism, as mentioned, but that is tangential to this particular argument.

Where such a state might err is in attempting to provide goods and services in its own right, rather than regulating them, in the mistaken belief that it could avert several major economic laws. While a government has major advantages – especially economy of scale and vertical integration¹⁰³ - and may be able to act as a monopoly, to its own advantage, it must still maintain its economic standing and act within the market. If it is a steel monopoly, for example, it must be able to produce steel effectively, with fewer costs, and to the benefit of the citizenry – otherwise, why bother, absent ideological concerns?¹⁰⁴

The argument at this point has two closely related and interconnected forks. The first argues that any state-based market function (and especially a state monopoly) is subject to the exact same pressures and drives as any other function in said market. Therefore, two unpalatable options exist for this first fork – either the function faces competition (and therefore must respond rationally and selfishly or become unprofitable/unsuccessful) or it does not (and therefore ends up being grotesquely inefficient). Either way, it offers little to no improvement on the market for the consumer, with the worker only potentially benefiting in the latter case.

The second argues that the state would replace the domination of corporations with bureaucrats.

This can be phrased internally and externally. Internally, a state-run steel company is not identical

102 An assumption which is somewhat difficult to contemplate, but without which, Hayek's arguments are entirely unintelligible to republicanism, and vice versa. While there exists literature which claims Hayek adheres to the neo-roman/republican tradition (Irving 2017, 7-15), Hayek does not seem to hold to alienation or structural domination, and the paper in question seemingly ignores Pettit's later work in lieu of focusing on Skinner. Moreover, Hayek states that "it is not the source but the limitation of power that prevents it from being arbitrary" (Hayek 2001, 74), and this seems very contrary to Pettit, let alone the neo-republican thesis.

103 Which is one reason for the great success, cheapness and effectiveness of government health insurance and/or entirely socialised medical systems such as the NHS over private, fully market-driven insurance systems.

104 One answer to this rhetorical question is, of course, to comply with the eyeball test and strict material equality (Pettit 2014), but permit that this is unnecessary for the sake of the argument.

to one that is backed by market capital – nor for that matter, a worker’s cooperative. But it has similar drives and organisation to the former. The need to make a profit may be secondary to some other political objective, but there will still be a need to produce steel efficiently. Externally, the steel company must still sell its steel (or supply it to some other part of the state apparatus). Again, little changes. Therefore, if a steel company is supposed to compete with others in the market, it *may* have certain advantages which enable it to direct a kinder hand to its workers or to benefit consumers. Backed by subsidies, it may be able to buy in greater quantities and make use of economy of scale, as an example. The individuals at the top still wield enormous power, however, at least within a capitalist system, and a command economy has its own issues¹⁰⁵.

Rather than erroneously making those who produce and those who regulate that production the same, the market should be allowed to function. A concern with the state as a market agent does not mean the state has no role to play. For instance, the market does not ban the sale of infants; government legislation does. Or so the argument might proceed.

In defence of government interference in the economy, the first fork’s logic can be questioned by utilising the work of Alex Hirschman. Hirschman points out that two methods of redress are typically used: voice, so as to criticise or otherwise make one’s concerns known, and exit, so as to avert the flaw entirely (Hirschman 1970, 21-43). The latter approach is not available in the event of a government monopoly, but the first may remain, and be used effectively as a means of chastisement and control. Ordinarily, voice would have minimal¹⁰⁶ impact on a monopoly. But a government, established according to republican democratic requirements and dealing with an

¹⁰⁵ Additionally, Hayek argued that the structure of the command economy was incredibly toxic to liberty, and this remains true under non-domination. Just as with capitalism, domination flows downwards, this time from political figures (Hayek 2001, 68-74).

¹⁰⁶ Hirschman does make the point that monopolies may welcome exit over voice for this precise reason (Hirschman 1970, 56-60), as they may content themselves with a market share which costs them less time and effort to placate. An effective voice is something to be dreaded, but difficult to ensure.

active and committed citizenry – admittedly, quite a large caveat – would need to address major and popular concerns, and would therefore have impetus to act.

For the second fork, curbing abuse of such bureaucratic power is vitally important. Again, the democratic requirements of the republican state will do much to curb them. This does little to ensure that the individuals within each company are well-regarded, however; consumers may only be aware of mistreatment and malpractice at their end. A culture of silence, and silent abuse, could develop as easily under a bureaucratic government division as under a capitalist company – perhaps a little more easily, by preying upon notions of patriotism.

To address this, two things are needed. The first is, as Pettit suggests, a robust independence within the workplace, along with the ability and willingness to contest illegitimate decisions. This could be accomplished by integrating some sort of “workplace democracy”, to which the thesis will turn in chapter five. Less radically, it could be accomplished by enforcing transparency and oversight from both the government itself and individual citizens – the latter via anonymous and surprise inspections. The second is to ensure positions of bureaucratic power are not maintained for long enough, and with enough security, to build effective power. While this may be at a cost of efficiency, given the high turnover would affect managerial capability, it would help ensure the power necessary to hide abuse never became entrenched, and that if it did, there would be an opportunity to see it redressed after those in power had moved on.

Republicanism is obviously not opposed to state intervention per se. It is worth briefly considering, however, how republican thinking views state control of the economy. Pettit supports some element of private property (Pettit 2014, 65-68, 70-72, 85), but allows for “common property” - his example

being a road. A road however is pretty much common property by default. Pettit's concern with equitable support for cultures might entail museums or monuments as common property, upheld by taxes, and this seems both plausible and more substantive as an example. He refers to the prospects of tariffs and subsidies in some papers (Pettit 2010, 85) but again in little detail.

What Pettit does cover extensively is the need for individuals to have a measure of independence from government; they should not have to rely upon its goodwill. He allows for various kinds of insurance – medical and financial, disability and pensions – but gives little detail on exactly what they might entail. To be entirely fair to Pettit, neither will this thesis; assessing financial security is beyond the author's abilities, to give but one example. Would the NHS of the United Kingdom go too far? Probably not – since private healthcare remains available and the legislation surrounding the NHS attempts to prohibit inequitable treatment. What of nurturing industries deemed vital to economic development, supporting them via tariffs and subsidies? Again, there seems to be little of concern, assuming one does not believe that governments are fundamentally incapable of regularly making decisions with economic rationality and any degree of success – a statement which is clearly false (Chang 2010, 125-136). Their acceptability will be, as with government, to the extent that citizens can exert influence on the policies enacted.

The practical upshot is that full centrally planned state control of the economy would go too far, but that this does not prevent state intervention of various kinds, up to and including nationalised industries. As shall be argued in the next chapter, a full command economy is not necessary to prevent systemic or corporate domination, but substantial state interference and a measure of state control are. As Pettit puts, it, “regulation is not oppression”.

Chapter Four

Section One – Solutions to the problem, and a critique of Rawls' ideology

Having summed up the problems presented for republicanism by corporate power in chapter three and having established a “neo-republican” viewpoint which explicitly builds in socialist and social egalitarian thought in chapter two, the thesis will now turn towards a solution that still upholds non-domination and discursive control. Any such solution must account for not only Pettit's stated demands on governments, and the problems previously discussed, most notably systemic domination and corporate power. Such a solution is to be contrasted with the liberal or social democracy currently practised in much of the more economically developed world. Such still allow for three major components of corporate power: massive material inequalities, concentration of wealth and power for the most well-off and the steady disregard of the majority's economic well-being and dignity alike.

As discussed in the previous chapter, over-reliance on the market simply will not work. Any solution which necessitates authoritarian methods or governance is also flatly denied, due to violating non-domination and Pettit's democratic requirements. Desiring the preservation of basic liberties and a loose material equality (Pettit 2014, 79-81, 107), a few ideas immediately present themselves, offered in no particular order. The first is a Rawlsian property-owning democracy organised in accordance with his difference principle; in such a democracy, the only permissible inequalities in distribution are those that maximise the minimum and preserve or improve the advantages of the least advantaged¹⁰⁷. While Pettit argues that his system is both less and more demanding than Rawls' (Pettit 2014, 107, Pettit 2012, 107-110), and certainly operates on different principles, an argument can be made that some blend of Rawls and Pettit would best serve non-

¹⁰⁷ A brief note – Rawls does not look for any particular “pattern” of (in)equality to end up with, but rather structural principles that produce patterns of this kind, allowing for various potential systems and methods of distributive justice, amongst other “social goods” (Rawls 1973, 88, 93-94. 265-274).

domination¹⁰⁸. The second idea worth considering is some form of socialism; it must be democratic, but whether it would rely upon a command economy or the market is open to question. An anarchistic-leaning socialism would possibly preserve the material equality Pettit desires, but stands in direct opposition to his need for government oversight. The third would be enforced mutualism¹⁰⁹, to the point it might even be considered some form of syndicalism; a wage ceiling, a wage floor, and ensuring that all employees of an enterprise have a stake in the business (Casassas & De Wispelaere 2016, 10-21). The fourth is to accept the thesis' arguments thus far, but to reject that Pettit's solutions are wholly insufficient; they require adaptation, not replacements. Instead, the problem is one of implementation of those solutions. Two strands of this approach will be discussed in the thesis. One is the "marketisation" and exit-prospects championed by Taylor in *Exit Left*. The other is to build in "workplace republicanism" and ensure that capitalism accomplishes its goals in a fair and equitable manner. No major organisational changes need to be made on such an account, though basic income has republican support (Lovett 2009, 825-828, Pettit 2007, 1-7, Casassas & De Wispelaere 2016, 10, etc).

The range of solutions in organisational terms is thus quite diverse. Some might also require an ideological shift, or yet more theorising built into the neo-republican framework. This is particularly the case with any discussion of Rawls, but Taylor's solution brings in neo-liberal ideas towards the market, socialist doctrine might continue to blend socialism and traditional republicanism, etc. The thesis will argue for the second solution – a form of socialism relying upon market functions, voluntary exchange, and yet simultaneously, the elimination of private property and the control of the means of production, financial exchange, etc, in the hands of society rather than individuals. The principles behind this organisation remain entirely republican, following Pettit and Lovett's logic – loose material equality (expressive egalitarianism) is necessary for non-domination, and the

108 For example, a republican property owning democracy is defended by Dagger (Dagger 2006, 156-162).

109 For clarity, this refers not to the anarchist tradition of political thought dating back to Proudhon, but the idea of a social movement based on mutual interdependence.

more equal individuals are, the less likely domination becomes (Pettit 2012, 88, Lovett 2009, 825-828). This is coupled with the need to preserve discursive control and prevent systemic domination, as previously outlined.

The best way to proceed is both to outline the strengths of such a strategy, and the weaknesses of its competitors. Such weaknesses are not limited to organisation; Rawls' blueprints for a society may or may not work, but it must equally be demonstrated that the principles he depends upon (maximin, liberal egalitarianism, etc) are insufficient to achieve the desired material equality, resources, and protections necessary for non-domination¹¹⁰. Such socialism would not necessarily be incompatible with a universal basic income of some kind, nor with mutualism. Their inclusion or exclusion can therefore wait. Instead, the thesis will discuss the distinctions between Rawlsian liberalism and republicanism. Considering the ways in which they are (in)compatible will aid in any proposed synthesis.

An exhaustive list of every detail would require more space and time than is available to the thesis and to the reader. Therefore, the thesis will focus on three critical differences: Rawls and republicanism's views on freedom, institutions and inequality, and the role of the state in influencing civil society (and the individuals comprising it) towards a particular view of "the good".

As noted above, Rawls and republicanism operate on substantially different versions of freedom. The thesis has already outlined the republican view in considerable detail, and defended it against objections from those who prefer a more liberal, egalitarian view. But Rawls' view has yet to be suitably outlined. Rawls, like Pettit, rejects the classical positive-negative view; he instead argues

¹¹⁰ Rawls does not aim at non-domination, and begins from very different ideological premises (Pettit 1997, 50, Maynor 2003, 23, 55-56, 92). This can be seen via his discussion of slavery in contrast to being free and equal, where Rawls makes an argument from personhood and on competing claims, as opposed to social position (Rawls 2001, 20-24). Consider indentured servitude, with fixed rules and where the person was still viewed as "claim-worthy". Rawls might have problems with this, but not, it seems, on grounds of freedom. Rawls also distinguishes "classical republicanism" from liberalism (Rawls 2001, 144), considering them compatible, but separate. What is necessary to be free, and what resources are necessary to be free, thus differs substantially. However, it is still arguable that Rawls' methodology might eliminate corporate power in a way Pettit does not, and thus would be preferable for securing republican freedom despite not actually being designed to do so. As will be made clear in this section, this is not the case, but maximin could theoretically be more extensive than the very loose principles Pettit offers in *Just Freedom*.

that the entire debate is merely a question of emphasis rather than meaningful content. Instead, “this or that person (or persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not do) so and so.” (Rawls 1973, 202). Moreover, Rawls argues that there are many such liberties, whose value is interconnected and ultimately dependent on the lack of interference by persons or by institutions, mandating legal restrictions and a “rather intricate complex of rights and duties” (Rawls 1973, 202-204). In contrast to Pettit’s view, he does not accept that resources are necessary for liberty to apply, but rather that their lack devalues the “worth” of liberty (Rawls 1973, 202-204). In the Law of Peoples, he goes still further, arguing that freedom and justice are interconnected and approximately follow one another (Rawls 1999, 14-16, 36-37). Rawls also expresses some scepticism towards a consequentialist approach to liberty and other ends, like utility; he views this as far too flimsy a justification, instead anchoring liberty in just practice, and allowing for liberty to be restrained only for the sake of greater liberty overall. Further, any loss of particular liberties must be acceptable to those who find themselves with less-than-equal liberty (Rawls 1973, 210-211, 250). Rawls’ first priority is the so-called “basic liberties”, the most important ones; they may only be limited to arrange a greater overall supply of such liberties, or to prevent them from being denied. The exact arrangement, in Rawls’ view, does not matter so long as it is compatible with a provision of such liberties to all involved (Rawls 1973, 203-204, 250). Liberty thus comes prior to equality of opportunity, which then passes on to Rawls’ definition of justice, to be discussed shortly. How is this liberty to be provided and guaranteed?¹¹¹ Unlike Pettit, who focuses on a large number of institutional specifics on one hand and very general principles like the eyeball test on the other, Rawls focuses primarily on the idea of a social contract, one which can only be supported by institutions, to which the thesis now turns.

Briefly, Pettit criticises Rawls’ position in *On the People’s Terms* as not giving enough security and resources as part of his definition of freedom, thus necessitating the connection with justice (Pettit

111 Pettit similarly orders liberty as the first priority, but makes no use of Rawls’ “lexical” mode of ordering.

2012 82-94), while his own theory maintains a “richer” value of freedom. Moreover, Rawls’ definition lacks the distinction between controlled and uncontrolled interference; the thesis will return to this point after continuing the explanation of Rawls’ position.

Rawls’ view on institutions is intricate, so a summary will have to suffice . He defines an institution as “a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities...an institution may be thought of in two ways: first as an abstract object, that is, as a possible form of conduct expressed by a system of rules; and second, as the realisation in the thought and conduct...specified by these rules” (Rawls 1973, 55). But an institution is not the mere sum of its parts, nor is the overall structure of society merely one “super-institution”. Parts of the institutions may be just¹¹² or unjust, without affecting the status of the whole. In the same way, a society may be flawed by the presence of unjust institutions without its own constitution being so. Rawls explicitly ties formal justice – adherence to procedure – with substantive justice, the recognition and provision of rights, liberties, and various other goods (Rawls 1973, 55-60), arguing that any formally just institution will tend towards substantive justice as well. The critical element of this view is that institutions are subject to his two principles of liberty and justice as well (Rawls 1973, 60-64, 250).

Rawls also argues that institutions must be just and/or free over time – a continuous procedural justice (Sugin 2004, page 2007). They need not necessarily be so in every single instance. This presents an interesting dichotomy with his rejection of consequentialism, but not one that is necessarily inconsistent. He seems much more concerned with justice as an ongoing project; any particular instance of injustice, while regrettable, cannot be the focus of a society as a whole. Indeed, he seems to think it is impossible to speak of justice and fairness (or indeed, justice as fairness) “from a social point of view” in any given individual circumstance (Rawls 1993, 266).

112 As a reminder, this is relevant for our purposes because Rawls binds liberty and justice together.

In *Political Liberalism*, Rawls sets out further details on “the basic structure” (Rawls 1993, 35) and how it might look, informed by his own conception of procedural justice¹¹³ and a “public political conception of justice”. The basic structure is a key component to a “well-ordered society”, if and only if it satisfies those conceptions of justice, with liberty anchored to it, following Rawls’ “two principles of justice” and basic liberties (Rawls 1973, 60-65). To do so, the basic structure must secure “just background conditions”, (Rawls 1993, 266). These conditions may, however, be eroded, even inadvertently, by methods not unlike those highlighted earlier in the thesis: “the invisible hand” of capitalism does much to detract from justice and fairness, while the market’s complexity makes it increasingly difficult to control or legislate over it, without resulting in a regulatory quagmire (Rawls 1993, 266-269). He proposes thus a “division of labour” - individuals act as they will and he claims no conformation to “any observable pattern”, but the rules and laws are held to the principles of justice; thus public law, statutes, taxation and entitlements (Rawls 1993, 283).

On such a view, institutional injustice and (propagation of) inequality is much more severe than any in the individual sphere, which potentially sets him against Pettit’s view – Pettit is more concerned than Rawls appears to be with individual instances of domination, and criticises Rawls on this point; under republicanism, *no* domination can be entertained, and a system which “depends (depending) on the goodwill of someone who is unlikely to turn nasty” is unacceptable (Pettit 2014, 103)¹¹⁴. Pettit’s concern is on action, particularly individual action, and is termed “individualist” here. Rawls’ two principles of justice as fairness, and Pettit’s concepts of justice as insulation, must be examined in greater detail, and then the thesis can discuss their respective solutions for inequality.

¹¹³ To be discussed and compared with republicanism shortly.

¹¹⁴ This has particular contrast with Rawls’ view on the family, where Pettit insists on interference (of a non-arbitrary kind, likely via law), and Rawls famously does his best to exclude it from political life (Keams 1983, 36-42, Rawls 2001, 162-168, esp. 165, Pettit 2014, 15).

A small clarification is needed beforehand. Rawls uses justice as fairness in two senses, which may explain some of Pettit's seemingly uncharitable criticisms. In one sense, it is similar to Pettit's usage – justice in terms of a just distribution, set as “a proper balance of competing claims” (Pettit 2014, 79-81). In another, however, Rawlsian justice relates to the overall harmonious working of institutions and society in the greater whole; a just institution may not be distributively just, but it accomplishes its goals in a rational, transparent and even-handed manner – a fair manner, simply put. This is also the sense in which Hayek supposedly agrees with Rawls (Lister 2011, 5, 16-17).

Pettit and Rawls sketch out theories of distributive justice, the latter more extensively. Rawls sets out the case for a distribution which maximises justice by ensuring that any economic inequalities maximise the interests¹¹⁵ of the least advantaged (Rawls 2001, 58-61), again on a procedural basis. He justifies such an outcome over both greater overall prosperity but bitter inequality (what he calls the utilitarian view) and over complete equality. The utilitarian view is discarded for its total lack of scruples and lack of regard for the basic structure (Rawls 1993, 258-261), while complete equality is supposedly “incompatible with the integrity of free persons” because “we have a right to our natural abilities and a right to whatever we become entitled to by taking part in a fair social process” (Rawls 1993, 283-284). However, it is important to remember that Rawls maintains a lexical priority when it comes to justice and (in)equality; the basic liberties come first, then equality of opportunity is to be guaranteed, and only then must economic inequality be addressed. While the first two provide reasons to address inequality in themselves, it may be that the establishment of certain basic liberties counteracts any attempts to address such inequality, e.g.: the preservation of systems of private property. Likewise, while Rawls is able to denounce an incredibly prosperous autocracy, a point on which the neo-republican view concurs, his definition of equality of opportunity may differ substantially from the thesis', and may not be extensive enough to

115 Rawls' specific term is “expectations” as in “(reasonable) expectations of primary goods over a complete life. These expectations are their life-prospects.” (Rawls 2001, 59).

correspond with the equity demanded by social egalitarianism, let alone neo-republican theory, or even Pettit's demands for cultural support (Pettit 1997, 145-146).

Such distributive justice is, for Rawls, a desirable end in itself; for Pettit, it is simply a matter of ensuring that individuals are not subject to the domination of others (Pettit 2014, 102-104). It is, in his words, a minimalist base. Likewise, Pettit argues that Rawlsian liberalism focuses too much on equality of resources; to his mind, it pays too little attention to inequalities of social power and privilege, and on the other, it and other "radical egalitarian" programs are "moral fantasies" (Pettit 2014, 107). Because Pettit views his ideal of freedom as richer and more demanding than the Rawlsian one, he is strangely both unconcerned with "a strict, substantive equality in wealth and power" (Pettit 2014, 82) and supportive of a "substantive and revisionary set of policies" (Pettit 2014, 102). As freedom and equality sharply correlate, as established in chapters two and three, Pettit's account of a "freedom centred principle of justice" (Pettit 2014, 78-79) is misleading, and his critique of equality of resources seems to be more of a critique of Dworkin or similar egalitarians, not Rawls' specific vision.

The procedural versus individual distinction is also useful to consider, and may be more of a genuine divergence. Both agree on the need for extensive protections to guarantee liberty; to promote the "value" of liberty on the Rawlsian side, and the resources to make use of liberty on Pettit's; the two converge on similar protections despite having far different ideas of how to guarantee liberty and distributive justice. In an ideal Rawlsian world, individual actions and behaviours would have relatively little consequence; the system as a whole would correct any injustices over time, via procedural means (Rawls 1973, 87-88, Rawls 1993, 265-271). In the absence of such a world, there may be occasions where individual action is required, although Rawls may prefer to avoid it (Rawls 2001, 53). Pettit is deeply sceptical of such procedural liberties, which he feels lack republicanism's attention to detail and leave gaps open for personal exploitation

(Pettit 2014, 219). Republicanism uses systems and constitutional methods as well, but domination must be curtailed to the greatest extent possible.

Pettit instead outlines a system of protections against *any* uncontrolled interference (Pettit 2014, 103-107), relying on the long list of requirements, especially the idea of insulation – whether this is in relationships he deems special (corporate power, for example) or in general cases of crime, abuse of power, etc. Pettit too would doubtless prefer a system where these events simply did not happen. Unlike Rawls, however, he establishes that an ideal republican system is not only allowed but *required* to intervene in cases of individual domination.

As noted above, neo-republicanism may demand additional guarantees. Too much inequality of any kind – social, economic or political – is a potential threat to the free individual, and an opportunity for domination. Likewise, the focus on process rather than individual instances means that systemic domination could go unnoticed for a very long time. An example of this under a Rawlsian process would be the matter of free speech. Rawls guarantees the right of free speech, but not its effective value – according to Pettit, at least (Pettit 2014, 103). A more charitable reading would suggest that Rawls is less concerned with social power and status than Pettit, but would be equally appalled at efforts to distort and control that free speech. It seems likely, however, that his focus on the bigger picture of institutions would result in inequalities which, following the arguments in chapter three on media control and concentration, diminish the standing and value of free speech according to republican norms. In particular, Rawls does not place a positive demand on civic virtues and autonomy in the same way as republicanism, and especially the neo-republicanism the thesis proposes, does. A plausible example would be media organisations which, although complying with all the institutional rules Rawls might set, did nothing to foster dialogue or challenge the status quo, or simply advocated passive, incremental change in solutions that benefited their owners' socio-

economic position. Thus, the political discourse could be narrowed, as it currently is under capitalism (Chomsky 2002, 31-37).

Another example: it is equally possible that such a society would have a recurring case of alienation in Schuppert's sense (perhaps an ostracised trade or ethnicity) who, due to a lack of effective representation, would be unable to effect meaningful change. Rawls places certain demands of reciprocity and equal treatment, coupled with the thought-experiment of the original position, and this would prohibit blatant discrimination¹¹⁶. But one may consider the development of a society on procedural terms, via democratic elections and the slow change of public deliberation. Over time, institutions will be reformed and developed in accordance with the wishes of the majority. Reciprocity and fairness will, ideally, compel these changes to be fair¹¹⁷. They are only fair to those with voice and interest, however. A small and relatively alien group in an otherwise homogenous state, such as the Ainu in Japan or the aboriginal peoples of Australia¹¹⁸, might be subject to charity and aid by reciprocity. They will still lack a voice, though; they will lack the character of being socially free and equal, because in a very real sense, they are not. They are dependent upon being heard and considered, and then factored into public policy, by a majority which has little in common with them. Republicanism, by dint of the demands for equitable treatment would find this impermissible; the status of being part of a minority group should never result in the loss of being socially free and equal, in other words. It is not obvious that Rawls' principles can effectively address alienation of this kind without substantial modification.

The key issue for both individual and systemic domination, however, is the potential for instances of inequality wherein social or economic power permits uncontrolled interference. This could occur in at least two ways – perhaps more, but these seem to be the most notable. First, individuals may

116 In an ideal world, of course, but it seems difficult to blame Rawls for the persistence of unthinking prejudices.

117 Pettit's concept of civility in *Republicanism* resembles this, and the two complement one another well.

118 For a despised trade, we might consider the world's oldest profession – prostitutes are frequently subject to abuse and degradation, and this is routinely ignored.

become trapped in positions of economic or social vulnerability which Rawls' procedural focus allows for – there may be numerous instances of individual domination, provided the system as a whole exhibits no such tendencies. For example, transient workers might lose out on protections that static workers enjoy, or such protections might be of little value. This could hold for migrants as well, with formal protections and liberties which accomplished little (Ottonelli & Torresi 2010, 202-222). Alternatively, procedures themselves could become corrupted, or interact with one another such that each procedure was formally acceptable, but the results became inherently objectionable. Tommie Shelby phrases this excellently: “unjust racial hierarchy and inequality can be systematically reproduced in the absence of explicit racist rules or overt racial animus.” (Shelby 2016, 26). Flaws at any level could result in systemic failings, whether in goals, content, or application. Moreover, these could combine; a failure of both employment and education, for instance, may effectively freeze specific groups out of higher education and higher workplace roles. Some individuals may still get through; there may even be “affirmative action” programmes to allow for this (Shelby 2016, 27-30). But on the whole it would be insufficient.

An immediate response from Rawls against the procedural flaws argument might be to point out that adherence to formal justice tends towards real justice in the long run, and a similar pattern may hold for inequality; “where we find formal justice...we are likely to find substantive justice as well” (Rawls 1973, 58-60); the lack of total success is not a reason to abandon a project, or else republicanism would be equally doomed. Moreover, the presence of such cases would imply that the basic structure was failing to perform effectively, and would therefore need reform and assistance. Unlike Dworkin's equality of resources, Rawls is not committed to a kind of distributive equality which explicitly disallows corrective action or coldly rejects reciprocal duties. Quite the opposite; Rawls' distaste for individual aid and imposing an ideal pattern (Rawls 1993, 283) need not be dogmatically followed, and in cases where the system has obviously broken down, the social contract has failed at least one party. Some individual intervention could therefore be justified. In

the case of interactional failure, Rawls would undoubtedly agree that such areas should be reformed; he also notes that “unless this structure is appropriately regulated and adjusted, an initially just social process will eventually cease to be just” (Rawls 1993, 266). The question then becomes whether the system could easily discover such flaws and eliminate them. There does seem to be some inconsistency in how the system is to cope with chronic cases of individual injustice.

A more promising critique along these lines would be to consider who is running these institutions, and whether the inequalities Rawls permits could conceivably have knock on effects. Such would only be worsened with cases of the Schuppertian alienation mentioned previously, resulting in both inferiors and elites. But this is more of a problem of organisation, to be considered in the next section. It is enough to say at this point that the system may easily end up procedurally just for many, but not for a substantial minority, and this should be a serious concern.

A related issue is that of private domination. Neither Pettit nor Rawls are eager to see individuals dependent on government (Rawls 2001, 21-23, Pettit 2014, 77-78). But their definitions of dependency differ, and they especially differ with regard to private institutions. The paradigm case for this would be a small firm which produces luxury goods; it is clearly not part of the basic structure, not being a “major social institution” (Rawls 1973, 7) nor does its ownership conflict with loose material equality or expressive egalitarianism (Pettit 2012, 103, 113-114). Assume that in order to remain competitive, the owner engages in abusive motivational techniques, regular threats of unemployment, unpaid overtime, etc. If the employees lose their jobs, they will be subjected to deprivation¹¹⁹. According to Rawls, this is regrettable and highly unpleasant, but it is not actually coercion, etc – it remains permissible. Rawls might argue that there are moral reasons to avert this, or that available legislation would aid in correcting it, but it is not, in itself, freedom-depriving. To Pettit, this situation is dominating, but is only problematic to the proportion it is inescapable (Pettit

119 Both Pettit and Rawls agree on the need for unemployment insurance/benefit, but neither give much detail on its content.

2001, 155-156), or under the neo-republican thesis, to the proportion it is alienating. Thus in many cases it will be freedom-depriving. If there are good grounds for regarding subservience, and the instilling of subservience, as freedom-depriving – and chapter one, section three, argued that there were – then Rawls' view seems notably lacking.

Lastly, republicanism might challenge Rawls via non-domination directly. Rawls' definition of liberty is closer to the standard of non-interference, although he does not characterise it in this way (Rawls 1973, 201-202). He speaks of constraints and duties solely, making no reference to the prospect of non-arbitrary interference; as with negative liberty, any constraint is at best a necessary evil. What if Rawls were to adopt the republican standard of non-domination, however, such that he would need a system which – by procedure – would ensure the loss of the potential to dominate, the enforcement of the eyeball test, etc? In chapter one, it was established that the republican conception of liberty was more nuanced and complete, and preferable to the liberal, negative liberty model. In chapter two, autonomy and systemic domination were established as goals for the republican – or neo-republican – to protect and avert, respectively. These again seem compatible and desirable for Rawls.

Non-domination does not conflict with many of Rawls' arguments. It is likely that he would still favour some form of expansive, egalitarian change over Pettit's "loose material equality", certainly considering the problem of systemic domination, which Pettit does not embrace. The original position, his proceduralist focus, etc, would also remain. Faced with the need to avoid subservience and all the other evils that republicanism rightfully condemns, and to avert dependency on others' goodwill, Rawls might adopt many of Pettit's criteria in *Just Freedom*, most notably protections for those who would be otherwise dependent.

To articulate a full redesign of Rawls' arguments under non-domination's principles would require a separate thesis. If Rawls were prepared to adopt a republican conception of freedom and focus upon individual instances of possible domination, as well as alienation, and could offer a plausible solution on doing so by procedural means, then the dispute would narrow considerably. There seem good reasons for a Rawlsian approach to adjust itself in response to republican criticism. If that is the case, does Rawls need to be concerned with maximin, his two principles of justice, and so on? Pettit insists stridently that he does not – liberty alone is capable of grounding all such concerns. This seems unduly optimistic, however. As noted, freedom and equality correlate, and Pettit does not allow for systemic domination. It would be more apt to say that distributive justice is contained and guided by republican liberty, in a way which Rawls rightly acknowledges (Rawls 1973, 151). The question then is whether liberty and justice would be better served by procedural policy of the kind Rawls favours, with republican amendments, or by some other, more individualistic solution.

Section Two – Universal Basic Income

A tangent at this point is needed. Universal basic income (UBI) is an organisational proposal that has been advanced by both left and right – the most comprehensive support coming from Van Parijs (Van Parijs 2017, 1-3). His theory, and its implementation, is the main one on which the thesis will focus. It is compatible with much of the current system of liberal and social democracy, and with the other organisational principles immediately outlined in section one; an exception would be most kinds of socialism, where the product of society is distributed equally or equitably, or in accordance with need, and all production is controlled. Such forms of socialism effectively encompass UBI.

Universal basic income is the theory that most¹²⁰ forms of welfare could be replaced by a single fund payable to each adult, being sufficient to live on, if meagrely, and paid in addition to any other funds they may receive. Lovett argues on its behalf for republican freedom, arguing (not unlike Pettit's later writings in *Just Freedom*) that equality and freedom are tightly bound, and that such a basic income is an opportunity for both (Lovett 2009, 826-829). Van Parijs suggests that such a fund could be paid for by additional corporate and consumption taxes, or by taxes on environmental externalities (Van Parijs 2017, 236-239).

As an addition to current liberal democratic practice, or even the more extensive protections found in social democratic practice (such as in the Nordic countries), UBI has

120 While not explicitly stated, Van Parijs allows for social welfare of certain kinds, e.g.: language training for immigrants, which presumably need not be extended to all citizens but would require some usage of government budgets, and would not be funded by a tax solely on their persons (Van Parijs 2017, 243)

much to recommend it. It would, in theory¹²¹, reduce administrative overhead and aid in welfare reform. Because it would be truly universal, such an income would be more appealing to those historically neglected in welfare opportunities. From the proceduralist perspective, UBI would impose no particular pattern on distribution and could be applied consistently, blind to individual circumstance. Most importantly for republicans, it could accomplish three important goals. Firstly, it would reduce the discretionary control governments might exert over such welfare, reducing the need for minorities or the dispossessed to “toady” or prostrate themselves to government officials. Secondly, it would aid in reducing the power of employers mentioned earlier in the thesis; a guaranteed income would reduce the power of threatening unemployment. Thirdly, by granting non-earning individuals (home-makers, for instance) an independent source of income, it would reduce the power and ability to dominate that their earning counterparts possess over them. There may be further benefits, but these already make a promising case for its adoption.

The problem of UBI is that it is insufficient to address the problems the thesis has outlined *on its own*. Van Parijs makes an excellent case for it as a system of welfare, but UBI fails to address corporate power and systemic domination to any meaningful degree. Equally, it fails to disentangle corporate power from politics, and offers little increase in democratic legitimacy¹²². It offers no especial redress to Schuppertian alienation¹²³; to the

121 Van Parijs has lengthy chapters which discuss the history and trial runs of various kinds of basic income. Results are tentative, but promising (Van Parijs, 29-99, 133-169).

122 In Pettit’s sense of the phrase; UBI solely improves the horizontal aspect of justice.

123 Again, Van Parijs is aware of these pitfalls, but his explanations as to the feasibility of a truly universal basic income in the midst of racially charged “identity politics” are overly optimistic. One need merely consider the dichotomy in the Danish People’s Party (<https://danskfolkeparti.dk/politik/principprogram/>)’s strong support of welfare and governmental support, and utter xenophobia for immigrants, especially those from outside northern Europe. A basic income for some compounding the suffering or second-class status of others is a paradigm case of Schuppertian alienation.

extent it prohibits wage-slavery it is an aid against Marxist alienation, but it does little to counteract the problems of competition, differing interests, a class system, etc. It reduces the severity of these myriad problems, but is a palliative for them at best. For an example, corporate power may be maintained by moving assets elsewhere to regain leverage.¹²⁴ Subtler methods could also be used to punish a recalcitrant employee in a UBI nation. UBI would do nothing on its own to protect from, for example, so called right to work laws (Gould & Shierholz 2011, 1-13) which make it easy to fire an employee and have toxic effects on living standards. Precisely because UBI, in itself, changes everyday life in the capitalist system so little, it lacks the ability to enact truly revolutionary change in our socio-political systems, and perhaps even our discourse. It is an incomplete part of a full solution.

The thesis' preferred solution – a neo-republican, egalitarian system in Carens' mould – encompasses UBI's strengths but goes significantly further in redistribution and socialisation. This may lose some agreement from proceduralists, but it loses nothing in positives from the republican perspective. The thesis must consider if the use of UBI would improve the potential of other solutions proposed; it will do so in section two when discussing property owning democracy, and in chapter five.

¹²⁴ Once again, Van Parijs is aware and calls for a global change; this again seems overly optimistic (Van Parijs 2017, 217-230). Capital flight remains an issue for the egalitarian system as well, of course.

Section Three – Rawls’ Property Owning Democracy

Having argued for a neo-republican conception of liberty, Rawls might raise certain objections at this point on the grounds of distributive justice and practicality. While he might concede that non-domination is a more comprehensive conception of liberty, and one need be less concerned with distributive justice (and more concerned with individual freedom) if the idea of liberty-as-non-domination is “richer”, as Pettit puts it, and thus the basic liberties require much more material support in and of themselves, he may object to the thesis’ criticisms on organisational grounds. Considering part of the neo-republican critique of Rawls involved the proceduralist blindness to structural domination and “gaming the system”, as well as the problem of socio-economic inferiors, this may seem surprising.

Rawls’ hypothetical concern takes two approaches. First, he may accuse the neo-republican thesis of abandoning Pettit’s realism – that the demands are simply too great to be feasible for any government or system that works with human individuals as they are now, and not as we might wish. Operating by procedure is lamentably not perfect, but designing and implementing a recurring system over individual instances of assistance is a more secure and stable method that will, over time, accomplish greater results than a superficially appealing system that collapses under its own weight.

Second, Rawls allows for a kind of liberal socialism which still operates under the guidelines of “maximin”, proceduralist operating, and which focuses on the basic liberties, basic structure, and the establishment of public reason. If such a socialism

dispensed with the basic liberties as Rawls presents them, and focused on Pettit's instead, then this would be akin to the neo-republican solution outlined in the introduction¹²⁵. This would adapt to the ideological critique but maintain organisational distinctiveness.

Additionally, Rawls might argue that the preservation of certain socio-economic inequalities allows for the betterment of the least advantaged, and that a neo-republican socialism would be fundamentally impoverished. If that impoverishment was severe enough, it could come into conflict with the resources needed for republican freedom. He might therefore support some variation on his property-owning democracy which would be less perfect in ideal theory, but far more practical.

To begin its rebuttal, the thesis will first outline Rawls' organisational principles and critique his desired outcome, a property-owning democracy, followed by noting neo-republican amendments that could conceivably be included. This "hybrid" end-state will then be assessed for viability in achieving the protection of non-domination, and whether it would evade the problems raised in the first section. Ultimately it will be argued it is inadequate, and so Rawls' account of a socialist fulfilment of his ideology will be critiqued in the same way.

Rawls' preferred solution is that of property-owning democracy, or POD. In contrast to many contemporary egalitarian theories, he rejects welfare state capitalism – social democratic policies – (Chambers 2008, 22, Vallier 2018, 142-143) as palliative; they maintain a deeply inegalitarian and unfair basic structure. Property owning democracy is

¹²⁵ To briefly recap, full voluntary exchange, with the society's GDP split into equal shares for consumption, after taxation and business expenditures; all means of production are owned by the state and run by private individuals.

not alien to republicanism, either; republican principles might permit something resembling the proposals of Alan Thomas (Thomas 2016, Thomas 2008, 101-123). Pettit himself, while he does not use the term in *Just Freedom*, outlines a system of property rights and a “basic liberty of property ownership” that seems to resemble it. Certainly, welfare state capitalism as practiced in the modern day has failed to mitigate inequality, a point on which the thesis and Rawls agree in full. Indeed, one of Rawls’ major concerns with welfare state capitalism is the way in which citizens may be divided (between those who require major welfare assistance and those who do not) and dependent upon the market or the government, one way or another.

A Rawlsian POD is still quite interventionist, however¹²⁶. Such a democracy would aim to regulate, plan and invest, ensuring the provision of public goods. Ideally, capital would be widely distributed¹²⁷ and dispersed in preference to pure economic efficiency, but efficiency would remain via the utilisation of the market. To dilute the effects of capital transfer, a “stiff inheritance tax” would be utilised. Presumably, this could incorporate capital gains taxes, housing taxes, etc. (O’Neill & Williamson 2008, 4).

Rawls’ POD would be designed from the ground up to satisfy both the two principles of justice and the political values of liberty, equality and democracy (O’Neill 2008, 80). It would value reciprocity, and the establishment of equal relations between citizens. One interesting note is that the wide dispersal of capital would, in an ideal world, result in a roughly equal control of the means of production while still in individual hands.

¹²⁶ This point is particularly necessary in the face of very different ideologies using the term in a very different way. For example, Thatcherite policies in the United Kingdom support a “property owning democracy” which does not resemble Rawls’ in any meaningful sense. See notes 7+11, O’Neill 2008, 95.

¹²⁷ Which, by Piketty’s numbers at least, it very much is not.

An immediate criticism, raised by O'Neill, is that Rawls assumes that POD alone would be sufficient to protect the value of political liberties (and, for our own concerns, guard against non-domination). For the numerous reasons outlined in chapters two and three, this seems implausible, or at least necessitates much more explanation. This could, however, be readily solved by accepting Pettit's democratic requirements and the "insulation" of the political from the economic, as O'Neill suggests in the latter case. There would then be much more security for political liberty as espoused by neo-republicanism.

O'Neill is primarily concerned with arguing over the POD/welfare state distinction, however, and only briefly touches upon socialism. Rawls does touch against Marxist (and Schuppertian) alienation, noting that "the narrowing and demeaning features of the division should be largely overcome once the institutions of property-owning democracy are realised" (O'Neill 2008, 89). But there is little emphasis on how this is to be achieved, or answer for systemic domination. POD would be an improvement, but it is not clear, from Rawls at least, if it is enough to preclude an underclass altogether. Nor is it clear that it would prevent the hateful competition characterising Marxist alienation. Production would still remain in the hands of a portion, not society as a whole. There is thus little guarantee that POD's implementation *alone* would be sufficient to prevent domination; if it is not, it may be that socialism would be.

Likewise, there have been suggestions for inoculating Rawls via other republican principles. Alan Thomas argues for an explicit commitment to “effective political agency”, following some of Cohen’s critique of Rawls, in particular, the “overspill” argument wherein Cohen criticises the self-interested motivations of socio-economic elites. Cohen condemns the very presence of elites; one of his concerns is that, in Thomas’ words, “Rawls’ view is to redress, not eliminate, inequality” (Thomas 2008, 114). And this inequality would, per the arguments of the rest of the thesis, prove pernicious. While Thomas does not accept the overspill argument in its entirety, he still holds that Rawls’ value of freedom and the guaranteeing of justice is under extreme stress without the joining of republican doctrine (Thomas 2008, 117-122). This might, if sufficiently constituted, help POD deal with both Cohen’s critique and the thesis’.

However, Thomas’ arguments notwithstanding, some issues for a joining of republican democracy and POD remain that question his view. In particular, it is unclear if Rawls has considered addressing corporate power as it arises, it is equally unclear if a republican POD can address corporate power effectively without implementing extremely rigorous controls – especially in regards to systemic domination - and alienation remains a threat, if somewhat diminished in comparison to the welfare state and modern capitalism.

Starting with the first, under Rawls’ POD, the economy will be directed to disperse capital and promote a just society over financial growth and economic efficiency. This is

an excellent start. Rawls' methodology in doing so is incomplete, however. Wealth is still permitted to concentrate in the hands of a few – an elite – giving them disproportionate influence. This is especially the case practically speaking, as any POD established after welfare state capitalism¹²⁸ will have to rely on redistribution, and incomplete or ill-considered redistribution will inevitably leave the “playing field” unequal. An inheritance tax helps, but by its very nature only after the damage has been done. A global tax on capital (Piketty 2014, 515-531, Vallier 2018, 148-150) would also be helpful, but insufficient. Elites will assume great importance. Again, Cohen's “overspill” objection raises its head, but Thomas underestimates its harm; it is also corrosive to republicanism and democratic liberty, as established in chapter three.

In the extreme, this creates the problem of Galt's Gulch – a number of rich and influential individuals who do their utmost to ensure society runs to their tune, by dint of being skilled, intelligent, and ruthless. Because capital has been widely dispersed, they do not have the ability to own *everything*, or almost everything. This is a great improvement on capitalism-as-was but they own enough to be influential. Their interests lie in self-enrichment. They will try to sway public opinion to facilitate this¹²⁹. They will try to wrest control of production into as few hands (i.e. theirs) as possible. And this will do much to threaten the system's workings, especially because the combination of greed and ideology will be particularly difficult to refute; they gain nothing from egalitarianism. There is a risk of a more widely dispersed “political business cycle”, with detrimental effects (Kalicki 1943, 4-6).

128 E.g.: any modern state, if one is lucky; if not, one goes from a pure liberal democracy and relatively unfettered capitalism.
129 Harkening back to Gramsci in chapter two, they essentially restart the “war of position”.

The logical step here is to point out they are hardly behaving reciprocally – like the rabble in Hegelian thought, they are unable to reconcile themselves to a society in which they do not receive disproportionate rewards for admittedly important and helpful work. They should be condemned and their assets seized, but this violates all manner of Rawlsian conditions – it disrespects their legally acquired property, it fails to maximise the minimum, and so on. To give in to them, however, will create further inequality whenever they decide to use their capital and influence to bargain against the needs of the rest of society.

Rawls gives little guidance on how to resolve this. Perhaps instead, one might consider how to ensure it does not arise. Let it be assumed that the redistribution is totally successful in ensuring equality of opportunity, that any inequalities emerging are to the benefit of the least advantaged, sufficient prosperity and happiness for all, etc. It is not perfect, but it fulfils all the characteristics of POD very well.

How does the redistributive effort ensure that this widely dispersed capital does not congeal back into a few hands? Thomas makes excellent suggestions, noting that “land and capital are widely dispersed; no sector dominates the control of resources; inheritance laws are strongly egalitarian; incentives are put in place for small savers; there is substantial public investment in the education system; and each citizen is given income from property and the opportunity to invest” (Thomas 2008, 113). The aforementioned global tax on capital may be of some use.

The problem with such efforts is twofold. First, in the absence of truly global solutions (again, the aforementioned tax), there is a high risk of capital flight or at the very least, accounting tricks to minimise one's tax burden. It is remarkably easy for the wealthy to move money "offshore". Second, most of these suggestions are more assertions than concrete policy. Unless implemented with great care and stringent requirements, they may amount to nothing more than a delay. Take the inheritance laws, for instance. In the United Kingdom, any outright gift given to one's offspring is subject to reduced tax, or no tax at all, over seven years (). This allows a rich family to, as an example, give their child a "small gift" of several hundred thousand pounds, and with some luck¹³⁰, no tax at all needs to be paid. Rawls could accept an extensive inheritance tax (Rawls 2001, 53), but inadequately designed, loopholes such as this exist.

Alienation¹³¹ meanwhile is more of an indirect problem. As mentioned, Rawls observes that POD will have beneficial effects on recognition and the drudgery, competition, etc, endemic to modern capitalism. Although likely, it is insufficient. It is unreasonable to criticise Rawls on being unable to address Schuppertian alienation on the grounds of pre-existing racial or sexual prejudices, and POD certainly seems better equipped to address these¹³² than welfare-state capitalism.

130 Luck which will be aided via access to exceptional healthcare, public or private, access to better nutrition, living in areas with lower crime rates...and so on.

131 To recap, for the reader's benefit, alienation is the loss of autonomy; it may be due to a lack of inherent self-respect and self-will (Schuppertian) or it may be because one's conditions have reduced one to the barest state of humanity, lacking the ability to think and feel, concentrating on living through each day (Marxist).

132 Against a potential objection; it has been argued that pure capitalism is anything but racist, as competition ensures merit in employment and lack of scruples with regards to selling; a customer is a customer (Friedman 1982, 108-118). A POD, by nature of government involvement, might allow the marginalisation of minorities, who have little effective voice. No doubt Rawls would be amenable to an explicit allowance for protections of minority rights and ensuring capital was deliberately available, in replacement of ordinary welfare, which leaves them dependent.

Where POD may continue to fail is in Schuppertian alienation based on economic grounds, for example, the very lowest and most degrading professions, and in Marxist alienation. The former will be supported economically by society, but Rawls says little to suggest their dignity will improve compared with welfare state capitalism. While they will not have to endure the division, dependence, and potential humiliation of welfare, they will still remain distinctly recognition starved. In the latter case, again, POD's dispersal of capital is welcome, and done to a sufficient degree, reduces the "hateful competition" and the alienation of men from one another. The possibility persists, however, that a proportion of individuals will remain focused purely on survival, with resulting curtailment of autonomy and use of political rights and privileges¹³³. Again, given Rawls' focus on the "appropriate" balance of competing claims, this encourages individuals to see themselves at odds.

Could POD be amended to address these problems? Adopting republican requirements aside, a universal basic income would be an easy way to disperse capital without relying on welfare, with advantages both in administration and support of non-domination, following Van Parijs and Lovett's earlier arguments. Building upon Rawls with all manner of ingenious methods of regulatory capture and management of land and capital, as Thomas offers, is equally doable. But there is no realistic solution to accomplish this perfectly by procedure alone. As soon as the procedure fails, corruption ensues. At that point, further redistribution – on an individual level – is required.

¹³³ This is related to, but distinct from, the problem of alienation by Rawls' focus on procedure. Even allowing for the more individualist republican view over Rawls in a POD, competition remains an issue.

An objection might be levied here: that every system will have some point of failure. Supplying airtight policy is an impossibly high standard for anyone, and the task of political philosophy is not to provide policy in the first place. Thus, Rawls cannot be called upon to create a perfect system, nor is this thesis able to offer a comprehensive policy in its own right. This misses the point, however.

The problem remains that POD still contains all the many contradictions and tensions of capitalism, just mitigated. They may be mitigated very well indeed, but they remain. Capital being widely dispersed, perhaps aided by a global tax on capital as Piketty envisages (Vallier 2018, 145-151, Piketty 2014) removes the worst excesses and slows their return. Republican democratic requirements, as outlined by Thomas, shore up legitimate democratic government and help prevent corruption. Once the system has begun to break down, however, it is necessary to act from outside it¹³⁴, or to break its rules in a way designed to support it rather than degrade it. These are actions Rawls protests, however (Rawls 1973, 354). Far better, if possible, to remove all concerns and begin with a new system from the ground up, ideally one which will not necessitate action outside of institutional process.

Against this, Rawls argues in *The Basic Structure as Subject* that there indeed ought to be an “ideal form” and that “adjustments in the basic structure are always necessary” (Rawls 1977, 163-164), a view restated in *Justice as Fairness* (Rawls 2001, 53-55). Were the problems of Galt’s Gulch, alienation, etc to appear, then reform would be necessary, to be

¹³⁴ For clarity, Rawls accepts that a system of institutions might require political maintenance. He errs primarily in timeframe; institutional reform (amending tax rates, for example) does not solve immediate and pressing problems, which may not be identifiable to political discourse. The thesis discusses this shortly.

carried out via a procedural manner. And while this would not solve individual instances of domination, it would, over time, correct the problems outlined; the institutions, which we concern ourselves here, would be adequately served.

Two problems in turn. First, the scope of the problems may lie outside those of the procedures. It is one thing to correct an unjust law, and quite another to correct the alienation inherent in the society. Nor are such procedures capable of addressing global problems. Arguably, they could be reformed to deal with new problems, in deference to the “ideal form”, but that depends upon their being secure. And POD is, by its very nature, less secure than socialism, and less secure than a structure which can allow for direct action and intervention. This is again more pronounced when considered on the international scale.

Second, Rawls offers little by way of explanation as to how the procedural system could be corrected if it became politically corrupt. Pettit’s dual-aspect model and contestation offers mechanisms for accomplishing this. And again, a society which gives greater power to its citizens would be preferable. The thesis’ preferred solution would, by dint of embracing said dual-aspect model and the socialisation, equal consumption shares, etc, outlined in chapter five, be preferential on this metric.

Rawls’ preference for POD is thus inadequate for the thesis’ purposes. He writes of democratic, liberal socialism much less extensively. There is an argument to be made that his “reticence” to adopt socialism (Ypi 2018, 5) hamstrings his development here, that he

is unable to conceive of a critique of capitalism not only in its economic sphere but in its political ones (Ypi 2018, 10), hence the necessity of bringing in republican theorising of this kind. A socialism of the kind Rawls desires would accomplish the same purposes as POD, it seems, but he gives no concrete proposals about the form and appearance of that variant of socialism.

It may be objected, however, that the thesis has merely established that Rawlsian practice and ideology is inadequate without substantial modification; it has yet to demonstrate any real improvement by way of socialism. The actual viability of (some form of) socialism as an economic model will be the subject of the next section – for now, the thesis will assume some inefficiency in comparison to full or welfare-state capitalism, or even Rawlsian property-owning-democracy, and begin with other major objections, most notably Rawls' critique of socialism, the drain of capital, and the ability to reconcile it with non-domination's political requirements.

Rawls' reluctance towards a liberal socialism is influenced by certain difficulties he observes in comparison to POD (Rawls 1973, 270-274). He criticises command economy socialism for disallowing the free choice of occupation, for its myriad inefficiencies, for its coercion and disregard of equality of opportunity (Rawls 2001, 138). Yet he makes it abundantly clear that markets and the private control of the means of production need not be identical, and has little difficulty with market socialism. He errs, then, in – perhaps subconsciously – assigning so much value to the market, but placing very little regard on socialism, though he notes that whichever model will best address the demands of his two

concepts of justice is empirical at best (Rawls 2001, 138-139). Rawls also notes that, in his view, the worst excesses of the market system and the bulk of socialist criticism can be addressed via POD (Rawls 1973, 280-281, Rawls 2001, 176-179).

Given that the command economy is not something republicans would favour either, allowing for Rawls' criticisms necessitates a market-based socialism of some kind, not least for the "decentralising" nature of its economy. This is not beyond neo-republican capabilities, but it may be difficult to reconcile any market functions with the necessity for strict material equality.

Capital drain is the loss of any capital, whether it be "capital flight", the "brain drain", etc. It is a major part of the problem Rawls hoped to avoid via maximin, that talented and wealthy individuals will go elsewhere to invest their talents and wealth. It is exacerbated by the global nature of today's world economy; never before has it been so easy to migrate, or hide wealth in offshore accounts and shell companies. If the intent is strict material equality over maximin, then it seems difficult to reason a way of averting the latter, except through coercive measures which may be unreasonably authoritarian. Enforced redistribution of wealth may¹³⁵ be justifiable; refusal of emigration less so.

To address this problem without coercion, individuals would need to be motivated to commit, to the fullest extent possible, to a system which did not profit them. While some degree of altruism, patriotism, and simple habituation to one's birth-country might be a motivating factor, it would be a distinct weakness to rely upon it. Individuals will look to

135 And is, as argued shortly.

their own advantage far too frequently for this preference for the familiar to suffice alone. One option might be to remain very secure or “profitable” in other areas – an overall excellent standard of living, excellent healthcare, low rates of crime, etc, or for investment, to maintain a high standard of technical skill, to have strong commercial ties, etc. This is not always an available option, however – particularly if a developing country wishes to adopt some form of non-capitalist economy: the country will be a pariah among global financial institutions and may struggle to fund one or more of these areas.

A secondary option is to find another way of motivating individuals. But this is notoriously difficult; Rawls himself notes “the theory of justice assumes a definite limit on the strength of social and altruistic motivation” (Rawls 1973, 281), due to the presence of competing claims, individual or otherwise, that are legitimate and yet incompatible. Still, if achievable, it is a better option than coercion. This option will be considered further in chapter five.

An authoritarian socialism serves neither Rawls nor republicanism. The exact nature of the liberal (or republican) democratic socialism will be discussed in the next section, when its viability is evaluated. It must be a *democratic* socialism; it must comply with Pettit’s requirements, which in theory is not difficult. While social ownership of the means of production and indeed the complete abolition of private capital arrangements are contrary to Pettit’s list of basic liberties given in *Just Freedom* (Pettit 2014, 72), there is reason enough to consider this as a point where this kind of liberty could be sacrificed for the sake of all the rest of the “primary goods”.

What of the objection that socialism cannot realistically be implemented without coercive elements (Hayek 2001, etc)? No doubt this will depend on the kind of socialism offered. Briefly, we may ask if these coercive elements would violate discursive control or require uncontrolled, arbitrary interference. One might also ask if socialism was capable of adhering to Pettit's "tough luck" test, that individuals who had to comply with its potentially stringent demands could attribute this to misfortune over malice.

This depends on the scope of the question; there is a group of people who can be offered nothing, and they are right in thinking that government is an "ill-willed agency" against them. However, in an ideal world, individuals (or corporate entities) who had already achieved enormous power and wealth in complete contradiction of strict material equality would have to agree that their loss of said power and wealth was "compatible with the community-wide standards that all accept", corresponding with neo-republican norms.

Practically speaking, any solution to the problem of corporate power necessarily entails redistribution. If this redistribution is the result of democratic judgement and is applied evenly, by a body answerable to a representative government per Pettit, then at the least its methodology for interference is not uncontrolled¹³⁶.

In conclusion, POD represents an excellent step forward from modern welfare state capitalism, particularly if combined with Thomas' suggestions and a universal basic

¹³⁶ Assuming fair and unbiased treatment of each case, but this is the point of such methodology; unjust actions can be challenged.

income. It fails to adequately address the tensions within capitalism, however, and its focus on procedure – once again – means it is critically lacking in stability and in its ability to correct itself given cases of sufficient scope and complexity. The thesis thus moves on to socialism, of a sufficiently liberal kind.

Section Four – Market Socialism

If the potential solution for republicanism lies in socialism, we must consider which variant of socialism. Anything which relies on non-democratic principles is out; anything which mandates the complete dependency of the individual is questionable. Pettit notes the immense risk for such in *Just Freedom*; quite apart from the potentially unwholesome psychological effects, no government is perfect, and total reliance is equally a way to total control¹³⁷ (Pettit 2012, 158). It will be a socialism that is organised on republican, rather than Rawlsian/liberal egalitarian principles, as outlined in the prior section; this means a commitment to ensuring specific social and economic norms, liberty and strict material equality, etc¹³⁸. It also means, following Schuppert and Marx, a commitment against alienation and social vulnerability that Rawls lacks and which Pettit insufficiently develops.

The obvious choice, if free-market capitalism and Rawlsian property owning democracy are to be rejected¹³⁹ entirely, is that of a socialism that embraces some degree of marketisation, which may on the face of it wield enormous power, but in practice, democratic oversight ensures that power is little exercised¹⁴⁰. Market socialism of this kind is best defined as one in which the means of production are still owned by the state, for the ostensible good of all, but the production of goods and services are set by the market and voluntary exchange. There will be downsides to such a solution, but the thesis will argue that this is overall the best possible solution that is practically achievable. Thus, the argument splits into two. First, it must be established that market socialism of some form is both practical and potentially desirable. Second, it must be established which of its

137 This is notably similar to the argument presented in chapter three, section four, that domination under a state monopoly is both inevitable and worse than anything the market could concoct. It is however a narrower claim, and unlike the stronger claim of chapter three, is entirely compatible with state control of the means of production.

138 It must be, to borrow the phrase if not exactly the requirements, a “civic economy”. The egalitarian system in chapter five does live up to a number of Dagger’s requirements, however (Dagger 2006, 161-167).

139 Some forbearance is requested here, because the thesis’ critique of Rawls continues in the next chapter; thus far Rawls’ ideological basis has been denounced as unacceptable, but we have yet to establish if socialism is better on organisational grounds, if paired with republican doctrine. The reason to pursue socialism first is that there is a great deal of potential variance, the more so as more of the ideas of section one are incorporated or rejected. One given proposal may work where another might not, hence the structure.

140 A useful comparison is the sheer difficulty of amending the United States’ constitution. Despite the legal ability to discard, to use a single example, the electoral college in its entirety, the practical ability to do so is nearly nil.

myriad forms sufficiently meets the desired republican/socialist criteria, while remaining within the boundaries of practicality.

Market socialism has rarely been practised across a society as an economic whole. One major example is Yugoslavia, which although not entirely working on the basis of a market socialism, with key industries nationalised¹⁴¹, maintained a semblance of such an economy for some fifty years before the country broke apart. Other examples can be found within capitalism in the form of cooperatives, such as Mondragon in Spain and John Lewis in the United Kingdom (Errasti et al 2003, 554-567, Paraque & Wilmott 2014, 606-614). The practical data such examples can give us is very limited, however, as these are but single (if sometimes quite large) companies where the owners and workers are mostly identical. As such, the thesis will address these only briefly before moving on to a more detailed examination of Yugoslavia.

Cooperative businesses in modern capitalist society have varied in effectiveness but have a similar degree of productivity to those of normal, capitalist firms (Perotin 2014, 37-42). They seem to favour areas of activity with low risk, and thrive best in societies and relationships with a high degree of personal trust (Monteiro and Stewart 2012, 7-13, 21). The primary benefit of the workers' cooperative is in building what might be called workplace democracy, which the thesis discusses in considerably more detail in chapter five, section two. It is evident that such practices, which diminish the gap between labour and management, are beneficial to neo-republican goals, encouraging the eyeball test and reducing socio-economic inequality.

Such evidence must, as stated, be treated cautiously. It is, however, a positive indicator towards the viability of some sort of economic system that is worker run and worker led. Historic concerns have focused on underinvestment and various kinds of discrimination (Artz & Kim 2011, 23-24), which

141 Then again, certain otherwise entirely capitalist countries have state monopolies, so this may not be a disqualification in itself.

has been disputed. Even if true, if this was the only difficulty for such companies to overcome, it would again indicate viability of a cooperative system.

The Yugoslavian example differs in many ways, being an entire national economy that interwove capitalist (and command economy socialist) economic forces, as opposed to being but one small part of a greater capitalist economy. At the time, globalism had not yet reached current heights, and so taking the view that it was essentially in the same situation (a worker cooperative country's economy, amidst the greater global capitalism) seems inherently flawed.

Doing a full-scale assessment of its effectiveness would require time and space the thesis lacks, not to mention an in-depth consideration of its history and socio-political status over at least fifty years. As a result, the thesis will primarily rely upon the work done by Uvalic and Chilosi in this area. It is possible that further research may contradict their findings.

Uvalic stresses the imperfect nature of Yugoslavia, both politically and economically, in their assessment. It is striking, however, that despite such imperfections and the political hostility that surrounded it, the economy was generally functional. Certainly, it was less efficient than the more liberal capitalist countries in Western Europe¹⁴², and the need to balance socialist political doctrine with economic reality often resulted in slow or misjudged reforms (Uvalic 2018, 7, 9-10) but it was much more efficient and allowed for a greater level of practical democracy than the authoritarian and fully planned economies of the Warsaw Pact (Uvalic 2018, 13-14 18, 21).

A critical element of the Yugoslavian market socialist economy, at least for the thesis' needs, is the element of self-management. To varying degrees over the course of some fifty years, myriad firms

¹⁴² Including countries such as the United Kingdom and West Germany, where a strong safety net with socialist characteristics, if not outright state control, were present and effective.

organised themselves with little more management than might have been seen in, say, the United States. Some of these were run by the workers themselves, and some by individual entrepreneurs. Both existed independently. While some data is mixed (Estrin 1991, 190-192), clearly it is possible for a socialist economy to function without strict state controls or quotas in all industries.

In the same way, where there was interference in management issues, these tended to be various political interventions by local authorities. It is undeniable that these decisions tended to make things worse, and frequently far more inefficient. However, the firms themselves were quite autonomous and entirely in control of their own constitution. As Chilosi additionally notes, certain capitalist countries (his example is the Four Asian Tigers) have had considerable interference and achieved market success (Chilosi 1992, 177-179, Uvalic 2018, 8-9, Wikipedia, Four Asian Tigers). It is reasonable to suggest that a state which lacked the social pressures of Yugoslavia, in particular the bickering between its constituent parts (Uvalic 2018, 24-25, 27-30), might be far more successful in implementing and coordinating market socialism on a national scale, with its interference directed in aiding, rather than curtailing, innovation and productive capability.

A more negative point which the literature emphasises is the failure of incentives and investment. This is of course shared by command economies, but it is noteworthy that market socialism has run into similar problems. At higher levels of skill and market contribution, there seems to have been a lack of motivation. Additionally, the overall attempt to guide the economy towards what was socially useful rather than most profitable appears to have been a dismal failure (Chilosi 1992, 182). The latter in particular is troublesome, because it implies the need for personal profit-based motivation, an incentive which is unhelpful in addressing the problems of corporate power. By their very nature, large-scale commercial interests can apply substantive economic assets as leverage.

Lastly, market socialism in Yugoslavia¹⁴³ ultimately failed. With considerable economic damage by the 1980s, market-based reforms and liberalisation due to the need for foreign loans – not to mention the eventual disintegration of the Yugoslavian state – ensured that market socialism existed in name only. Much of this failure can be attributed to external political factors, but not all of it. Capitalist economies established in the same antebellum period have continued without serious transition. The tensions between a market economy and socialist doctrine ultimately proved irreconcilable.

Thus, one concludes that market socialism – as of Yugoslavia – is vulnerable, by its very nature, to political pressure and the internal tensions of motivation and socialist ideology versus everyday management. It is not automatically a failure, nor is it predisposed to failure, but it is easily co-opted. The problem of external opposition, ideological or otherwise, should not be underestimated either.

This is a particular concern because of a recurring argument that market socialism (in its various incarnations) is inherently unstable, and will either collapse back into some form of capitalist market arrangement, or will require further micromanagement and oversight by a central political apparatus and will become some form of command economy socialism. (Cohen 2001, 312, Gray 1993, 92-99) If we accept that a centrally planned economic is neither feasible, nor desirable, then this critique is concerning.

Cohen offers a related argument as well, which argues that market socialism - and he singles out Yugoslavia for particular note – may readily find itself committing the same basic errors as

143 And elsewhere; similar tensions existed in the NEP of the early USSR (Bandera 1963 265-79, esp 268-269), but eventually folded into full command economy socialism, whereas Yugoslavia became ever more marketised.

capitalism and undertake its affairs such that it is still a system fundamentally detrimental to the welfare of human beings. This is because capitalism inherently focuses on output from work rather than decreasing the burden of work, and he suggests several egalitarian forms which still succumb to this flaw (Cohen 2001, 297-317).

How might we allow for a stable market socialism, that did not succumb to the flaws Yugoslavia exposed? The major problems that face any solution of a socialist nature, no matter its organising principles, are the prospect of averting loss of efficiency (whether via simple inadequacy, “free riders”, or anything else), ensuring motivation to replace or supplement the profit motive¹⁴⁴, the epistemic objection¹⁴⁵, and the method of establishing it. A strict command economy fails to address these problems effectively, as the long historical record has shown, and the solution must be democratically organised on republican principles. The thesis’ proposed solution is that of Joseph Caren’s egalitarian system, with some amendments. It solves each of these problems and can easily meet the necessary democratic requirements. Its stability will be argued in chapters five and six.

A last concern before we proceed: given the explicitly Marxist understanding of class, exploitation and alienation on which the thesis has relied since chapter three, it may be objected that any solution – no matter how avowedly socialist in character – which relies upon the function of market exchange is vulnerable to a charge of perpetuating alienation and exploitation¹⁴⁶. This differs in part from the critique of chapter three, section three, because said critique focused upon capitalist exchange. It is similar to Cohen’s concern above. The objection here assumes that, of the four major concerns, scarcity is managed and both reward and power are widely dispersed, along with neo-

144 Or persuading a sufficient number that an equal, equitable or needs-based distribution is both just and in their best personal interests.

145 e.g.: that a command economy cannot ever efficiently allocate resources due to a lack of information and that this information is effectively conveyed via the market.

146 The Marxist account of alienation is not inherent to the market and voluntary exchange; alienation arises from the material conditions forced upon the workers, the hateful competition all parties have with one another, and the stripping away of both meaning and reward from labour. A market which was devoid of private property (as opposed to devoid of personal property) might avert all of the above. It may be impossible to accomplish such a market, however, without the presence of immense abundance (or non-scarcity, rather) which may equally prove impossible.

republican democracy and strict material equality. This concern is that the demands of the market will create discord between workers and capital, or in this case management, and the demands of the market may necessitate the poor treatment of the worker.

Conflict arises from the differing goals and perspectives of managers and workers. It is relatively easy for different groups of workers within the same general band to have differing drives and expectations (Goldthorpe 1968, 22-37, esp 36-37). In part, this can be explained by differences in social status in the Weberian sense, but an equally likely explanation is the demands of different types of work. To use Goldthorpe's examples, a setter, a machinist and a dogsbody will have different expectations of their work, and a different perspective of how to proceed.

A manager, meanwhile, will not only be approaching from the demands of different work, but from the perspective of employing all such work to its fullest potential¹⁴⁷. While not the grand sweeping struggle of bourgeois and proletariat, this still is troubling, because the ultimate "grand design" may involve personal sacrifices on the part of the worker¹⁴⁸. Hiring requirements may differ in good or bad times; in the latter, it may not be practical to maintain previous employment. To an extent, this is mitigated by the "tough luck" test and simple consequentialism; of course every worker has a right to feel aggrieved, but their loss is for the gain of all the rest. The problem is that this creates competition, and not a friendly one. If there is social or economic gain or loss by employment or unemployment, then two things are assured. First, every individual has a concrete reason to make themselves as indispensable as possible, by whatever means¹⁴⁹. Second, those with the power to make the decision gain meaningful power over the remainder.

147 In an ideal world. Naturally, many different motivations are possible; this simply assumes a paradigm case of seeking to perform their task effectively and efficiently, at no cost to themselves.

148 Could this be mitigated by a democratically organised workplace? This is, again, considered in chapter five section two. But for this particular problem, it simply makes the competition, suspicion and potential hostility horizontal, rather than vertical. Nonetheless, it may be an improvement to consider on the thesis' proposed solution.

149 To the extent of that gain/loss, of course. Some mild shame at being unemployed is not a provocation to murder.

This is likely to be a problem without a great transformation of personal character. In chapter five, ways this might be accomplished are outlined, and in chapter six, the consideration of republican “civic virtue” is established as a supplement to such a solution. In its absence, this will remain a considerable problem. It could be partially mitigated via a robust allocation of resources towards needs, but this will not end the competition nor the divide of competing interests.

Exploitation occurs in market socialism, following Vrousalis’ explanation, when the worker – although rewarded according to their needs or at least by an equitable portion of the proceeds – still remains in a vulnerable position. Consider two illustrations. First, one may contemplate the typical example of the former Soviet Union and various satellite states. While scarcity was to some degree managed and some prosperity remained, queue-management and a black-market economy remained necessary for many to secure necessary resources (Katsenelinboigen 1977, etc). In this case, the fault lies outside the system, but is difficult or even impossible to correct. A secondary economy develops, one which is very unequal and where those who do not partake and partake well become vulnerable. Second, the system could still permit vulnerability via monopsony. Monopolies will, under any socialist system, only be perpetuated if they can in some way be harnessed for the greater good of the population. Healthcare, for example, may end up as a government monopoly in a strong socialist state, or it may be more decentralised. It is, however, possible that an individual might have a very limited, technical set of skills and may find themselves beholden to their superiors in order to find work. They then have a motive to accept unfair treatment, to remain employed. Unemployment benefit or some sort of basic income alleviates this, to an extent.

There are several ways of preventing worker vulnerability. The latter problem can be mitigated via a universal basic income, which the preferred solution of the thesis includes. This fails to give people purpose, however. A more considered approach would be to a: offer solutions against

monopsonies as one acts against monopolies, by offering subsidies and start-up support to new companies in these depleted skills. If the technical skills in question are simply hopelessly outdated, the government might offer the prospect of training, perhaps via apprenticeships or reduced rates.

As for the secondary economy, this could be mitigated in two ways. The first would be the establishment of a digitalised economy, which is discussed in greater detail in the next chapters, as a means of tracking expenditures¹⁵⁰. The second would be, rather than excessive legal punishments, the simple confiscation of any and all unregistered goods without compensation. Seized goods would be sold by the government at reduced rates, thus, undercutting the black marketeers themselves.

These are but tentative sketches, not detailed policy. Regardless, it is clear that market socialism can be adapted to fit, and to address potential concerns about the state of those who labour within it. If that is the case, then it should similarly be possible for the egalitarian system.

¹⁵⁰ This is of particular importance to Carens, due to the need for an accurate accounting of the egalitarian system's entire economic output.

Chapter Five

Section One – The Egalitarian System

In chapter four, we began discussing the ideological and organisational bases from which the solution to the problem of corporate domination (and the prospect of unchecked private power in capitalism as a whole) ought to proceed. The conclusion was that some form of socialism was necessary, that the foundation for such socialism must involve democratic and republican political policy, and that this socialism make some use of market arrangements. A delicate balance must be struck between democratic control of the economy, independence of the individual, and practical considerations. However, such socialism must also be stable, and relatively efficient, to avoid problems such as those that befell Yugoslavia.

With market socialism demonstrated to have some possibility of success, it would now seem practical to discuss more specific arrangements: most notably, the proposal of Joseph Carens found in *Equality, Moral Incentives and the Market*. Carens hypothesises that the current capitalist system – which he calls a personal profit motivated system, or PPM - could be kept almost entirely intact, allowing for the efficiency of the market, freedom of distribution, etc. The important change he proposes is that all after-tax income would be split equally for the purposes of consumption. This phrasing is important, because of the necessity to allow income for investment, and for the prospects of a: redistributive taxation, and b: individuals requiring more money or resources for their employment; a mechanic's tools, for instance. To support such a distribution, their motivations would need to change from profit maximisation to social duty maximisation¹⁵¹. He calls his new system the “egalitarian system”, and gives several practical examples to show how it might work.

¹⁵¹ Carens naturally does not claim that individuals in the PPM system are solely driven by rational self-interest and personal profit (Carens 1981 27-32). Indeed, almost all possible motivations one may have for working in the PPM system may remain in the egalitarian system, and there may remain individuals in the egalitarian system who still ardently desire personal profit in the same way some ardently desire the betterment of society in the PPM system. They are not necessarily a driving force, however.

His first example is Sam Smith, who owns a factory and whose goal is profit maximisation, and therefore adopts a rational, utilitarian approach – paying as little as possible for resources, selling as highly as possible, paying his workers the most efficient rate the market will bear. In the egalitarian system, Sam maintains such practices; not unlike a trustee, Sam intends to get the greatest profit for his charge – in this case, society (Carens 1981, 27-30).

His second example is that of Benedict and Arnold, who own competing factories producing a single good (in Carens' example, widgets). They gain satisfaction from maximising income from consumption, and making widgets. Both men have an opportunity to move from a failing widget market into a much stronger gadget market¹⁵², but one of them gains far more satisfaction from making widgets than from maximising his income. Just as before, the same behaviour exists in both PPM and egalitarian systems; : both maximise their preferences, with one continuing to make widgets no matter the profit or social duty to be gained from gadgets, while the other changes his product.

The third example he gives is that of Jane, a worker rather than a factory owner, who must choose her career path in order to maximise her income, and again, does so in much the same way in both systems. Jane makes use of prices, her wage rates, and predictions of future societal needs in order to maximise the value of her sold labour.

The egalitarian system thus closely resembles capitalism in how it functions. The egalitarian system differs when it comes to savings, investment, and (to a degree) risk. Carens outlines the problem of saving and investments with the example of a house or rare artwork, whose value once acquired only increases. It seems reasonable to allow people to save for additional, pricier direct

¹⁵² Simplifying opportunity costs, overheads from refurbishing their factories, etc.

consumption – saving up for a holiday, for example – but allowing them to buy goods for later resale and keep the profit would immediately reintroduce income inequality. Carens' solution, which for administrative reasons, would be applied only to houses and land,¹⁵³ is an annual tax. This would be levied on the house's value as of the year before, establishing a new base each year. Borrowing money would in much the same way be paid for out of future consumption shares. Carens concedes that this is likely to reintroduce some inequality, if some individuals save and borrow prudently.

Far more inequality would be introduced if Carens permitted investment and direct return on that investment, as in the PPM system. Those who saved prudently would then be able to apply their additional income for gradual returns, as in the PPM system. Not permitting investment, however, would be a death-knell to economic efficiency. To allay this, Carens suggests that individuals must – in general – not desire to gain extra pre-tax income by using their after-tax income shares, and outlines a mechanism to facilitate this. Essentially, a part of pre-tax income would be saved (as opposed to the previous saving of after-tax income only), but not capable of being spent on anything other than investment. Should an individual not wish to invest¹⁵⁴, it will simply be taken into the net contribution, and split up appropriately. However, this is not enough. Individuals could still obtain disproportionate wealth via gifts and inheritance, or – although Carens does not suggest it – gambling or sheer luck. Carens does not believe small gifts would be troublesome, even aggregated, but he fails to consider examples like Wilt Chamberlain, where a widely beloved individual receives many small gifts in the wake of a personal tragedy and therefore becomes monstrously wealthy. His solution for larger gifts is to treat them as taxable income in all respects, including the annual tax, if necessary. For smaller gifts, it may be sufficient to demand that these be

¹⁵³ Given when Carens was writing (1981), it seems reasonable to suggest that a move to an entirely digital economy might allow for this to be expanded to more goods.

¹⁵⁴ Carens notes that almost everyone would have an incentive to invest with such a scheme, since to not do so would be detrimental to maximising one's social duty. But there may be individuals who simply believe they cannot invest sensibly, and who would simply forfeit the opportunity to the government.

in the form of direct consumption, or do not exceed an annual limit. The finer details of the solution may need to be refined in practice.

Risk in the egalitarian system differs primarily from the PPM system in that individuals will take more risks, not fewer. While initially surprising, Carens gives the example of an individual gaining either £50 or a combined 60% chance of £100 plus 40% chance of £0. Under the PPM system, while it might seem rational to take the slightly more advantageous second option, individuals may in practice be averse to risking the loss. They may need that £50 to survive. The egalitarian system “transfers both the burdens and the gains of risk from the individual to society as a whole”.

Reckless risks would be discouraged by the desire to maximise social duty, and sensible risks would be incentivised by the prospect of esteem and adulation for their success. Continuing with the third example above, Jane would choose her career path based upon expected return. Even if this did not unfold as planned, she would still have acted in a way to maximise her social duty. The same is true of all such risks in the egalitarian system; disapproval and approval are to be based more on prudence and good judgement than the actual result.

All of this indicates that the egalitarian system should, if the PPM system functions reasonably well, function at a similar level of efficiency. Although efficiency is gained – such as with risk, where the diffusion of risk encourages the more “rational” decision to invest, as with limited liability – it is lost elsewhere, as Carens concedes that the profit motive is likely stronger than that of social duty, or at least ties in more neatly with the market.

For Carens’ system to be achievable, it requires certain logically necessary prerequisites; Carens lists ten such. In summary, it must be possible for individuals to be motivated by altruism and social recognition, and to obtain the “same relative value” (Carens 1981, 174) by satisfying their social

obligations as they would by obtaining profit to satisfy income consumption. They must be able to save income above a certain (pre-tax) level solely for investment, and all must receive the same income shares. Allowing that individuals will still have some interest in profit, the laws and tax systems must be generally obeyed (Carens 1981, 174-175). Of his ten logically necessary prerequisites, the most troublesome are undoubtedly the third and fourth: combined, individuals in the egalitarian system gain the aforementioned same relative value of satisfactions from performing their social duty, and individuals believe that the obligation to maximise their pre-tax income “does not extend to the use of their after-tax equal income shares” (Carens 1981, 174) and such additional income should solely be invested, as noted above.

Anticipating concerns with the soundness of such prerequisites, he thus lists eight empirically necessary prerequisites, separate from the logical prerequisites. To again summarise, there must be an effective and intense socialisation process to ensure that individuals prioritise social duty (and thus pre-tax income) maximisation and derive satisfaction in doing so. The egalitarian system must be able to provide sufficient resources for the “physical subsistence” of its members. Individuals must be aware of relative prices to give the appropriate amount of social recognition, and there must be “widespread commitment to the norm of equal-income distribution” (Carens 1981, 176). Lastly, the social elites of such a system must share this commitment, be generally honest in enforcing and adhering to tax laws, and be willing to play a greater role in supporting economic activity in times of full employment and economic decline (Carens 1981, 175-176).

Carens also voices support for a polyarchal¹⁵⁵ system but insists this is neither a logically nor empirically necessary prerequisite. Fortunately, while not all polyarchies are democracies, all democracies are polyarchies, and so the thesis will add two more prerequisites to ensure compliance with Pettit. First, the egalitarian system must be capable of assuring the discursive control of the

155 Lit, “rule by many”, wherein power is distributed to multiple people. See <https://www.britannica.com/topic/polyarchy>.

individuals within it. Second, it must be governable through democratic means. The exact form does not matter, provided it adheres to Pettit's requirements.

The strength of the egalitarian system as a solution to the problem of corporate power and domination under capitalism depends on how persuasive one finds each of these prerequisites, and also on how well the egalitarian system curbs the myriad inequalities of power and wealth.

Therefore, this chapter will outline and defend the methods in which these prerequisites may be secured by the egalitarian system, with one important exception. Because successful socialisation for social-duty maximisation as a motivation is so critical to Carens' theory, and rests on psychological theorising as opposed to politico-economic theorising, the motivational elements of Carens' theory and the socialisation they require are discussed in chapter six, section one.

The egalitarian system has a few further benefits. Firstly, it incorporates universal basic income; for reasons noted previously, this has benefits both economically and politically. Secondly, following Lovett, as well as Casassas and De Wispelaere, it also introduces a wage ceiling to accompany the high wage floor. As the latter two note, this is valuable to republican practice, and as the first notes, the high equality aids in freedom. Thirdly, it offers no impediment to workers' cooperatives or similarly democratic firms, while granting more freedom of employment and entrepreneurship than a system based solely on such organisational modes.

Equally, it compares well to other socialist or egalitarian models mentioned in chapter four. In comparison to a Rawlsian socialism or POD, it does not innately adopt the Maximin criterion; if combined with Pettit's republican principles (the eyeball test, etc), it ensures strict economic equality. This makes the problem of elites one of social esteem, rather than economic power, and thus is more easily addressed. In comparison to more orthodox market socialism, Carens' view is

more coherent and more easily attainable. It is flexible enough to allow for common ownership, and there is little reason it could not be combined with the more spontaneous cooperation mutualism envisages. By relying on voluntary exchange and interjecting ideally only at the systemic level, it at least mitigates concerns that procedural theories might have about repeated interference and reliance upon patterned distributions¹⁵⁶. If combined with support for differing cultures and those who genuinely require additional help – new mothers, to name but one of many examples – through taxation and government funding as Pettit outlines, it stands an excellent chance of safeguarding non-domination. This is in addition to being more just than the PPM system – distributively and otherwise – guaranteeing greater socio-economic equality, etc.

To forestall a possible (and pedantic) objection at this point, Carens' system does not seek to redistribute capital and offers no practical guidance about doing so. The transformative element of his theory may also appear utopian, no matter the strength of the egalitarian system when dealing with a socialised populace. Moreover, Carens discusses communist practice, and does not associate himself with the Marxist tradition in any way (Carens 1981, 164-165), maintaining a commitment and association with generic egalitarianism – although he acknowledges certain Marxist theorising towards a similar kind of socialising and transformative theory. He makes no particular reference to socialism, although he attempts to show his organisational structure is compatible with a needs-based distribution rather than strict equality¹⁵⁷.

The problem of utopianism will be a recurring one throughout this chapter and the next. To address the point on market socialism, however, the thesis will reject Carens' self-description, by two methods. The first is to add an amendment in which all private property – in the Marxist sense – belongs to a democratic government and thus to the people. Entrepreneurs and the like become

¹⁵⁶ Though Carens, as with Pettit, lacks any such concerns.

¹⁵⁷ Under the thesis, such needs are to be covered via democratically chosen and allocated funds: e.g. Pettit's consideration of cultural practices, maternity and/or paternity leave, healthcare, etc. But there is certainly room for negotiation and adaptation on this point.

more like foremen and managers. Practical, everyday activities change little, except that there is a greater level of government oversight. It might be argued that such would diminish the risk-taking and profiteering necessary for the market to function well, but this charge can be equally levied at Carens' social-duty maximisation, and it seems implausible to assert a considerable loss of efficiency over a technical detail of this kind. Indeed, one might accrue *more* respect for taking successful and bold decisions with the lack of personal profit. The only difference is that the entrepreneur manages, rather than owns, his or her companies. The change from the egalitarian system at this point is purely one of legal ownership and ultimate authority.

The second method is to question Carens' logic. His solution to the problems of the free market boils down to the addition of the "intangible hand" of social esteem as a point of public policy, and the equalisation of wealth for the purposes of consumption; coupled with the requirements of loose material equality and republican democracy, it would seem absurd to suggest that the end result was capitalist in nature. Absent this, what else to call it but socialism? Thus, the remainder of the thesis will discuss Carens' system at all times as if it had adopted the above amendment, and thus qualifies as socialism as outlined in chapter four, with the means of production socially controlled.

A secondary concern with the egalitarian system might come from the Rawlsian perspective. Accepting that a democratic socialism is preferable to POD, and accepting the need for neo-republican non-domination over the less demanding liberal conception of freedom, followers of Rawls might still argue that a "maximin" system was preferable on organisational and ideological grounds. They may argue for the implausibility of socialisation, and that allocating equal income for consumption would cause problems in supply and demand of human capital.

Carens concedes the possibility of a Rawlsian justification¹⁵⁸ on ideological grounds for his system; the two are not incompatible. He also points out that the egalitarian system surpasses the difference principle in certain respects, and that the least-advantaged would presumably gain from an arrangement which relied on social inequalities rather than economic ones, thus fulfilling the maximin criteria and limiting the inequality of the whole system (Carens 1981, 208-210).

As for the practical problems, socialisation will be discussed in chapter six, as stated. As for supply and demand, individuals will have more reason to take unpleasant jobs than under Rawls' measures. While Rawls is concerned with the elite positions of society going unfilled, because individuals lack the esteem and money to motivate proper use of their rare talents¹⁵⁹, the least advantaged in his society remain forced into a career of, for example, waste disposal treatment. Under Rawls' egalitarian proposals, their lives would be far better than the wage-slavery of modern capitalism, but they might still effectively be forced into demeaning, unrewarding positions

Not so in the egalitarian system, where one's social esteem is based upon the extent to which one fulfils one's social duties¹⁶⁰. If a job is difficult and exhausting, then it will be rewarded by additional social recognition. If an elite position necessitates ferocious effort, or – as in the case of entrepreneurs – leads to great benefits for society, it will still be thoroughly esteemed. Human capital may be more difficult to obtain for some jobs, but considering the more equitable distribution overall, it is still worth pursuing over the basic POD.

A more pressing problem is capital flight (Investopedia, Capital Flight), especially in the establishment of the egalitarian system. Earlier, the prospect of capital drain for the Rawlsian

158 He also points out that his system could be organised on other egalitarian or socialist grounds. He himself assumes the least different position in order to strengthen his arguments (Carens 1981, xi.)

159 Notably, Carens cites Rawls' point on "the distribution of natural talent as a common asset".

160 This has an important secondary benefit. Certain feminist critiques have long espoused the idea that "care work" - domestic duties, looking after children and the elderly, nursing and care-home work, etc - is grotesquely undervalued and underpaid. The egalitarian system would in theory do much to correct this (Shelby 2016, 180).

system was noted. Capital flight is a particularly pernicious problem for the egalitarian system as well. Not only is the egalitarian system vulnerable to emigration and “brain drain” - the loss of human capital - in a way that Rawls is not¹⁶¹, but by the nature of the amendments the thesis suggests, a great deal of private property would need to be seized. By virtue of the global economy, at least some of this property would belong to foreigners, which introduces additional diplomatic complexity.

Simply seizing property without due compensation, however justified, will create diplomatic tensions. The existence of a state which rejects liberalism and capitalism, though neither democracy nor liberty, is unlikely to be welcomed. Such a state which restricts emigration, or imposes taxation upon those emigrating, may be seen as hypocritical and equally unwelcome.

Yet to do neither means that the state and society will suffer (greater) economic shock, at exactly the time when the system is most vulnerable. This is likely to be compounded by a lack of foreign investment, for even in the most amenable circumstances¹⁶² (compensation, financial enticements to invest, legal enshrining of property rights), investment seems improbable.

Regarding the brain drain and the loss of skilled professionals, there are several means the egalitarian state might employ. First, policies to reward skilled immigrants might draw those who prefer a strong safety net, who favour the state on ideological grounds, or those who would find it an improvement to their material conditions. Second, the egalitarian system could target particular jobs via social recognition and socialisation, holding them up as ideal professions, and pointing to them as areas where one might maximise their social duty. Retraining initiatives, investment in higher education, etc, could be of use here. Third, many mid-ranking professionals will see (in

161 In theory; as a counterpoint, the egalitarian system also lacks problems of acquisition and still allows for motivating “elites” via social recognition, and Rawls’ system might still be subject to the brain drain when contrasted with a far less substantively just state.

162 And for this to be the case would seem both preferential and hypocritical. Likewise, a Rawlsian justification would run into similar investment problems.

theory) an improvement in their lives, and possibly also in direct income; replacements may be plausible, certainly in legal, bureaucratic or financial roles.

Investment is more troublesome. There will undeniably be great economic volatility to begin with, but even absent this, there is less reason to invest where there is less profit. Carens gives little indication as to how it might work (Carens 1981, 12, 16, 26, 66-72, 157, 228, 229, 249). Pre-tax investment could be rewarded with the dividends owed, but this is questionably fair, and still unlikely to be appealing. Absent rare resources, abundant technical or logistical skills or a market too large to ignore, which can hardly be guaranteed, there is substantial risk of underinvestment. Some loss of efficiency was expected, but this would be a drastic economic shock.

Unlike human capital, this has no easy solution. In part, one could expect the economy to improve given the “unlocking” of capital, dispersion of capital, etc, which may act as a counterpoint in providing more domestic investment. It may simply need to be an unfortunate trade – economic efficiency and raw economic product in exchange for more secure liberty. It is likely to be most harmful at the most vulnerable moment – that of transition – and thus must be prepared for, the nature of such preparation varying from state to state.

There is also the prospect that inculcating republican and socialist social norms may be anathema to Rawls. Maynor argues that Rawls strives for “a neutrality of aim” which is anathema to the republican goal of “advocating and supporting certain substantive ideals, institutions and versions of civic virtue and citizenship that support and maintain the principles of nondomination”. Moreover, republicanism challenges certain ends and individual characters, standing contrary to Rawls’ lack of judgement on decisions by “reasonable” individuals.

Rawls, by contrast, maintains political virtues which are not part of any comprehensive doctrine, but rather supplement the establishment of the basic structure. These virtues are not neutral, in the sense that Rawls still supports a democratic liberalism over other, less enlightened states, and desires a doctrine of “public reason” (Maynor 2003, 55-102). In an ideal Rawlsian world, individuals would set aside their nonpolitical¹⁶³ views and debate solely on the merits of political virtue. Rawls does, as Maynor notes, allow a proviso to permit reasonable, in his sense of the word, nonpolitical doctrines to be brought forwards, but Maynor equally points out that this proviso is hamstrung by ambiguities and the fact that individuals are still likely to “bracket off parts of their identities” for an indefinite, perhaps perpetual, amount of time (Maynor 2003, 105-107). This also seems an impossible standard to maintain; Rawls himself is forced to concede and allow legitimate use of coercive force in certain areas outside the “basic structure”, or to include more and more into it, such as family life (Maynor 2003, 110-114).

Republicanism, by contrast, has no qualms about accepting or denouncing beliefs, political or nonpolitical, in accordance with its own values and judgements. This might be a valid reason to favour liberalism over republicanism, should this concern holders of those beliefs, but it certainly means it lacks the problems Maynor outlines for Rawls. Is Maynor’s critique fair, however? Is there no way in which Rawls might answer these criticisms?

The way forwards lies, as before, by allowing for the strengths of both theories to be considered. In *The Idea of Public Reason Revisited*, Rawls (Rawls 1999, 131-180) discusses the viability of religious or “nonpolitical” reasoning influencing political decisions. He concedes that it may do so, highlighting the issue of public prayer in schools (Rawls 1999, 164-168), by appealing to public reason, and he might further concede, in response to Maynor’s argument, that republican methods

¹⁶³ This terminology seems to capture the distinction poorly. It may be better to say discourse-acceptable and discourse-unacceptable, as while one’s moral, philosophical and religious beliefs may massively influence one’s personal politics, they do not, in effect, “count” for anything and should be discounted as suitable arguments and motivations in public politics.

might better serve the public interest, and on those grounds – not the grounds of republican virtue or discursive control per se – they ought to be promoted. The basic structure would be readily supplemented by republican principles. For example, Rawls notes that women have been historically disadvantaged by systemic disregard for their care-work and by male-advantaged divorce laws, societal conduct, etc (Rawls 1999, 160-163). Building the eyeball test into legislative functioning would help to correct such disadvantages. Despite Rawls' claim that enforcing a more equal division of labour, or compensating it, cannot be justified – as this transgresses against the basic liberties – one might justify it and similar “reasonable” doctrines, on the basis of extending those liberties still further. This is despite the republican position's clear conflict with religious freedom in this case, as many religions dictate precisely such disadvantageous positions. Rawls hopes to eliminate involuntary disadvantage, and permit voluntary. Republicanism would go still further.

This does not address Maynor's arguments regarding bracketing. It does suggest, however, that republican political doctrine can be justified on grounds of public reason. If one was to prefer the egalitarian system's justification to spring from Rawls, then republican and indeed egalitarian socialisation could be appealed to on the grounds of eliminating unjust disadvantages, eliminating dependency, etc. If combined with a view of freedom more republican than liberal-egalitarian, the net result would be similar and similarly acceptable as the thesis' preferred solution.

The egalitarian system has many merits. It combines the efficiency of the voluntary market exchange with the strict material equality neo-republicanism demands, and averts some of the criticisms levied at Rawls, while being flexible enough to make use of different kinds of institutional arrangements. There remain major concerns, however, the most vital of which relate to its explicit dependence on socialisation and motivation, which republicanism lacks. Additionally, it

may remain vulnerable, as more traditional market socialism is, to degeneration. Before addressing these concerns, it is worth considering if the egalitarian system is completely compatible with republicanism.

Section Two – Amendments to the Egalitarian System, Workplace Republicanism, and Social Esteem

This brings the thesis to republican amendments. The arguments made here may concede the principles of democratic corrosion, structural domination and corporate power established earlier in the thesis, particularly chapters two and three. The contention presented in this chapter is twofold, however. First, while being sceptical of unmanaged capitalism acknowledging the thesis' earlier points, more orthodox republicans may equally be sceptical of socialism of any stripe, of the motivational aspects of Carens' solution, and of the explicit social egalitarian and Marxist influences on the "neo-republican" position the thesis has adopted. The extent of this scepticism may differ, but they may prefer a solution which minimises change to the economic system. Taylor, in particular, argues that republicans ought to be "celebratory" towards markets and embrace market functions, particularly the tool of exit (Hirschman 1970), while others articulate that the problem is primarily one of hierarchical workplaces and modern organisation (Breen 2017, 424-438, Hsieh 2005, 134-140, etc). Second, these problems are as much caused by social power as economic, so that our solution may actually exacerbate them by introducing new mechanisms for social esteem and recognition to be wielded as a weapon instead of the market.

As he stands in greatest opposition to the thesis' points, I begin with RS Taylor.

Taylor writes that republican theorising, such as Pettit, mostly focuses on voice over exit, which he views as a mistake (RS Taylor, Introduction). While aware of Hirschman's

arguments against an emphasis on exit (RS Taylor, Introduction Hirschman 1970, 45-6, 82-85, 100-112), Taylor believes it is better to “double down” on exit and encourage one’s complete withdrawal. The suggestions of greater voice, he argues, have severe issues. He does not support a completely unhindered market; quite the opposite: “securing competition and free exit requires what I call an ‘Anglo-Nordic’ package of policies, including informational campaigns, labor-market reform, aggressive antitrust, capitalist demogrants, and a basic income” (RS Taylor, Introduction). In this he does not depart unduly from the thesis, but Taylor does not support the market being co-opted towards socialist ends, arguing that more direct methods will sooner or later increase domination. He concedes that this may be subject to trade-offs, and that republicanism has room for multiple approaches. A Carens-esque system falls outside the broad boundaries that he permits, however. Therefore, the thesis will examine Taylor’s arguments for greater exit and especially support and use of the market, and his arguments against government control. When suitably dissected, the thesis will respond to both, drawing upon other works, such as Hsieh’s.

Taylor’s arguments for exit are multifaceted. To begin with, he highlights the utility of voice, although correspondent with Hirschman’s arguments, namely that exit can diminish (or “atrophy”) voice (Hirschman 1970, 34, 43). Voice is given greater power by the sudden threat or application of exit (Hirschman 1970, 126), but once that exit is utilised, especially by those with the greatest access to voice, those left behind have far less power. Taylor questions, however, whether we should be concerned with voice, or with “the security of those most vulnerable to institutional failure”. To alleviate this, we

should not turn away from exit, but rather guarantee “more and better resourced exit”. He makes rhetorical comparisons to Milton Friedman’s voucher system (RS Taylor, EVC, Friedman 1982, 85-107), arguing that deliberate policy could be utilised to guarantee effective exit against the least advantaged. While he considers the benefits of a “no-exit” policy, such as a society where no private schools exist and everyone is forced into the same system, he argues that this is (in the United States) constitutionally impossible and more importantly, subject to “free residential mobility”, a freedom that is unlikely to be infringed; it would seem highly authoritarian to attempt to do so. Thus, free exit vs partial exit seems to make the case that if exit is inevitable, it at least should be facilitated and supported for the most vulnerable and least advantaged as a priority.

A problem to raise immediately is that exit means very different things in different contexts, and this is a problem that repeats throughout Taylor’s arguments. Hirschman defines exit primarily in terms of the firm and gives little indication as to how it is best applied in other contexts. He also notes that many cases of political exit are of “true exit”, that is, without caring for their effects on the “society that was left behind” (Hirschman 1970, 3-5, 106-119), and Taylor never really picks up on this. Exit in the context of schools in the United States might mean leaving a county, or perhaps a state, or perhaps exit from the United States altogether. This is less significant here, but much more significant when it comes to markets. When he mentions a worker has a choice of exit, is that choice meaningful in a capitalist market, if -that- exit is purely on a company basis, rather than exiting the entire, structurally dominating system? This is not helped by an ambiguity in what regulation involves, which is discussed shortly.

Why should we prefer the indirect aid of exit to the direct aid of voice, through democratic means or government regulation, however? Taylor states directly that “such empowerment threatens even greater domination, not by private agents, but rather by public (or quasi-public) agents”, drawing upon Pettit’s concerns with government overreach and democratic accountability. Giving an example of union disputes, he raises a concern similar to that of Hayek’s discussed in chapter three – government oversight of economic matters necessitates a class of non-economic personnel to oversee it, or requires the government to back one side or the other. He does not reject all state action; “these reforms will require a redirection of state interventions so that they work with rather than against the grain of competitive markets, and to this degree they may overlap with the policy preferences of some on the political right” (RS Taylor, EVC). He does, however, question the enabling of public abuse. As he points out, republican theorists ought to be concerned with the potential for abuse, not merely its cultivation. Workers instead need to be empowered with exit, and governments should not seek to interfere inside the behaviour of firms.

His second chapter focuses primarily on marital exit, again following general principles. For brevity’s sake, only one section is of particular note, when he discusses “marital regulators”, enforced with the direct empowerment of women’s voice and protection. He writes: “marital regulators, given their wide remit to stop abuse, must be granted discretionary powers of a sort that can themselves be readily abused, especially given the complexity of their regulatory task and the limited ability of other state authorities to

provide effective oversight due to that complexity. Regulators might use these powers to demand bribes from husbands in return for leniency or even to harass them as part of personal or ideological vendettas. Again, public domination does not require that these marital regulators actually abuse their positions—they may, in fact, be highly conscientious—but only requires that they have the ability to abuse, which they will certainly have given their broad powers of monitoring and enforcement.” (RS Taylor, Family).

Again, this highlights Taylor’s deep concern with public regulation. He additionally states: “Whether we consider the domination of workers by abusive managers or that of businesses by corrupt regulators and politicians, the kinds of policy instruments that were used to limit marital power through resourced exit and enhanced competition can also be used to limit market and political power.” (RS Taylor, Family).

Allowing for this, one might think that Taylor is overstating the point. Empowering voice and regulation by legislation can rule with a far softer touch than he envisages. For example, in the case of marriage, offering subsidised assistance and marriage counselling, along with efforts to ensure suitable training on the part of police and care workers to recognise warning signs, would be both valuable and practical, and obviate the horror of “marital regulators”.

It is not difficult to take his example to a *reductio ad absurdum*, as well. Consider the vital role of environmental regulation, given that environmental costs – as a classic

example of externalities – are almost never applied to the firms responsible for them. He emphasises the point by excluding democratic accountability: “The democratic state can demand that domineering husbands include their wives in their decision-making processes, but because such inclusion is contrary to their interests, the state will again have to give regulators the necessary discretionary powers to monitor, assess, and redress spousal non-compliance. As we have just seen, though, such monitoring and enforcement powers can be abused by regulators, threatening an increase in total domination.” (RS Taylor, Family). This invites ready comparison to polluting companies; to be asked to clean up is naturally against their interests. If environmental regulation, with its complexity – and the need for abusable powers via regulation, if not at the same personal level as with marriage – is forbidden, almost any interference in the market must be dependent upon individual exit and the empowerment necessary to do so. So too with financial, health and safety regulation, and other areas subject to the prospect of abuse. This is a horrifically flawed design. Individual workers may not even be aware of the pollution that they themselves are causing, especially if any inspection procedures are instituted by higher management that care little for environmental harms. There are countless areas where privacy concerns or potential for abuse is vastly outweighed by the good done via effective regulation, and where the knowledge and/or ability required for exit is unavailable. In response, Taylor might look towards his various policies to facilitate exit, but if he remains focused on marital independence from regulation and exit as the sole recourse, his theory is untenable in practice.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Indeed, one might turn the argument on its head – does not the enormous power of personal profit allow for the corruption, blackmail and distortion of regulatory policy?

In chapter three on markets, Taylor acknowledges the prospect for markets to bring power to bear. Interestingly, while he notes Dagger's point that differential incomes inherently cause problems for domination – consider Pettit's eyeball test – he seemingly ignores this possibility, focusing instead on efforts to attain a perfectly competitive market. He states that republicans may be concerned that “perfect competition is a lofty ideal that real-world markets will rarely approach, much less attain...but it (the concern) applies no less strongly to the other components of republicanism. The rule of law, the separation of powers, bicameralism, federalism, and international legalism are also demanding ideals that real-world political systems at best approximate rather than achieve” (RS Taylor, Market). This is a poor argument, for in the vast array of political processes, these ideals have been attained to an effective degree, for example in the United States' federal system and separation of powers, or the bicameral legislation of the United Kingdom; granted, Pettit and other republican thinkers are optimistic, but their optimism at least has *some* foundation. A perfectly competitive market has yet to be reached at any point under capitalism, nor has any capitalist economy ever remotely resembled such. Furthermore, an imperfect market will not become more perfect by its own processes, whereas the political process *can* include its own betterment. There is a difference between utopian thinking, which Pettit approaches despite his best efforts¹⁶⁵, and lunacy.

Taylor stipulates that his policy proposals must be employed as a package and not piecemeal, yet he concedes numerous difficulties of implementation, for instance with migrant workers (RS Taylor, Market). The package, and individual proposals, seem more

165 As the thesis shall argue in chapter six, section three.

than a little suspect. One example he uses is licensed taxis versus Uber, Lyft, etc, claiming that such licenses stymie competition and promote domination. This is somewhat ironic given the lengthy list of abuses and power that Uber offers, to the point of refusing to treat its workers as workers, instead as self-employed contractors. (Wikipedia, Uber BV v Aslam, England and Wales Court of Appeal, Leighton 2016, 866-871, Mishel 2018). He suggests, at length, policies of anti-trust legislation and worker retraining and resourcing (RS Taylor, State), while ambivalent about union power, which can both increase and decrease domination. None of his proposals, however, so much as touch upon the prospect of externalities, of alienation, and especially of the competing claims between *staatsvolk* and *marktvolk*. While it may reinforce his overall scepticism towards government, he seems oddly reticent to consider the prospect of market forces engaging in regulatory capture. Perhaps that is because resisting this would require a strong state with extensive regulatory powers, which he cannot accept.

In his fourth and fifth chapters, he discusses republican perspectives on government control – via Pettit’s democratic requirements, etc – and the perspective of more right-wing “republicans” like Hayek and Sandel, drawing away from critiques of structural domination as Schuppert and his example of Gourevitch offer (RS Taylor, State and RPP, Gourevitch 2013, 602-607). He concedes the value of political voice, especially at the national level, but maintains the economic model of exit has a great role to play, unsurprisingly (RS Taylor, State). He rejects universal basic income as an expansion of state power, in fact arguing that UBI would work *against* the eyeball test, due to the increase in taxation necessary to sustain it. This, coupled with consequent greater powers

for revenue agents, would, again following his marital freedom example, vastly increase the prospect of public domination (RS Taylor, RPP). One can only imagine his horror at Carens' system of equal consumption shares. He concedes that his argument might be extreme, but argues that it would be impolitic to assume a perfect government any more than a perfect market; scepticism about the escalation of government power should be a primary tenet on his account.

His arguments remain dubious here, on multiple grounds. Firstly, he offers no critique of systemic domination. As established in chapter two, this is a grievous flaw to his arguments, more so because of the inherent systemic issues from Marxist alienation and exploitation. In much the same vein, he ignores subtler exertions of power like “wage theft”, which Anderson, Gourevitch and other workplace republicans could correct via regulation and collective workplace management; a lack of oversight would only exacerbate this problem (Meixell & Eisenbray 2014, 1-6). Secondly, Taylor underestimates the international difficulties he faces. If the egalitarian system has difficulties arising from capital flight¹⁶⁶, his commitment to a perfect market is overwhelmingly hamstrung by the global market system as it exists now. Whereas the egalitarian system can still engage in enthusiastic commerce, his framework of anti-trust laws and increased competition is flawed in an age where vital industrial projects operate in a single, authoritarian nation with no attachment to a republican economic policy (Athukora 2017, 363-382). Even ignoring China, competing local attitudes to regulation and especially deregulation – the famous “race to the bottom” - make his proposals internationally unworkable.

¹⁶⁶ As discussed in chapter four and later in the section.

Thirdly, while he acknowledges political voice, his concentration on mobility and exit as a supplement leads to a particularly unpalatable conclusion. In the event of a dying community, the best solution is its “resourced abandonment” (RS Taylor, State), placing resources that would be spent on welfare on encouragement to move elsewhere, perhaps to “Innovation hubs”, doubtless to be combined with his retraining and “demogrants” initiatives in fostering entrepreneurs and competition. It is precisely this kind of mobility that Dagger criticises (Dagger 1997), which Taylor acknowledges but does not address adequately, noting that Dagger’s concerns are reasonable, but the flaw is of failing to secure resourcing and preconditions to make it effective. On the contrary: Taylor seems to regard individuals as mere economic potential, and only as individuals beyond that; his proposal has no problems with uprooting families, including children, and encourages diaspora rather than any semblance of “democratic virtue” in local communities.

In the same vein, his proposal directly weakens worker voice and potential organisation. By ensuring that workers have no investment in any particular community, that community is less likely to be invested in, emotionally or financially. Likewise, the association of a community with its work would strengthen the solidarity of the workers therein, possibly developing a conscious identification with it, like the “Motor City” of Detroit and its automobile industry.

Fourthly, Taylor exhibits economic naiveté regarding exit’s potential as a threat in motivating local, non-national governments. Specifically, certain industries remain highly

concentrated in certain points; one may consider Silicon Valley or Hollywood as examples where specialist, related industries cluster. Resources for start-ups in those industries outside of these locations may be exceedingly difficult due to high economic barriers to entry. In these cases, local government must act to keep the local industry happy, but this does not apply to individual workers, whose effective voice is dependent upon their economic scarcity. Any exodus of citizens is easily replaceable, barring spectacular incompetence. Fifthly, Taylor notes that there must be a “positive commitment to further their country’s welfare” for a republican state to function effectively. Civic virtue is discussed in chapter six, but he concedes that his economic approach does nothing for a national level of “democratic virtue” (RS Taylor, State). The egalitarian system addresses these concerns in an effective yet decentralised manner. There are doubtless further concerns.

All of these problems being directly stated, Taylor does outline several salient points which neo-republican theory would be wise to incorporate. Firstly, he is right that exit has its usefulness. Offering exit drastically enhances one’s freedom and independence. Carens’ egalitarian system offers this in a more comprehensive way than Taylor’s proposals, which rely too heavily on an utterly imperfect market. Secondly, Taylor’s continued scepticism of government – while farcical to the extremes he takes it – merits some answer. The thesis considers how his scepticism might be answered in establishing the egalitarian system and avoiding corruption, in part, in section three, but his concerns with regulatory bodies may persist. The arguments of Gonzalez-Ricoy (Gonzalez-Ricoy 2014, 238-248) provide some effective suggestions in the form of those regulations, but

not regulation of the regulations. Thirdly, questions of voice and exit's intersection remain relevant in considering Alvarez's political idiocy from chapter two. The resignation of voice and the option of exit must remain available at a political level, to serve as an effective measure of protest for those who no longer have any other.

Elizabeth Anderson provides an approach contrasting with Taylor. In lectures given at Princeton University, she argues that individual, hierarchical firms have essentially become private governments. She gives a lengthy description of all the ways in which a firm may interfere with its workers, explaining it is private both in the sense that the modern state interferes with the firm's internal mechanisms to an increasingly limited degree, and that business-owners reject interference from workers (Anderson 2017, 37-41). As established earlier, she also notes that the propositions for exit from a firm or even from the market amount to nothing more than formality.

Anderson is less hostile towards the market than the thesis presented here. She acknowledges its necessity and even that there be some form of hierarchical organisation inherent within it, following the theory of the firm (Anderson 2017, 64). Her solution is to extend the checks on government that one finds in public government – a rule of law, democratic accountability, the right of exit, etc – along with a return to high levels of collective bargaining and worker voice (Anderson 2017, 63-67). This would presumably require the addition of the safeguards demanded by neo-republican theory: strict material equality, discursive control, and an end to alienation when possible, along with methods to punish scandal at all levels.

Where Anderson falls short is in her disregard of the inherent flaws of capitalism. She is right to allow that the market and modern capitalism are not remotely identical, but fails to follow through, by suggesting that change should merely be at the level of individual firms. In her defence, she is completely right to insist upon an end to “private government”, and there is no indication that the egalitarian system would necessarily deliver this. Her proposals must be accompanied by changes to the system as a whole, however. More stringent legislation is useful, but as the arguments of chapter three indicate, this is mostly wasted effort. Moreover, if one was to extend the thesis’ proposals to the workplace, the level of control would be incompatible with the free ownership of capital, suggesting that each firm should be managed by the workers. Under Carens’ system, this is not necessarily so, but neither does he reject the idea altogether (Carens 1981, 178-195). Anderson herself admits that there may be practical reasons not to embrace full workplace democracy and cooperative labour (Anderson 2017, 131); these reasons may diminish in the egalitarian system, but without empirical observation, this remains unclear.

One might ask what prevents Anderson’s reforms from being constituted within the framework of the egalitarian system. Nothing: some of her suggestions may no longer be required, but an end to the atrocious “right-to-work” laws that she (and earlier chapters) rightfully castigate remains essential. Carens’ theory requires very little change in the form of organisation between the egalitarian and PPM systems, so anything that works can usefully be co-opted.

The former arguments merely indicate that the right of exit is insufficient in capitalist practice and Taylor's reliance on the market is woefully misguided. Workplace republicanism, entailing a greater commitment to both exit and voice, can be applied to the egalitarian system with equal validity as to capitalism. This has done little, however, to alleviate republican concerns about social power, to which the thesis now turns. To answer these objections effectively, the thesis will briefly restate the importance of social status as an element of class, and the recognition/redistribution distinction discussed in chapter two, section three. It will then consider the potential role of esteem and social inequalities, particularly the former as outlined by Pettit and Brennan, and then outline some of the criticism of permitting social, as well as economic, inequalities.

Social status in Weber's sense was partially accepted by the thesis as an explanation and driving force for the stratification of the wider class system and class struggle. It is (an element of) the distinction between poor white and poor black workers in the United States, the socio-political divide between low-paid workers and the very rich (but still not strictly capitalist) workers in capitalist economies, and so on. Social status is also very important on grounds of Schuppertian alienation, because the possibility exists for various minorities (ethnic, religious, political, sexual etc) to be in an extremely privileged position through class while still subjected to systemic domination, or to be socially privileged in one way while discriminated in another. Consider the example of a black policeman in the United States, who upon being encountered in plain clothes late at night

by another officer, is subjected to policies born out of racial discrimination. Vulnerability in Schuppert's sense can arise despite being very secure in other contexts.

In turn, the distribution of material resources is but one element to the insulation and insurance Pettit (and the neo-republican solution) promotes. The distribution required is incompatible with a class system. There is also the need for recognition, however. This desire is inextricably linked to that of redistribution; each case of recognition also incurs an element of redistribution (and vice versa), according to Fraser, whose view the thesis takes to be correct. This is particularly important when it comes to systemic domination and alienation, both in the Schuppertian and Marxist senses, because it implies that a single approach will ultimately be unsuccessful. It will fail because only one of the root causes has actually been addressed. This is why Carens' approach is so useful; by anchoring the motivation in social duty maximisation, and linking social recognition to the fulfilment of that duty, the recognition so craved is fulfilled, and presumably in a mainly egalitarian way¹⁶⁷. By allocating equal consumption shares, the need for a fair distribution is sated¹⁶⁸.

It is this need for recognition that Pettit and Brennan deem the “intangible hand” of motivation – if the iron hand of government agency and the invisible hand of profit motivation fail to supply a convincing rationale for action, then the intangible hand is a third potential motivator. We can count on individuals doing things for the fame or

167 This remains a case of “mainly” because complete equality of opportunity and outcome is very probably impossible. Not all individuals are capable of being equally esteemed – some are just naturally charismatic. Even if there were some element of redistribution of recognition (although the author has no idea of the form such redistribution might take), it is impossible to give all vocations equal esteem. That said, it is equally impossible to ensure that all individuals will be satisfied with the work available to them, in terms of its recognition rewards.

168 Pending of course the neo-republican amendments outlined in the previous section, e.g.: taxation for social security, equitable rather than equal treatment of minority cultures, the possibility of women-only spaces and so on.

prestige, and social norms will help to effectively restrain or motivate certain behaviours. The esteem of others is definitely worth pursuing; it provides us with self-esteem, and it increases our chances of favourable economic and social dealings (Pettit & Brennan 2004, 23-33). We may even simply desire esteem as a biological imperative.

This intangible hand responds in distinctive ways, according to Pettit and Brennan. While it cannot be directly traded – and indeed an attempt to do so is normally seen as disesteemable – an economy of esteem is capable of being established, with distinct elements of supply and demand, qualification, and so on (Pettit & Brennan 2004, 50-77). And just as with the invisible hand being served by the market, the intangible hand can be aided by institutions which encourage the distribution of esteem towards positive values and norms. This obviously synergises with the republican need to inculcate such norms, and Carens’ socialisation too.

There is a danger here. Carens’ system very much depends on economic equality. It offers no such promise of equality vis-à-vis social recognition. Cillian McBride, in *Recognition*, distinguishes the effects of the two kinds of social recognition: respect and esteem¹⁶⁹. Much of the social recognition demanded to avert alienation (of both the Schuppertian and Marxist kinds) or to aid in the preservation of autonomy/discursive control is respect-based. According to McBride, this is relatively unproblematic; respect in the sense he uses it is not something that can be stacked indefinitely. Rather, it is the kind of respect due us as free, equal human beings. We can also speak of respect or recognition in terms of people’s accomplishments, this being esteem, which can clearly

169 See also Darwall, 1977, whose “appraisal respect” McBride touches on as a sort of esteem.

grow proportionately. We may consider an individual who is respected for their intellect, who succeeds in business and is therefore respected for that, who writes a book on how to succeed in business and is still more respected for their scholarship¹⁷⁰. We may consider Anderson's examples when she writes of inequalities and esteem under Amazon, and the horrific abuse of autonomy entailed (Anderson 2017, 128-130). Her example aligns more towards recognition, and to prevent this abuse seems inherently justifiable. Conversely, we can also consider the cult of personality that arises in the United States towards entrepreneurs (Galbraith 1992, 75), and how this creates an illusion of competence and control and is converted into political power. Supporting this seems less justifiable.

It should be readily apparent that while Carens' system is classless, it is *not* status-less. Indeed, Carens openly touts the ability of entrepreneurs to be lauded for their accomplishments as a strength of his system, not a weakness, but he also acknowledges the prospect of inequalities of social esteem and approval (Carens 1981, 153-156). He argues that this could be fixed via effective socialisation towards "a man's endowments (fixing) the measure of his duty" (Carens 1981, 155). And while further social inequalities – power, prestige, and so on – are possible too, they would inflict less harm than in the PPM system, where they are accompanied by the myriad troublesome prospects of massive economic inequality, and a system of social approval directly tied to the pursuit of profit.

170 Pettit and Brennan outline this distinction as *isothymia* and *megalothymia* (Pettit & Brennan, section 1), and discuss it as recognition vs esteem as well, rather than respect. Esteem is inherently comparative; respect is not.

It may, however, be possible to reduce inequalities in social esteem further; it is certainly a worthy goal. Carens notes, furthermore, that the basic prerequisites of the egalitarian system are not necessarily incompatible with “more egalitarian versions of PPM systems” (Carens 1981, 181) and his premises work with a very basic PPM system. As such, many methods by which we might theoretically reduce the effective power status conveys are available to Carens as they would be to Rawls, as an example.

What problems might arise from a surplus of social esteem for individuals or groups? One immediate issue is the establishment of an entrenched social hierarchy which serves to replace that of the economic. In such a hierarchy, many of the old problems would re-emerge, with the currency one of favour trading and mutual nepotism (McBride 2013, 85-88, 102). In effect, economic capital has been replaced by social capital (McBride 2013, 93). A second is that recognition and esteem may not be towards positive social norms – McBride uses examples of the mafia, who thrive on an infamy they must maintain via a mixture of an honour code and shocking brutality, and individuals who seek out societal disesteem intentionally, such as juvenile delinquents (McBride 2013, 144). Likewise, incorrectly applied disesteem can be extremely harmful: for instance, the stigma attached to a failed career or bankruptcy, for which one may not actually have been at fault. A third problem relates to McBride’s scepticism that there is a “just distribution” of esteem, or that this is even an appropriate way to characterise esteem altogether (McBride 2013, 103-116, 132-133).

An immediate caveat worthy of note is that all of these problems exist writ large within the present capitalist system, where they are additionally supported by the highly unjust, illiberal and inequalitarian socio-economic conditions and institutional arrangements which dominate modern society. The egalitarian system is likely to mitigate them, but problems they may remain, without an effort to address them effectively. What solutions might be available within the egalitarian system, while maintaining its strengths by tying social recognition and esteem to social duty?

The first issue, of social hierarchy, is obviously a concern for republicanism and socialism alike. And while Carens' prerequisites rule out an officially entrenched elite "caste", they do not rule out an unofficial one. Such a caste could develop when individuals consistently fulfilled their social duty well, and perhaps then amplified their esteem by favour and esteem trading, although covertly. They would wish to avoid the problems Pettit and Brennan outline (Pettit & Brennan 2004, 161, 181) – notably, that bragging or (discovered) fraud would fail to impress.

In mitigation, maximising one's social duty also implies that the elite are diligent, selfless individuals who are genuinely trying to make society better. The hierarchy remains a problem even then; although it minimises the likelihood of their influence being used to unpleasant ends, it is still possible for just and decent people, in a moment of moral weakness, to do decidedly unpleasant things. An elite may also include those who are lucky, good at feigning virtue, using the social influence of a parent or spouse, etc.

As Carens' use of social recognition of a tool is vital to the thesis, establishing a more favourable distribution of esteem is undesirable and may not be possible anyway.

Conversely, political, social and economic hierarchies should be discarded and the neo-republican thesis offers methods for their removal. If some hierarchy is inevitable, then the best outcome is to minimise its influence, to ensure that it remains compliant with the eyeball test. To accomplish this, a rigid structural framework is inadequate; this sort of social hierarchy is subtle and relies on what people think, which may be directed, but not forced, under any circumstances. Thus the unenviable task of allowing for esteem, without allowing for it to matter.

Short of a society where independence from each other ensures no-one can be vulnerable to such influence, anti-hierarchical steps can be taken as part of Carens' socialisation: some people deserve more praise, but that praise should not result in active influence, although the line may be difficult to draw in practice. Further, such esteem should always be dependent upon not only maximising social duty but the normative goals behind that duty: freedom, equality, and independence. Those who try to employ their status contrary to these goals should rightfully be shunned. Ultimately, both solutions are rather limited. The best defence to offer is simply that Carens' system provides a marked improvement on capitalism vis-à-vis hierarchy and what is praiseworthy, drawing far closer to republican practice than anything produced by glorifying free market successes. There remains room for perfecting this.

The second problem is less thorny. While McBride criticises the “rosy” optimism of regulation via the intangible hand, the socialisation project that Carens intends focuses on the maximisation of social duty, and Carens makes it exceedingly clear that disapprobation is not placed upon those who genuinely tried and did poorly, but upon those who reject the system entirely or fail to live within its constraints. Note that this does not require a Stakhanovite obsession with work – society will reach an equilibrium on how much effort is required, in much the same way as it does now (Carens 1981, 147-149).

The socialisation will therefore prize characteristics and actions which are, on the whole, positive, unlike the mafia example. Deviancy and conflicting socialisation, the main threats to this, have already been addressed, albeit not perfectly. Regulation by the intangible hand does require the egalitarian society’s norms to be widely valued for it to work effectively; thus, criticism holds more concern earlier in the socialisation process. At this point, greater effort is required to show the value and appeal of the norms in question. This could be done by tying the self-interest of individuals to the norms more directly – showing that they would directly benefit from their adoption. This would not be difficult over time, but depending upon the initial economic shocks of the egalitarian system, it may need more robust demonstration of the vulnerability and exploitation under capitalism, accentuating the negatives over the positives.

The third problem cannot be wholly answered here: articulating how best to characterise esteem and related concerns is beyond the scope of the thesis. What can be said is that the

justice of the thesis' distribution of social esteem will be dependent largely upon how it is characterised. Because the thesis accepts the perspectival dualism of Fraser, the thesis accepts that, in her words, "neither claims for redistribution or claims for recognition can be contained within a separate sphere" (Fraser & Honneth 2003, 64). Therefore, the egalitarian system will help attend to distortions of social esteem. It will not be complete, and the focus on social esteem as a driving motive may cause corruption and misdistribution of resources, but it will still be a much more just distribution of both recognition and resources than under the current capitalist system. If one holds Fraser to be correct, this will be true no matter how such a distribution should look, precisely because the egalitarian system corrects the enormous misdistribution of resources under capitalism

In conclusion, the egalitarian system is not perfect, from a republican perspective, and it still allows for various socio-economic inequalities, as well as potentially inequitable working conditions, that may permit alienation. It does, however, accomplish a great deal, and much of what it does not explicitly accomplish could be built into the system while retaining its cohesiveness. Furthermore, because of the egalitarian socialisation towards duty, mutual respect and the aggressive pursuit of the common good, esteem is theoretically built upon goodwill and diligence, rather than wealth and ruthless self-interest. In practice, it will inevitably be defined less clearly. It still presents a more palatable ideal than capitalism.

Section Three – Establishment of the Egalitarian System and Vanguardism

Section one established the egalitarian system and its prerequisites. Section two discussed further amendments that might be necessary, most notably from workplace republicanism. It also discussed the potential concern that the egalitarian system would maintain problems caused by social status. Section three considers a more practical problem. How is the egalitarian society to be established and perpetuated? Carens side-steps the question, citing that a: he wishes to avoid giving a specific example to avoid lapsing into “practical social planning” (Carens 1981, 21) and b: to avoid any focus on individual circumstances and psychology (Carens 1981, 95). This is problematic, because the socialisation in question is exceedingly intensive. It seems implausible that individuals, as they are presently under the capitalist system as it is now, would respond in the way required, to the degree required, for the egalitarian system to succeed.

The problem of establishing a new constitution post-revolution¹⁷¹ is an old one. Rousseau discusses this starting in “The Legislator”¹⁷² (Rousseau 1998, 213-229), arguing that trying to communicate one’s ideas in full is useless; “the effect would have to become the cause; the social spirit, which should be created by these institutions, would have to preside over their very foundation.” There is a great need for “morality, (of) custom, (of) public opinion”. Comparable writing can be found in Xun Zi, in the need for sages to introduce wisdom by artifice (Stanford, Xun Zi, Liu 2006, 102-106), Plato, whose example Rousseau cites, and others besides. Rousseau’s solution is for a single great individual to present laws, to change human nature in its entirety, yet to have no power to actually execute or legislate for those laws, and if necessary, to deceive the population.

This is relevant not because of a need for inculcating democratic norms, but economic ones. It is entirely plausible that, were there to be economic unrest and disruption, the decline in living standards might allow for a counter-revolutionary backlash against the egalitarian state. If not socialised or at least highly committed to the project as a population, the project would have a high risk of failure. Indeed, this may be too strong a position to start from. How exactly is the desire for an egalitarian state and system to be brought about, when there is – as outlined in chapters two and three – a great deal of structural domination, corporate power, regulatory capture, control of the media, and so on?

171 Or at least, post political upheaval.

172 The exact translation varies. It could be “The Lawgiver”, etc.

Rousseau's solution if taken literally is not amenable to republicanism, at least of the kind Pettit supports (Pettit 2013, 199). A more passive citizenry does not suit the "Italian-Atlantic tradition", though Pettit points out that Rousseau does not rule out contestation altogether. If one takes the idea of a single entity to be best translated to an uncontested legislature, which if in a republic is supposedly uncorruptible and resisting is misguided at best (Pettit 2013, 193-194, 199), as Pettit does, then Rousseau's solution is utterly incompatible. Indeed, it may look rather authoritarian.

A solution in Rousseau's vein can be found in Lenin's writings, where he argues for a vanguard party to bring about the revolution and side-step the lengthy process of historical materialism, with all of its associated ills during the bourgeois period (Lenin 1902, Ch 3, note esp. footnote 13). He equally proposes a form of "democratic centralism", wherein said vanguard party will democratically decide upon its policies and then proceed with one, unified purpose. This is, again, inherently anathema to republican policy and, historically, has led to tyranny rather than any form of democratic progress or socialism as he intended (Pettit 2017 B, 341-343).

The two approaches might be blended: a political vanguard party which, by its own explicit charter, takes up no position in government. The sole purpose of this party is education and mobilisation towards the end of establishing neo-republican norms and governance. Pettit concedes, contrary to the old pure negative liberty conception, that there is a substantive difference between a threat and offer. He also notes a difference between "spin" and outright lies. Even basic factual truths, solidly established by

scientific and journalistic rigour, have trouble finding purchase in social media. Utter falsehoods must be disowned for the political apparatus employed here to have any legitimacy whatsoever. It is certainly viable for it to tell the truth with style, however. An ironclad line is therefore drawn for such a party, but this does not necessarily limit it greatly in its practical actions.

Such an organisation must be strictly and relentlessly honest. It must engage in deliberative discussions when deciding how and what to focus on, inefficient though it may be, with an emphasis on collaboration. It must promote norms of honesty, civility, and inquiry, and although it may champion its own political causes, it must be equally demanding upon them. It must equally be capable of being contested, following Pettit, on its own terms: there must be some way to hold this party to account. And all of this must be set as a point of public principle, on which the party might be challenged.

This may give rise to an objection, however. The entire point of this was to have a vanguard party which would promote a radical, even revolutionary agenda, to the point of encouraging such revolution. Such a code as outlined in the prior paragraph would hamstring the effectiveness of a vanguard approach. Therefore, why not simply make use of an ordinary democratic party apparatus?

In some respects, this criticism is accurate; this is not a vanguard revolutionary party that aims to seize power and apply it effectively. It is not remotely Leninist in that sense. Its nature is more akin to activism, but highly focused and deliberately, relentlessly seeking

out political change. It gives direction, and does its best to shape the effective discourse. It creates the conditions for change, rather than enacting it. It remains accurately characterised as a vanguard, however, by dint of its smaller and more focused membership, the solidity of “core” political ideals which are fully observed, and its indifference to formal political office. Thus it avoids the charge against vanguardism Pettit raises; it aims at “persuading others, not overwhelming them.” (Pettit 2017 B, 343)

A further criticism might be as to the practicality of this. How plausible is it for mass-education? One advantage that the thesis has is the presence of social media. Social media has proven itself much more decentralised and thus harder to control for government, as well as overwhelmed with disinformation and confusion. This extends even to its definition – what distinguishes social media from mere social networking? Social media is best understood primarily as a means to transmit information en masse, to “enlarge the conversation” yet simultaneously it does not exist to hold that conversation. Social networking, by contrast, is focused on expanding contact and communication first and foremost. Sites like Facebook and Twitter straddle the line between the two, being primarily for communication yet allowing users to receive a great deal of social media and thus brand awareness (Edosomwan et al, 2011, 79-91). Both represent areas of concern, but social media is more damaging, precisely because of the inability truly to converse. Social media simply projects; there is no outcome by which a discourse can be opened, meaning the truth or falsehood of its claims is more difficult to refute.

It is clear that social media and social networking have a strong impact on both economic and political discourse, and participation in either (Shirky 2011, 7-9, Faulds & Mangold 2009, 358-365, Zuniga et al 2012, 325-331, etc). It is equally clear that they have been used as vectors for disinformation, via reinforcement – the so-called “echo chamber” - and propaganda (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017, 218-230, Zuniga et al 2012, 331, Allcott et al 2019, 1-7, Valenzuela et al 2019, 10-16). Allcott and Gentzkow’s findings suggest that the level of influence on political discourse is very low, but measurable and likely to increase as methods become more sophisticated. Other research indicates that social media acts as a powerful check on corruption following Pettit’s logic vis-à-vis scandals (Enikolopov et al 2018, 153-171).

Social media must therefore be considered under the consequentialist ethos Pettit embraces. Its potential for harm and judgement is clear, and current methods of fact-discerning are distinctly ambivalent in their effects (Clayton et al 2019, 1-23). But its potential for education and mobilisation are equally clear. It could be used to underwrite an entire political movement towards neo-republican ambitions.

Accepting then that the vanguard party is both practical and not inherently contradictory to republican goals, two things remain. Firstly, how is the vanguard party to be held to account, to avoid problems such as disinformation, or being co-opted by a charismatic tyrant¹⁷³, to ensure it is both scrupulously truthful and not directly intervening in the political process? Secondly, how effective will this be as socialisation, and under what

173 As was the case for Marxist-Leninist revolutionary parties in practice.

timeframe should it operate? After all, such socialisation will take a considerable period of time.

In order to be held to account, besides the ironclad line of truth, one might want to adopt some elements of Pettit's political requirements. For example, there could be a charter of sorts – as there is a constitution within a political body – which expressly set the limits of conduct and action, as publically available information. And just as with appellate and judicial resources (Pettit 2001, 171-172), there could be formal mechanisms for contestation. One difficulty that would arise would be that there is no real way to allow for separate checks and balances as an equivalent to the “mixed constitution” or bicameral legislatures Pettit outlines. This is partially balanced by the necessity, even more than most politicians, to uphold the normative standards of the group. Scandal, and the avoidance thereof, would be of supreme importance to avoid tarnishing the credibility of the movement. This in turn could result in corruption, deliberately hiding such scandals. But given that such a vanguard party appeals to those with republican norms and values, it should in turn be reasonably inoculated from such selfishness. At least, it will be no *more* vulnerable to corruption than a government, lacking far less explicit power to exert, and fewer rewards and status.

As to how effective such methods might be, the thesis lacks an appropriate empirical test. The timeframe, however, surely must extend some years past the establishment of the egalitarian system, until its socialisation has taken firm root in a new generation. This has the risk of the party simply becoming a mouthpiece of the new state, or becoming

irrelevant; a still worse risk would be that the vanguard party dissolved and took up a position within government, forming an internal cadre or obtaining a privileged position. Thus there is a need to preserve both independence and distance. What if the vanguard party remains intact, but separate? Again this is not ideal in the long term. If the new government and party agree in their entirety, then at best there is a crowding of political debate with but a single view, and at worst, one side becomes merely enforcers or mouthpiece of the other. If they publicly disagree, the movement undergoes the problem of fragmentation, as discussed above, and damages the legitimacy of the new government – which may, if brought about by revolution or mass civil protest, desperately need it. A better solution is to focus on steady withdrawal, moving from active political debate to simply offering encouragement, before disbanding over a steady and announced timeframe. Once done, no individual as a party of said party should seek political office.

Allowing for a vanguard party, albeit one that must remain answerable, would seem to address the problem of establishing an egalitarian state. It does have certain risks attached to it, most notably that an inadequately resourced and transparent party, or one with insufficient internal debate and restraint, might be co-opted to authoritarian ends, or become corrupt. Yet if the alternative is to engage in a democratic process which has been fatally undermined, and where genuine political change has become almost impossible, it is perhaps better to take such risks than to continue to be dominated.

Chapter Six

Section One – Socialisation and Authoritarianism

Organisational concerns aside, Carens relies upon certain notions of human motivation, specifically that the goal of social-duty maximisation can reliably replace the profit motive (Carens 1981, 111-118), challenging any critic to demonstrate the fixed nature of the human mind. While not necessarily in opposition to republican beliefs about norms (Pettit 1997, 241-246), nor the development of civic virtue, it is worth discussing in detail given the earlier concerns about organisational aspects of a Carens-esque socialism. Carens' view must be explicated, then defended. Given the acceptance of discursive control as a component of freedom in society, a sceptic might worry that a focus on changing individual psychology would result in domination and alienation. It would also be difficult to defend; if the charge against capitalism was that individuals were crushed under the weight of the system, a socialism that did the same for their own good is equally unjustifiable.

Other elements are worth considering, too. Part of the critique against Rawls relied on implementing a republican notion of virtue and value, one not shared by liberalism. This will be set out in greater detail in section two. Another tension is between the ostensible realism that Pettit and Marx espouse, and the explicit utopianism of Carens' project. Thus far, the thesis has argued that the solution presented is very much achievable. Yet Carens himself identifies his arguments as utopian, as opposed to a realistic blueprint. This is primarily dealt with in section three.

Carens sets forth the case for social-duty maximisation via some of his logically necessary prerequisites. For his motivational arguments to work, individuals must “derive satisfaction from performing this duty” of income maximisation; they must “place the same relative value” on their

satisfactions for doing so as on acquiring income for consumption; they must place some value on income for consumption, and they must generally obey the laws upholding the egalitarian system (Carens 1981, 174-176).

The thesis will assume these prerequisites to be true for the sake of the argument, although their truth seems intuitively plausible, excepting perhaps Carens' third prerequisite, that of same relative value. It has already been discussed in chapter five, but again note that this prerequisite is at least logically and empirically possible, even if one doubts its plausibility..

His empirical prerequisites concerning motivation necessitate more scrutiny. Carens' theory necessitates an "effective socialisation process", which "must be more intense than the socialisation process in the PPM system if people in the egalitarian system are to place as much value on social-duty satisfactions as people in the PPM system place on income-consumption satisfactions." He notes that no centralisation is needed for this socialisation. Beyond an effective tax structure and a moral motivation, the empirical prerequisites are not – in Carens' opinion - much different to or more demanding than those of the PPM system (Carens 1981, 175-177).

He details his rationale for these prerequisites in the first section of his book's third chapter. Carens specifically notes that he wishes to avoid questions about "what empirical conditions would have to be satisfied to take some real person...and to transform her values" (Carens 1981, 95). His solution is hypothetical, and relies strongly on socialisation, specifically, perpetual socialisation (Carens 1981, 101). He considers eight potential concerns; some involve motivation, while others do not. He is acutely aware of the possibility of new sources of social inequality (Carens 1981, 102).

Most important here are his arguments for the plasticity of human nature, the role and practice of socialisation as it already occurs in the PPM system, and his rationale for suggesting the egalitarian

system's socialisation must be more intense. As with Marx, Carens emphasises the “apparent impossibility of trying to identify any determinate human nature” (Carens 1981, 105) – instead, he notes a huge number of different cultural goals, practices, and values; it is not inconceivable that social-duty maximisation might be one of them. Humans have certain biological drives, and possess “differing genetic endowments”, affecting what and how they learn, but economic activity does not seem to be limited in this fashion. Carens cites an example of “Mountain Fur people” who labour solely for beer, regarding labour for wages or capital as shameful. Yet it is equally shameful to use money to acquire beer (or vice versa); their economic attitude is certainly distinctive enough from the PPM system that it suggests plasticity on this point (Carens 1981, 105-111).

What of socialisation under capitalism? Here, Carens relies on Merton, citing his studies of the United States, where socialisation for income consumption – and acquiring that income in the first place – is “very intensive in terms of the social approval which is attached to this goal” (Carens 1981, 116-119). The intangible hand here operates not unlike that of a private club or in-group (Pettit & Brennan 2004, 219-221) where social approval is a feedback loop – the esteem placed upon those who are rich becomes itself an argument for the rich to be esteemed. Because they have achieved the position, they must by definition deserve it (Galbraith 1992, 96-98).

Naturally, there is no American government department for socialisation; rather, it adds to itself through “de-centralised agencies – family, school and workplace – which are primarily responsible for this intense socialisation, presumably for the most part because they share a consensus on the considerable importance they attach to this goal” (Carens 1981, 119). Celebrity culture may boost the impact by providing a concrete example to idealise and desire. Pettit likewise allows for just this sort of socialisation, noting that patterns of behaviour reinforce social norms in everyday life as well as in dealings with government and its representatives (Pettit 1997, 254-255).

The intensity of the socialisation process necessary, compared with PPM, is because Carens' system relies solely on satisfactions of esteem, self-esteem and social recognition, as "the instrumental satisfactions associated with the acquisition of income for consumption are not available in the egalitarian system"¹⁷⁴ "If the goal of fulfilling one's social obligations...were to have the same place in the hierarchy of values of the egalitarian system as the goal of acquiring income...in the PPM system, this instrumental factor would have to be replaced by an increase in the social importance attached" (Carens 1981, 116-118). Plainly, one must make the social duty maximisation far more appealing than it is today. This may be challenging if American socialisation for income consumption is already quite intense.

The most troubling argument one might use against Carens is that his psychological reasoning is simply wrong. Psychology remains an uncertain science; it may be that individuals are not as malleable as he thinks, or that far stronger socialisation – outright brainwashing – would be needed for the socialisation to "stick". This is unacceptable if we are committed to the value of non-domination.

Evidence suggests this is not the case, however. Firstly, recent psychological studies suggest that the human mind *is* highly malleable, and that many are susceptible to obedience via social norms and suggestions from one's social superiors (Altemeyer 2006, 15-21, 25, Milgram 1963, 1-9, and so on). A notable problem for virtue ethicists has been the plethora of evidence that humans adapt to their circumstances and do not hold to fixed character traits, and that individuals attribute such traits in response to situations (the fundamental attribution error) (Harman 1999 87-94, Harman 2003 315-331, Nisbet & Ross 1991, Berry & Fredrickson 2015, 45-54, Doris 2002, so on and so forth).¹⁷⁵

174 A small note – this is not to say that individuals will not be satisfied by consumption of their (equal) income. It is denoting the loss of what Rawls describes as the freedom to make use of one's talents.

175 It should be pointed out that other literature questions the existence of this error at all (Funder & Fast 2010, Sabini et al 2001, etc). So long as human minds are plastic, Carens' argument will hold.

The problem is thus not one of being insufficiently malleable, but too malleable altogether.

Secondly, even if there is some innate selfishness to human nature – some biological imperative towards competition – there is equally innate cooperation and reciprocity. It is not beyond belief that the selfishness of individuals is best sated by the common good (Carens 1981, 120-123).

Human beings rarely resemble the close-fisted *homo-economicus*, reducing concepts and decisions to rational selfishness and irrational altruism. Instead, there is a mixture of motivations and impulses, which can be worked with and refined.

Besides this, three general arguments to a mixture of these prerequisites spring to mind. Their persuasiveness varies. They cover the strongest possible objections to Carens' motivational elements. The first is that of conflicting socialisation, social esteem, and "amour-propre" – the prospect of the socialisation being impeded in some manner¹⁷⁶. The second is that the intensity of socialisation needed may be incompatible with discursive control and non-domination, even assuming Carens' arguments about decentralisation are accurate and sufficient. The third is deviancy – how to accommodate Carens' system with the prospect of counter-cultures, resistance to socialisation, and those who lack any empathy or altruism altogether – individuals with anti-social personality disorder, for instance.

Conflicting socialisation may have many sources, but is broadly the same problem each time.

Consider a nation adhering to an egalitarian system, surrounded by many other countries which, thanks to globalisation etc, still rely on the PPM system – assuming the absence of a global revolution. The latter will propagate different social norms and viewpoints, which may counteract the egalitarian socialisation. An example might be a socialist citizen on an expensive holiday, seeing only the glitzy side of Vegas or Macau, and becoming enthralled with the idea of the free market. How might one deal with immigrants who had radically different socialisation in the same

¹⁷⁶ Carens notes that this occurred in China and Cuba (Carens 1981, 170) during their attempts at socialisation, and explains their "extra scrutiny" by reference to it. It is precisely this scrutiny that the second criticism fears.

vein? There is a great deal of literature on the problems of ethnic minorities with radically different beliefs and customs; finding acceptable solutions is fraught with difficulty. The same is likely true for economic “subcultures”. Likewise, individuals may support the egalitarian system solely to accomplish a need for social esteem, acting only out of self-love and pride – Rousseau’s amour-propre – and thus obey the forms, the “patterns” in Pettit’s nomenclature, without actually adhering to the spirit.

This criticism touches upon deviancy, but questions Carens in a slightly different way. Deviancy suggests that the laws and the norms of the egalitarian system are being outright disobeyed, or that social duty maximisation has no worth to the “deviants”. In this case, the egalitarian system works, at least in part, and the norms are still being obeyed. The problem is that internal or external factors may lessen the intensity of the socialisation process, and by doing so, threaten Carens’ empirical prerequisites.

This problem is impossible to avoid in any society, whether PPM or egalitarian; no government can impose perfect socialisation. Any attempt would be decidedly totalitarian. Solutions exist, however. The first step for any solution is to mitigate the damage caused; a neo-republican, egalitarian system might adopt several plausible options. The first is to ensure that amour-propre and similar selfish desires that conflict with egalitarian socialisation still have every ability to find that their own position is a beneficial one. Often, such selfish desires come with a fallacy of judgement along the lines of those thwarted by Rawls’ original position. Rawls’ original position was designed to ensure an individual could make no assumptions about where they would end up. When confronted with a sharp hierarchy, it would be a mistake to assume one would end up on top. Yet this is precisely what such desires assume; “surely, *I* would be better off under capitalism”. One who has made this mistake may argue that the PPM society rewards risk, but this is rarely plausible. They may argue for responsibility, desert, etc, and for the benefit of allowing people to accomplish their own

rewards, but a simple assessment of probabilities indicates a reliance on luck or a hopelessly distorted world view. It would be extremely foolish to bet on achieving any social position at the top end of today's pyramidal capitalist society, given the sheer improbability involved.

The egalitarian socialisation can thus meet this head-on, whether in schools or the workplace, by outlining how mistaken such beliefs are historically. The self-interested can thus be persuaded to adopt the system as beneficial for themselves, as much as others. By accepting this and continuing to adopt the forms of such socialisation, they may grow closer to the ideal, consciously or unconsciously. This will not always be the case, but it seems plausible that the numbers would be sufficient for the thesis' purposes.

While external influences may be combated with censorship, restrictions on immigration and emigration, and simple xenophobia, these are all thoroughly unacceptable to neo-republicanism, due to the imposition of uncontrolled interference (censorship), acute social vulnerability (xenophobia) or both (emigration restrictions)¹⁷⁷. They do much to remove both voice and exit. A more acceptable method is to build neo-republican values into the very framework of the society. An example of this can be found in the United States' constitution. Over time, the document has gathered almost religious significance, despite it being no more than part of an 18th century effort to create a semi-democratic republic. By venerating republican principles as aspirations for day to day life, by defending them as the foundation for the society as a whole, they become more entrenched and less malleable, aiding in preserving them against conflicting socialisation. Against this, one might question the value of a constitution that cannot change, especially given the anachronism of relying on a document centuries in age. This can be answered by reference to Pettit's dual-aspect model of democracy and contestatory change (Pettit 2012, 252-279); over time, the citizenry will be

¹⁷⁷ Immigration restrictions are less objectionable, but could still be used as a tool to supplement the other purposes and, in this capacity, would be equally concerning.

able to exercise an editorial control, shifting the exact balance of norms, but while maintaining a dedication to certain core principles. In this case, social duty maximisation.

Lastly, one might ask how conflicting socialisation will generally manifest in the egalitarian system. If socialisation towards neo-republican, egalitarian social norms fails to produce general adherence, many responses are possible. Countercultures, political groups and parties, etc, are problematic but not necessarily crippling to society. Crime, on the other hand, both threatens Carens' prerequisite of generally obeyed laws and damages the social fabric and the norms themselves over time. In particular, parasitical behaviour, such as fraud, theft and tax evasion¹⁷⁸ are encouraged by PPM-based socialisation towards personal profit at any cost. White collar crime of this kind is generally not treated severely in the western world, with punishments that frequently fail to outweigh the benefits of committing these crimes (Reiman 2004, 65-81, Sutherland 1945, 135-139). The egalitarian system should, to pre-empt these problems, introduce much harsher penalties. When they are considered in light of the damage such crimes do to norms of cooperation, trust, and civility, such punishment may seem more proportionate.

The second criticism rejects Carens' sanguine attitude towards more intense socialisation in the first place, with a strong rejection and a weak rejection. On the account of the strong rejection, the pursuit of socialisation on a societal scale – even if it engendered republican civic virtues, social duty maximisation, benevolence towards fellow human beings, etc – is worryingly totalitarian, harkening back to Berlin's critique of non-domination. While maintaining decentralised socialisation, there may also be a centralised initiative towards the egalitarian system within schools, workplaces, media, etc. This is quite different from an intense, but organic, socialisation in the PPM system. Although one may promote various different kinds of beliefs and social norms as a private

178 In the egalitarian system, this could be accomplished by failing to report profits accurately.

individual or group, this is quite different from a government or corporate entity doing so; much the same difference as between dominium and imperium. Such an approach contrasts with a republican doctrine that seeks to lead by example and inculcates such virtues within a campaign of high civic engagement (Pettit 2012, 224-227).

The weaker rejection suggests that the intensity of socialisation, while not necessitating brainwashing or authoritarian methods, may easily defer to them, and is incompatible with non-domination. Much of the literature on socialisation and the malleability of human psychology offers tempting prospects to those of an authoritarian bent. Thus, it is feasible that a slow progress towards a “properly” socialised egalitarian society would prompt an abuse of power. More urgently, socialisation of this kind may effectively damage discursive control, as individual beliefs are encouraged to conform. The cloying nature of social disesteem for speaking up already discourages voicing unpalatable beliefs¹⁷⁹. How much more so in the egalitarian system?

This is compounded by a further concern about social elites. Firstly, having protested the power of economic stratification and hierarchy, it seems reasonable to be concerned with the prospect of entrepreneurs and politicians etc establishing a social hierarchy, encouraging obedience and adherence to the status quo¹⁸⁰. Secondly, in order to maintain adequate socialisation over time, it may be that policy makers and those in positions of authority are demanded, unofficially (intense peer pressure and/or nepotism) or officially (via required education before service¹⁸¹, a requirement

179 It is worth noting that Pettit and Brennan consider this objection in some detail (Economy of Esteem, section 13) and find it unpersuasive, precisely because one can socialise for autonomy, and in some instances, even turn the intangible hand on itself. They use the example of an individual “coming out” and forcing a reassessment of their esteem.

180 This is separate but related to the problem of elites earlier, where the concern was their potential to form a new sort of class structure

181 To allay a misunderstanding here, this would not be some hellish process of re-education and brainwashing. This would simply be – for example – mandatory classes examining historical economic patterns, the deprivation and inequality endemic to modern capitalism, etc. It would need to be entirely compatible with discursive control; a comparison might be to one required to formally educate themselves on a matter being debated before they could contribute to the debate. Provided the bar for such education is low, and no particular adherence to norms, opinions about the facts

of party loyalty, etc) to embody and conform to the socialisation. Even if these actions might not *directly* threaten their autonomy or result in the exclusion of dissenting viewpoints, they fetter discursive control.

One potential response is to cling hard to the consequentialism embodied in Pettit's writings – even if the socialisation (and education, etc) is harmful to non-domination as a principle, stifles democratic discourse and so on, it is a worthwhile project nonetheless. Because it aids in preventing many of the truly horrible problems endemic to modern society, including those which are equally toxic to non-domination, for example, the purchase of political influence, it is still worth pursuing. This only works for the weaker rejection, however, as the stronger makes a claim for the utter incompatibility of republicanism and socialisation.

A more palatable solution is likely to emphasise the point of the egalitarian system: human liberty, which includes autonomy, ie the freedom of thought, opinion and conscience. Part of the socialisation should include engagement and vigilance as Pettit and other republicans outline. If the egalitarian system is to succeed, it should be able to withstand the criticism and concerns levied against it, from inside and out. Totalitarianism can be averted by decentralising the socialisation and combining it with an encouragement of scepticism and cautious optimism – trust but verify, to borrow a phrase. This still remains quite consequentialist in character; instilling a healthy distrust of authority, by an authority, is certainly open to a charge of hypocrisy.¹⁸²

If more intense socialisation is needed, especially amongst the “elites” of Carens system who must be capable of rallying to its defence, and one has no desire to restrict such privileged position solely

presented, etc, this is compatible with discursive control. Considering Pettit himself outlines a system of civic education and norm-holding as an ideal (Pettit 1997, Pettit 2012), this should equally be compatible with republican democratic requirements and policy.

¹⁸² It's worth considering Rawls' comments on stability in *The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus* (Rawls 2003, 170-172), wherein he outlines that a liberal conception ought to gain not merely practical stability but the stability won by reasoning citizens who hold disparate, conflicting views. It will be well-ordered if it averts “unreasonable comprehensive doctrines”. And the socialisation offered here will allow for disparate views while averting the latter. See also Rawls 1993, 140-144.

to those who are most dedicated, *and* the prospect of a selective, elite group engaging in peer pressure to conform is decidedly anathema to republican principles – all of which seem to be true – then the only other option is by enormous societal pressure from the masses below. If politicians act against social norms and lie, or if public servants become corrupt, they must be savaged in the court of public opinion. This would force them to rectify their behaviour, or at least justify it; thus winnowing out the selfish by imposing socialisation from the bottom up, not the top down¹⁸³.

For public opinion to hold the elite accountable, however, the majority must believe in neo-republican social norms and the spirit of the egalitarian system. This may not be the case at the beginning; even a devout believer in the power of the egalitarian system would not have been socialised in the same way as one born to such a project a century in. It is too dangerous to rely solely on the elite leading by example for socialisation. Thus, the conundrum remains: how to socialise the egalitarian system when attempting to inculcate certain values by schooling disrespects the discursive control of the pupils. Partially, this can be answered by making no specific demands for obedience to these norms and facts, merely understanding them. Partially, it can be answered via consequentialism. The tension and potential dangers remain, and the thesis can only answer that they necessitate further debate on where and how to draw the line. As with the vanguard party, the thesis will err on the side of some risk, if this will ensure that the present and ongoing threats to autonomy are dealt with.

Deviancy is best considered as an objection to Carens' points of "general" obedience to laws, the "general" support of elites, etc, but also to the socialisation process. He discusses deviancy in some detail. Carens points out there is considerable deviance in the PPM system – very few people are

183 And of course, it may be promptly pointed out this relies on a tyranny of the majority. But this exerts no direction, no thought control, except from the greater masses of the people; it is certainly not totalitarian if their persecution extends solely to voting them out of office

solely motivated by acquiring income for consumption, and some actively resist it, but the system still works. Deviancy up to a certain point hinders, but does not stop, society functioning “as intended”. Even extreme deviancy and nonconformity is, to Carens’ mind, only a problem in the egalitarian system to the same extent as in the PPM one. This applies only to motivation on income consumption/social duty maximisation; “with regard to the equal distribution of income, the egalitarian system could not afford to tolerate any significant range of behaviour, because this would compromise the basic nature of the system” (Carens 1981, 129-136). His solution partially involves the use and motivation of elites, discussed earlier, and partially more socialisation and commitment to the social norms involved. Because of the sensitivity of their nature, these norms would need to be enforced “through formal laws...and formal sanctions of criminal procedure” (Carens 1981, 136-137).

Carens may be overly optimistic at this point. Formal laws and criminal sanctions require suitable social norms to back them up, or they risk being seen as impractical, illegitimate, and tyrannical; extreme deviancy may in turn become more common and thus more problematic. This is all the more problematic if deviancy arises from group identity and behaviours (Akers et al 1979, 636-640, 644-651). Deviancy as regards equal distribution directly threatens such norms; the solution Carens proposes to curb deviancy requires them to be in place before the socialisation. This is impractical, to say the least.

The problem of extreme deviancy is most evident when considering individuals who are not merely dissatisfied by the egalitarian system, but are actively opposed to it. Selfishness and amour-propre can be mitigated; what of those who are simply malicious? Carens’ point on “general” obedience aside, consider those who Altemeyer describes as “social dominators”; cruel, status-obsessed, and aggressive (Altemeyer 2006, 161-173). Consider those with anti-social personality disorder;

consider the small but influential numbers of entrepreneurs who have most to gain from the PPM system.

This leads directly to dissatisfaction with equal shares; those who resent labouring on behalf of the common good are hardly apt to view their share as adequate. Indeed, they may be more likely to ascribe disproportionate value to their own labour, and feel that this system cheats them. Likewise, any pretence of adherence to social norms is just that – a pretence. Initially, those who lost out entirely in the transition to the egalitarian system may present less extreme cases of deviancy which nonetheless are more severe than mere conflicting socialisation. As Cohen notes, there exists a class of people for whom an egalitarian redistribution can offer nothing, and who will only concede to it via coercion¹⁸⁴ (Cohen 2011, 156-157)

These individuals will pay no heed towards the greater social good, nor towards equal distribution. They are the classic “free riders”. Their numbers may be small, but they will be disproportionately influential, either due to lingering social status and the “allure” of having once been great, or through their innate willingness to cheat and disregard social norms to get ahead. The expression “one bad apple spoils the bunch” is appropriate here; the effects of even a single deviant against social duty maximisation may act so as to drag others down with him, especially if the deviancy is successful and is not – immediately- accompanied by any retribution. Retribution could, of course, take the form of law, but could also be the acquisition of a bad reputation, social disesteem, etc.

Managing such deviance is an expanding field, and being primarily a matter of sociology and psychology, is not one the thesis is equipped to discuss in detail. The exact response will, however, depend enormously on the reasons for deviancy; does deviancy arise because of group identity, or

184 While sceptical, Cohen allows for this to be non-violent coercion, e.g.: by a general strike.

perhaps because of a discrepancy between personal goals and the norms espoused by society? The answer will inform the egalitarian system's response. A general note, however, is that deviants mostly thrive on their general acceptability by the wider "group" or society as a whole. Persecution will not necessarily remove them, especially if it sways public sympathy in their favour through being regarded as heavy handed, or unfair. If it is emphasised, as with white-collar crime, that the deviants are harmful, selfish, and offer society nothing while attempting to take everything – with no regard for social duty – their status might be diminished, and public sympathy lost.

In conclusion, the kind of motivational transformation that Carens wishes to enact is plausible, as a goal. It does not require authoritarian methods to implement, being widely decentralised, but it does require political support and widespread "dispersal" to prove effective. The major problem it faces is managing the individuals for whom socialisation is utterly ineffective or unwelcome. Modern society operates with deviancy, but deviancy is less harmful to it; it is admittedly unclear exactly how dangerous such deviancy would be to the egalitarian system, or how it might be combated in full.

Section Two – Socialisation and Civic Virtue

Civic virtue has been mentioned throughout the thesis, although usually in a minor context. It is worth examining in further detail before the thesis is concluded. Without such an examination, erroneous assumptions may be made about what constitutes civic virtue for republicans; one might even conclude that republicanism was tied to some sort of virtue ethics. One must also consider its interaction with socialisation and social duty maximisation; presumably a required “civic virtue” would be altruism, at least towards fellow citizens. This section will thus begin with Pettit’s account of civic virtue, to be contrasted with other republican scholars like Skinner, Lovett and Laborde. A further discussion of the socialist and Marxist perspective will follow. It will then consider how neo-republican civic virtue might work in the light of the need for Carens’ socialisation.

Pettit discusses civic virtue extensively in *Republicanism*, but some refinement of his thought can be found in *On the People’s Terms* and *Just Freedom*. In *Republicanism*, he calls it “civility” - “socially established norms that give an added salience and security and lustre to those areas (that are proofed against interference)” (Pettit 1997, 245-246). Civility is of extreme value to any republican state, for three major reasons. Firstly, it “buttresses” laws and public order, giving a reason for laws to be observed that is not out of mere fear of punishment or a sense of shame – it has a sense of legitimacy, not unlike the vertical democratic legitimacy established in chapter two. It gives greater moral weight to authority. Secondly, civility smooths out tensions between differing groups. Any state will contain “different groupings and different interests”, and civility between these groups enables the acceptance of differing perspectives and overall fair treatment of

these different interests, to the point that non-members might still support an interest which does not represent their own selfish concerns in the slightest. They instead act because of a “norm requiring concern for the common good...not just a politics of difference, but a politics of common concern”. (Pettit 1997, 246-248). Thirdly, civility is necessary for vigilance and the pursuit of criminals. If there is a general sentiment that “everyone does it”, or that the law favours particular interests (and thus if not part of those interests, one is disadvantaged), then the republican state may fracture. Driving out corruption is an endless battle for republicanism, but one that must be fought¹⁸⁵.

Pettit calls for another side to his virtue, however: trust, “in particular personal trust”. In a society such as Pettit envisages, individuals rely on adherence to social norms; they allow for public officials to act in the interests of all, they “treat other citizens with the same confident reliance, being prepared to accept reliance even when they are exposed and vulnerable: even when they have to trust the testimony or advice of relative strangers”. He acknowledges the discrepancy between trust and the suspicion towards corruption and crime, and the still greater discrepancy between this acceptance of vulnerability and the need to prevent domination from its exploitation. This is more so in the neo-republican thesis, given the prospect of systemic corruption and systemic domination recurring.

185 Pettit considers briefly if republicans should require a “restless citizenry” or if it is sufficient to respond to corruption as it arises, with overwhelming force (Pettit 1997, 248). Given the need for greater awareness the egalitarian system necessitates, the former is probably the more coherent view. There must always be an unwillingness to accept selfishness, especially on the part of public officials.

Pettit argues that such differences are not irreconcilable; he returns to the notion of the intangible hand as a solution for advancing both civility and trust. For civility, the intangible hand reinforces and promotes social norms of a certain benevolent character. It is plausible that one might offer greater esteem towards someone with an unswervingly just attitude. For trust, he refers to “the cunning of trust”, in a vague appeal to the well-known psychological factoid that asking for a favour from someone makes them better disposed towards you, and to another that individuals live up to the expectations others place upon them. By signalling that you think that the other individual is acting in accordance with social norms and is therefore trustworthy, Pettit suggests that you will encourage them to be trustworthy.

Such trust is unlikely to be so easily established; even so, Pettit remains committed to the idea of patterns of behaviour (Pettit 2014, 58-60). Even if a few individuals contradict said patterns, social norms reinforce them – and the rewards for behaving in accordance with them. Socialisation from Carens could therefore benefit from and enhance this process.

Other modern republicans take a similar line to Pettit. Maynor notes that “the principles of non-domination can become ordinary functions of modern life” - much as with socialisation towards maximising social duty, a decentralisation of virtue is a possibility, and the practice of one encourages the other (Maynor 2003, 200). Costa argues that Pettit does not go far enough in his proposals, and argues for a moral education and the inculcation of a “virtuous citizen” who embraces civic virtues that support non-

domination and the functioning of society (Costa 2009, 411-415). In developing socialisation via Carens, the thesis allows for Costa's arguments. Lovett compares the discussion on civility and civic virtue as not unlike Rawlsian discussions on stability, with an emphasis on establishing good practice that enables mistakes to be corrected internally, or be prevented from arising at all (Lovett 2013, 2, 10-17).

Skinner's approach differs from Laborde and Pettit because he makes use primarily of the historical republican tradition, examining the "Italian Atlantic" (Pocock 1975) historical literature which gives examples of civility and trust in practice. In particular, Skinner touches on Machiavelli, who in the *Discourses on Titus Levy* offers extensive practical advice, despite his reputation as an authoritarian apologist thanks to *The Prince*. Skinner notes that "(republican) communities are well adapted to attaining glory and greatness" because – citing Machiavelli - "it is not the pursuit of individual good but of the common good that makes cities great, and it is beyond doubt that the common good is never considered except in republics." (Skinner 1998, 61-62).

Machiavelli more directly comments on this in a way similar to Pettit's discussion of "dissensus" - republics are strong not just because of their institutions and the common good, but because their quarrelling forces laws and regulations which appeal to all. More pressingly, he suggests that corruption develops when individuals are excluded from political discourse (Maynor 2003, 24-30), which in turn mainly occurs when private interests and indeed self-interest triumph over the common good. As noted in chapter three, the collapse is thus locked in a feedback loop; self-interest and a loss of virtue

creates corruption and exclusion, which creates and rewards more self-interest and punishes virtue, leading to its loss. It is vitally important that this not be allowed to occur.

Should we then encourage discord for its own sake? Not necessarily – some disagreements are essentially irreconcilable¹⁸⁶ and a free state which is unprepared for the turmoil accompanying such disagreements is vulnerable to societal unrest or a desire for security over free debate, which all too easily leads to authoritarianism. For a society to thrive, it must have institutions in place to deal with these disputes, and more importantly, to end or bypass such irreconcilable disagreements. Machiavelli's solution was patriotism; the value of the republic had to override everything else. Such a nationalistic view is unlikely to succeed; it fails to account for the complexity and atomisation of modern life, and could be encouraged towards national enmities, which may be equally destructive. A solution will be found in socialist thought, to which the thesis turns shortly.

Skinner does make it clear that virtue and liberty are not identical in the historical tradition (Skinner 1998, 74) but that the historical republican theory of freedom – in contrast to the liberal strands, which he associates with thinkers like Paley – can only achieve the interplay of virtue and liberty inside a free state. A state will only be free to the extent it allows for participation and representation and encourages individuals to be independent. No-one who may be dependent upon another's goodwill can truly be free.

A brief digression: this may put one in mind of Rousseau's republicanism and his pursuit of the civic good, but Pettit directly rejects this. He states in *Just Freedom*: "Rousseau's

186 Notably, the struggle between classes.

vision would have appeared to celebrate a form of dependency...at odds with a vision of freedom as non-domination. The Rousseauvian version of republican thought might be better described as communitarian in character.” (Pettit 2014, 12). The Italian-Atlantic definition of the common good is more of an enlightened self-interest; by preserving the republic as a whole, each individual is freed from the prospect of tyranny, and may otherwise do as he wishes. While this critique may be somewhat unfair to Rousseau, it still emphasises the distinctive distaste for *subservience* that runs through republicanism. It is precisely this kind of subservience, too, which is toxic to virtue; as Pettit takes pains to outline, if I am dependent upon another’s goodwill, and yet can manage to avoid uncontrolled interference by acceding to their wishes, my liberty is still infringed. Because I must act or be a certain way to avoid trouble, developing civility, trust, independence and pride, etc, are all curtailed as well.

Virtue, in the republican sense, is thus highly important and inextricably tied with its sense of liberty. Only with virtue can liberty be appropriately prized; only as free individuals can virtue be properly cultivated. Civic virtue has been less emphasised in socialist and Marxist thought, but there are still suggestions of it. Much has been made of the ideal of a motivated and enlightened working class, who are more capable and “worthy” than the parasitic bourgeois class.

Marx himself does little to specify how individuals *should* behave. A large part of his and Engels’ writings, however, speak of the free and cultivated man; a man who is not alienated nor a slave to the division of labour, but who can truly realise all of his talents and abilities (Marxism.org – Virtue, Marx 2007, 42-43, 54). This has a certain

resemblance with the free citizen of Machiavelli and Skinner's writings. Also noteworthy is a line from Marx in one of the manuscripts, where he notes that "Association, society and conversation, which again has association as its end, are enough for them; the brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them, but a fact of life," (Marx 1844, Human Requirements), in contrast to the alienated state he describes elsewhere in the text: human beings are brought below animals, turned into machines, "submerged in Avarice".

The idea of virtue in Marx, then, dwells less with civility and trust, and more with solidarity – by working for the common good, the good of each individual can be better achieved. Is this a return to Rousseau, to dependency? Again, not necessarily. Marx remains focused on the individual's needs and ability. It is not contradictory to suggest that by coming together in the cause of liberty, the liberty of each can be preserved; nothing is more republican. It is by adopting this solidarity in response to disagreements that a more appropriate solution than Machiavelli's *patria* can be found. With solidarity of this sort, it is possible to conceive of one's existence as naturally entangled with all others, in a symbiotic and ultimately beneficial relationship, if we view one another not as competitors, but as common citizens and partners. This will most certainly aid in establishing the civility and trust Pettit espouses.

While Machiavelli and to an extent, Pettit, focuses on laws and institutions, socialism focuses on the individuals in question, just as the neo-republican thesis challenged Rawls on his focus on procedure and the system. In this case, individual disagreements and personal interests remain buried, as each agrees the best way to serve themselves is to

cooperate, to identify themselves as more successful together than apart, in the face of adversity. This adversity need not be predicated on class antagonisms, either, as this would give the solidarity a built in expiration date, fatally undermining it. Rather, it is the adversity of life – scarce resources, sickness, and natural disasters.

Would this virtuous solidarity be compatible with the republican tradition? It seems reasonable that it would foster the active and dedicated citizenry that is so prized. By the same measure, it would also encourage a communitarian approach quite different from the Italian-Atlantic tradition, one closer to Rousseau. It could encourage an atmosphere of conformity in accordance with social norms. Pettit addresses this in part via a short discussion in *Republicanism* (Pettit 1997, 251). Here he considers that an active and indeed zealously spirited citizenry may be necessary to punish certain offences, such as environmental pollution. Presumably, the possibility of going too far in this zeal is considered, and accepted, as part of the overall consequentialist ethos.

In terms of civic virtue and political discourse, Carens' theory stands in opposition neither to republicanism nor socialism, and could allow for just such an active and engaged citizenry through socialisation. The polyarchal character of government he offers would be as enriched by civility and trust, solidarity and charity, as any others would be, and kept in check via contestation. The proposed socialisation could promote republican and socialist virtues to be embraced, and the decentralised process is amenable to Pettit's social norms. Moreover, the decentralisation aids in averting republican fears of overreach. While Carens makes no reference to virtues, social norms, etc, as

republicans do, he notes briefly that societies (and individuals) may hold many different and inconsistent values¹⁸⁷ (Carens 1981, 172-174), not unlike the tension between trust and vigilance that Pettit mentions. Indeed, as all societies grow organically; it is impossible to expect one to maintain a flawlessly harmonious set of values, let alone identity, over an extended period.

So long as solidarity is maintained, however, this tension may be, if not curbed, then lessened. Personal and political solidarity feed into one another. For the egalitarian system to thrive, and a diverse republican state which cannot otherwise establish solidarity¹⁸⁸. to do likewise, the most effective solution is to embrace such an inculcation as a point of policy, over and above that of Carens' decentralised socialisation. This could conceivably be done via the promotion of laws and regulations to encourage solidarity and to discourage disregard for others.

To allay fears about overreach, such regulations should not be punitive but instead provide social rewards and satisfaction, or open up the possibility of actions – as the Good Samaritan laws do – which might not always be permissible. In the egalitarian society as described, for example, the giving of gifts requires some regulation, to avert just the sorts of problems Cohen foresaw with Rawls. It is conceivable that these could be relaxed in accordance with good conduct.

187 A useful example he gives to explain this is a society's contradictory needs for change and stability.

188 There is a great deal of literature, little of which the thesis has space to do justice to: Putnam's writings on ethnic tensions, Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship, etc

Comparison might be drawn between this and the PRC's "social credit system"

(xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/27/c_133443776.htm), which has otherwise been roundly condemned as a means of authoritarian control. True, the social credit system has three flaws: it can also be used for punitive measures, it involves mass surveillance, and it is being enacted by a one-party state which is decidedly less than democratic¹⁸⁹, a state of affairs equally common in Amazon's treatment of its workers (Philips and Rozworski 2019, 84-99). Absent these elements, such a system would encourage cooperation if nothing else; it does not seem *inherently* totalitarian, but clearly should not be imposed from the top down, whether by government or corporation. One potential concern might be that it would further encourage the abuse of favour/esteem trading (Pettit & Brennan 2004, 72-73, 217-219) and social esteem as an establishment of hierarchy, as previously discussed.

Against this, the thesis presents two points. Firstly, the system is to be based upon the demonstration of solidarity, both personal and political, and to reward individuals in ways that ideally encourage further virtuous behaviour. This does not negate such risks, but reduces their likelihood. To be discovered favour/esteem trading would bring disgrace and scandal, at the least, whilst establishing an anti-hierarchical ideal – and an altruistic, “we’re all in this together” mentality – will blunt the power of a social hierarchy.

Secondly, the arguments on behalf of Carens' use of esteem are equally valid here.

189 Tangentially, such scoring is already practised by financial, rental and other industries (<http://www.datascienceassn.org/sites/default/files/The%20Scored%20Society%20-%20Due%20Process%20for%20Automated%20Predictions.pdf>) If this is equally objectionable, then republicanism has a great deal to object to, particularly regarding “Big data”.

To conclude, the republican project of civic virtue is compatible, if not perfectly so, with socialist ideals. Carens' socialisation project provides an additional way to inculcate these virtues, as opposed to the patterns of political life and reciprocity on which Pettit relies. An active and engaged citizenry, which is fully committed to the socialist principle of solidarity and support for all, yet simultaneously in support of republican debate and discourse, is likely to be a vital part of any neo-republican state, and aids in both forming and maintaining the egalitarian system.

Section Three – Utopianism and Realism

The last matter before the thesis moves to concluding remarks is that of utopianism versus realism. To again define these, utopian theories seek to establish a grand change in human behaviour and politics, while realism focuses on the here and now – the “limits of the possible”, as it were. Utopians focus on how human beings may be brought to be better; realists believe human beings are flawed and must be worked with as they are (Nicholson 1998, 65-67). The subtitle of Carens’ book betrays it – utopian market theory. Indeed, much of the thesis may have seemed utopian in character; the condemnation of modern market conditions and corporate power is predicated as much on the potential for a better system as it is on their general awfulness. This may be seen as contradicting the core sources of criticism. Pettit makes the point of dealing with people as they are, and not as they could be. Socialism does have certain utopian strands, but in the Marxist tradition – which has been called upon heavily – there is at least a claim towards a scientific methodology, towards analysing and assessing the real forces of human nature and market functions. One may adopt a certain scepticism on this point, given that it is elsewhere contradicted by Marx’s own insistence on the transformatory nature of human emancipation (Marx 2007, 92-94). It is still the ideal, whereas Carens focuses on a social-duty maximisation that currently exists haphazardly, if at all. As Mencius and Rousseau note, only the most inhuman would feel nothing if they saw a child in harm’s way (Rousseau 1998, 74, Liu 2006, 73-74). This is not enough to guarantee more complex reactions, however. While the psychological requirements have been thoroughly justified, those requirements say little as to how we get from a PPM market system, to one which is based on social duty maximisation.

The thesis must therefore address this. The first way by which this can be done is to argue that Carens is not so utopian after all; much as with the argument about whether or not his work counts as market socialism, it is plausible to say that Carens' scepticism about the prospects of his own arguments may not be justified. This is not the case with his political doctrine; he deliberately gives no guidance as to how to create such a state as he envisions. The thesis will, however, argue that Carens' psychological and organisational arrangements are not in themselves utopian, and require a redirection, rather than a transformation, of human nature.

The second way is to question the "realist" credentials of Pettit and Marx. While the latter is, as mentioned, much more susceptible to such an attack, Pettit's own guidance towards political reform is equally difficult to apply usefully. In particular, his constitutional and legislative requirements, along with his need for democratic legitimacy, are almost impossible without a revolution of some kind. This is being generous, and taking the countries, such as the United States, which lie closest to his needs, as viable models.

The intention of these two strands of arguments is thus to show that Carens is hardly alone in having a utopian, or at the very least presently impractical, need for specific politico-economic institutions and organisational principles. At the same time, however, these principles are achievable, if unlikely, in real world conditions as we find them now.

Carens himself stresses that he wishes to address a realistic utopia, and that his utopia pales in comparison to that promised by “the traditional egalitarian socialist vision” (Carens 1981, 178-179, 185). Many of the problems of the old order of capitalism may remain, or at least have the potential to do so; one need only recall the challenge of exploitation and alienation levied in chapter four, section three. The very idea of a “realistic utopia” may seem a contradiction, however

Perhaps by way of contrast, Carens talks explicitly about the experiences of Cuba, China and others in attempting to create societies based upon altruistic motivations. He also allows for the prospect that the egalitarian system could be amended to be compatible with a needs-based distribution (Carens 1981, 184-187) closer to traditional socialism’s approach to distributive justice, as opposed to the simpler equal shared distribution that he embraces and which is compatible with Pettit’s loose material equality.

The failure of such models is admitted squarely by Carens, but at the same time, he argues that all such nations were attempting to change their economies rapidly, in an equally rapid period of cultural and social change, and in the face of immense short-run economic costs¹⁹⁰ (Carens 1981, 164-170), after which he again declines to offer a blueprint as to how his system might be established.

From another perspective, there is little to indicate that Carens’ logical and empirical prerequisites cannot be achieved when the egalitarian system has arisen and socialisation

¹⁹⁰ Aided neither by both countries’ severe lack of industrialisation and a true bourgeois class, thus being the countries least likely to attain communism, according to Marx. Likewise, the economic sanctions placed upon Cuba cannot be forgotten, nor can the devastation wrought by the Japanese upon China in World War II.

is ongoing. The system, as outlined and with neo-republican amendments, requires a great deal of work, but nothing that seems impossible to achieve: a reworking of bureaucracy and character alike. The difficulty is that of generating the egalitarian system in the first place, which he concedes and then ignores. The thesis has outlined a way by which the egalitarian state might be established, despite the presence of corporate power and hostile socio-political forces. It would be an error for the thesis to assert that this was guaranteed; a vanguard party leading to a mass movement, through education and agitation rather than by directing and ruling, has many points on which it might fail - but it is a possibility.

As for his psychological theory, Carens again has a harder time establishing such socialisation than he does in justifying it. The primary requirement for his theory to work is that individuals are capable of obeying laws which do not personally profit them¹⁹¹ capable of being motivated by social duty, and have mental plasticity. This has already been advocated extensively and is not an unachievable state; it seems to resemble reality far more than the coldly rational *homo-economicus*.

Carens' unwillingness to argue for a specific mechanism to establish the egalitarian system does not mean the egalitarian system is unattainable. To tie his utopian vision to any particular state would diminish the rhetorical effect of his arguments, becoming entangled in minutiae and empirical disagreement. The thesis, however, is concerned with the threat to non-domination posed by corporate power in modern liberal or social

¹⁹¹ And in the case of elites, supporting a system contrary to one which would be massively more beneficial for them, personally. This has historically taken great fortitude, but is not impossible.

democratic states that one is normally apt of to think of as “free”; thus the difficulty of establishing the egalitarian state must be faced.

Despite that difficulty, it is worthwhile, as only a few alternatives to the egalitarian system suggest they will be able to deal with corporate power. Most prospects are palliative, or delay and frustrate the implementation and concentration of that power. Those alternative solutions lack practical benefits that the egalitarian system entails. Universal basic income is incomplete and does not address corporate power. Marketisation and rights of exit, as Taylor outlines, simply do not work. Workplace democracy is again incomplete. A fully-fledged property owning democracy, with neo-republican amendments, comes the closest. This still lacks a proper commitment to strict material equality, and lacks the explicit socialisation of Carens, however.

One disadvantage that of the egalitarian system, although this is a potential problem for many egalitarian proposals, is that it requires a relatively strong economic base and the clout to address threats caused by globalisation. It is an unfortunate point of practicality that prohibits the establishment of such a society amongst those nations which could most benefit from it – one may think of the still struggling states of the “global south”, lacking in economic and political resources. This is not insurmountable, though. Unification into new countries is a possibility, and one which may even be desirable, in forming a nation-state based upon ideology rather than ethnicity, as with the United States of America.

Despite such concerns, a neo-republican socialism – based on explicitly democratic principles and strict material equality following Carens – is a worthwhile blueprint, and one which is eminently achievable. While Pettit might argue that Carens’ system would not survive corruption (Pettit 2017 B, 340), marrying his economic proposals with Pettit’s contestatory theorising should aid in correcting this.

This brings us to realism. Marx will be discussed first, followed by Pettit. Marx’s determination to make use of a “scientific socialism”, supported by many of his intellectual descendants, has rightfully been questioned. Arguing against utopian socialist moralism, much of his condemnation of capitalism is normative in character. Most tellingly, the inexorable progress of historical materialism ends in a very nebulous note of the state “withering on the vine” and true communism arising from socialism almost spontaneously.

For the purposes of the thesis, a lengthy critique is unnecessary. It is enough to outline certain major areas in which Marx is politically utopian. One example, which resonates with Carens, is in the impracticality of the command economy. Marx, without the benefit of experience, supposed that the rational allocation of resources by mandate and planning would be effective. Very obviously to the modern reader, he was wrong about this in almost every respect.¹⁹² For a command economy as Marx envisaged it to function, economics or human psychology would have to be up-ended. In this, Carens is decidedly

192 Notwithstanding the arguments regarding planning under modern capitalism (Chang, Galbraith, Anderson etc)

more realistic, for the system on which he bases his utopia is one that has been tried and tested.¹⁹³

Similarly, Marx, for all his distaste towards erratic predictions of future events and philosophical musings on political theory, was not incapable of latching onto singular events and extrapolating the immediate transformation of society from them. This happened in 1848, and again in 1871 with the Paris Commune. The Bolsheviks assumed that the October revolution would transform the world; more modern Marxists have pointed to similar alternatives. Eagleton notes that Marxism “has traditionally set its face against utopia, (it is) not because it rejects the idea of a radically transfigured society, but because it rejects the assumption that such a society could be, so to speak, simply parachuted into the present...If a transformed future is not in this sense anchored in the present, it quickly becomes a fetish.” (Eagleton 2000, 34). The appearance of utopianism in Marx’s work is therefore more of an overly ambitious optimism. It bears little resemblance to the whimsical utopian socialism that Marx attacked for a lack of consideration and attendance to practical reality. Carens only falls into the latter category because he does not attempt to outline how the egalitarian system could be created, and does not sufficiently develop its political structures. Neo-republicanism helps to provide an answer to both.

Yet Marx also commits the same error as Carens in insufficiently detailing how this transformation might be accomplished. Noteworthy ambiguities like the “dictatorship of

¹⁹³ This is unlike the labour theory of value, where Marx was equally wrong on the economics, but not utopian; he goes to a great deal of effort to ground his work and refer back to Smith, Ricardo, etc. The command economy was utopian precisely due to its detachment from reality.

the proletariat” aside, his theory of historical materialism claims that capitalist tensions and their accompanying crises will inevitably destroy capitalism as a system (Winternitz 1949). The proletariat will rise up and create a strong socialist state, which will later “wither away”. There is almost no detail on this process. Perhaps Marx felt so confident in this victory that little detail was needed, or perhaps he felt that, as one who was so rooted in the economic determinism of capitalist society, he could not outline the steps to move from socialism to true communism. It is hard to tell, precisely because of that lack of detail. Again, this challenges the “realist” credentials of Marx and Engels’ writing.

Marx, as a political and economic theorist, clearly intended on a “scientific”, empirical methodology that would not be swayed even by his own normative critique of capitalism. The historical materialism and material dialectic were, supposedly, simply the natural and inexorable progress of capitalism. Yet the necessity of revolution, of “class consciousness” (Lukacs 1920 S1-S3) and the obscurity and clearly enormous difficulty of achieving the end-state he so desired – a classless society of abundance and production – renders his thinking more utopian than he believed. That is not to say that it is wrong, merely that Carens and he are not so far apart in scope.

What of Pettit? In *Just Freedom*, Pettit is highly dismissive of more “radical” egalitarian proposals, believing his policies of insurance and insulation are readily attainable as a political program. He gives requirements for a state to be democratically legitimate, outlined throughout his work and especially in the dual-aspect model in *On the People’s Terms*, and he again argues that these are readily implementable and take individual

human beings as they are. And he makes the very realist claim that a stateless existence is impossible (Pettit 2014, 117). Moreover, he defines republicanism as realist, and argues for, indeed, anti-utopianism (Pettit 2017 B, 339-341).

Pettit asks for egalitarian taxation, a “sustainable natural environment”, social, medical, judicial and financial security, independence through minimising “exposure to possible abuse” and preventing domestic dependence. He favours regulation and protection from unchecked unions and workers, as well as employers and corporate interests, yet with severe limits on the penalties the criminal justice system can inflict, despite its (hopeful) robustness and far-reaching capabilities. He also suggests corporate entities should be tried as persons under said criminal justice (Pettit 2014, 104-106).

As noted, this is not terribly different in intent from Rawls’ property owning democracy, but Pettit gives very little indication as to how his proposals be achieved in practice. To be fair to Pettit, he offers them as proposals of policy, rather than actions to be achieved as rapidly as possible, and the flexibility of this approach was praised in chapter two. Yet two points strike the author as decidedly utopian. First, although Pettit’s requirements are not onerous and do not mandate a particularly demanding pattern of distribution, they would still necessitate sweeping changes even in democracies closest to his ideal. Such radical transformations do not tend to spontaneously arise; if Carens is to be criticised for his inability to articulate the transition between PPM and egalitarian systems, so too must Pettit be criticised on like grounds. Consider the United States, which hews to many (constitution, contestatory resources, bicameral legislature) of Pettit’s democratic

requirements, but also has “shortfalls and offenses of egregious proportions” (Pettit 2014, 149). Changing it to allow for greater influence from the citizenry, and what form that should take¹⁹⁴ are thorny questions.

Second, Pettit’s requirements work in part at cross purposes. The most obvious clash is in his limits on criminal justice, despite the need to wield that justice effectively against powerful recidivists, such as large transnational corporations. This problem is not insurmountable, but it seems bizarre to claim to “take men as they are” and yet hamstring efforts to curb their worst impulses via legislation (Pettit 2014, 97-98, 101, 106). This is assuming Pettit does not intend a widespread effort to inculcate social norms, as Carens does. Were he to do so, however, the project would need justification – which republican theory is readily equipped to provide – and a practical outline for achieving it, which Pettit does not provide. There seems to be a great need to reform and implement policy. None of Pettit’s proposals (Pettit 2014, 104-106) are unrealistic in the sense of *impractical*; many are unrealistic in the sense that modern society would need drastic reform; there seems to be a definite strand of not taking institutions, as opposed to humans, as they are.

A secondary point towards realism is that Pettit, unlike Marxist socialism and Carens, demands virtue but no great transformation of human psychology and motivation. He purports to take humans as they really are, and still extract virtue and democracy from them. The others may need something new; he argues he does not. While Carens does not, as noted above, make demands that are unrealistic, Pettit’s ideas vis-à-vis social

194 For example, the electoral college and its attendant controversies.

recognition make very few psychological demands, more matters of policy (Pettit & Brennan 2004, 279-294).

Against this, Pettit still relies heavily upon established social norms, and is aided by their cultivation. Their presence may not be strictly necessary for the neo-republican state to thrive, but the norms he invokes – civility, trust, etc – are increasingly absent in modern politics and modern political discourse. This absence may be lethal to a developing republican state, because there is no ability to offer a government trust when it demonstrates ever-increasing unworthiness of it. He gives little indication on how to correct this, and it seems unlikely short of direct revolution or a great transformation of character – not unlike Carens.

The most notable argument for Pettit's lapse into utopianism is his section of political ontology; Pettit outlines that the will of the constituted people - "an agent that emerges under the norm-imposing control of its constituting members" - is undominating because it "is formed on the basis of interaction...materialising under the direction of the norms they endorse". Pettit suggests that individuals may challenge these norms and the government they affect before they are implemented; "things going well, it is pre-tested case by case for whether it is suitably controlled and non-arbitrary" (Pettit 2012, 290).

He follows this by arguing that "the will of the constituted people may look similar to Rousseau's general will...but there need not be any will that is common to the constituting people, as we saw, let alone a will to which they might subject government.

All that may be in common is a network of norms that people impose on government as the unintended consequence of pursuing influence” (Pettit 2012, 291).

This not only seems far too swift in denying the resemblance to Rousseau, who Pettit adamantly insists is not the same kind of republican, but it seems extraordinarily optimistic. There is nothing about these statements that guarantees that these norms will be good norms, or that this constituted will, shall be properly representative of the people in question. There is certainly no guarantee of republican virtue or effective influence, and this supposes that there are not distortions. Pettit admits that his vision is “optimistic”, and “will only materialise under quite demanding conditions” (Pettit 2012, 279). But given the modern political state, with all of the problems raised by Streeck, and the difficulties of standing up to the global market as a whole, one might say that Pettit’s constituting will is naïve. There will certainly be external influences on government that the people cannot control, especially in a “debt state”. And how a debt state is to transition into a responsive, norm-conditioned, influence-driven democracy is not something Pettit answers in his writings.

Consider also the problems of elected politicians, private lobbies, and unelected authorities with influence over government (Pettit 2012, 232-238). For Pettit, this is but theory – how can we prevent these things from taking root? In the real world, of course, they have already taken root, and deeply. It is unfair to expect Pettit to offer a comprehensive list of how he intends to get rid of these entrenched problems, but equally, he claims that “the political institutions would require many amendments in even the

best-practice democracies today; but they would not be so distant from current arrangements as to seem utterly infeasible or utopian” (Pettit 2012, 239).

It is precisely this point the thesis challenges. Pettit’s view is inconsistent, offering realism on the one hand and optimism on the other; he offers up a vision of the modern world and of dual-aspect democracy that in no way exists. It does not mean that it is impossible for Pettit’s state to be brought into existence; it does not mean that norms of a republican kind could not be inculcated, both into the people and into the state. It does mean that he drastically underestimates the scale of the changes, the resistance of established interests, and the difficulty of institutional amendment without undertaking a similarly revolutionary approach as a socialist economy or the socialisation processes Carens offers. If the measure of the political realist is, as Pettit himself argues, that they look for institutions that are “feasible” and “reliably sustained” (Pettit 2017 B, 340), then each of the philosophers named here has lapsed. Pettit is admittedly more grounded in the political world as it stands than either Marx or Carens. The distance is not as great as might be assumed, however. It is certainly not sufficient to render their ideas incompatible by the measure of utopianism.

Conclusion

Republicanism must ensure freedom as discursive control and autonomy alike. But to do this, greater safeguards and more focus on socio-economic equality is necessary. By utilising Carens' egalitarian system, and by embracing the social-egalitarian and Marxist critiques, it is possible to ensure a strict material equality that adequately protects republican liberty. Such neo-republican safeguards would include social control of the means of production, elimination of media monopolies, and equal consumption shares, while preserving the strong contestatory tradition, democratic methodology and civic virtue that republicans invoke. It is clear that a market with insufficient regulation is of great threat to non-domination. The solution of the thesis passes a great deal of power into the hands of governments. Some, like Taylor, would be sceptical of this. It is not the only solution, and there are various ways it might be adapted, perhaps to incorporate Rawls' ideas further than the thesis presents. Pettit's listed amendments in *Just Freedom* are insufficient, and his democratic requirements necessitate further protection against a distortion of the contestatory, "dual-aspect" democracy he envisages. The argument of the thesis risks further harm, in search of a more comprehensive end to the problem. When sufficiently corrupted, it may be that a democratic state will require revolutionary activity to function once more. And to call for such a revolution is very much within both the socialist and republican strands that this thesis has called upon.

There are some things that cannot be concluded, however, due to lack of space or evidence. It cannot be concluded, for example, that this is the best solution possible; it may be, but it has yet to be tested. It still has substantial flaws over the republican or socialist ideals, as inequalities of social status and the level of socialisation required allow for domination and some degree of alienation. Suitably regulated, the egalitarian society's government's interference should not be of an arbitrary nature, but the strength of it may yet be counter-intuitive. Due to insufficient space to do justice to

the topic, immigration has mostly been glossed over, as have irrational prejudices like racism, sexism, etc. Were the thesis' proposals to be put into practice, these would need to be addressed. Lastly, there may remain scepticism about the stability of the egalitarian system, as there is with market socialism. It cannot be concluded either way, but the Yugoslavian experience suggests that it may require a solid economic base to begin with. There is also little space on the international demands of the egalitarian state, as one might find in Rawls' *Law of Peoples* (or Pettit's works, for that matter).

It is also worth noting that socialism and republicanism are not incompatible, nor are they incompatible with the social egalitarianism of Schuppert, etc. While the presentation of neo-republicanism, as opposed to Pettit, is explicitly egalitarian and anti-capitalist, this does not override the efforts of republican theory to enshrine freedom first and foremost. Rather, it indicates that the best way to secure that freedom is via a more collectivist and socialised approach than Pettit and other authors have thus far accepted. So long as there remains a robust network of norms and ironclad legal and political support for the democratic requirements Pettit envisages, even quite extensive interference will remain appropriately controlled in character. The extent to which this is required and how it is best done would be worthy of consideration. One area where debate and experimentation might be useful is in the procedural vs individual dichotomy between Rawls and Pettit, explored in chapter four. While the thesis offers theoretical arguments against Rawls, his focus on system and limited personal interference may prove necessary for the egalitarian system in practice. Again, this is an empirical question the thesis cannot answer.

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